

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NATO Denies Contemplating Nuclear Cuts

PM2803151590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "They Do Not Intend To Make Cuts"]

[Text] Brussels, 27 Mar—The member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance are not examining the question of a 50-percent reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe, which number about 4000 warheads at the present time. This was reported by UPI citing a statement by the official NATO spokesman in Brussels. Thus he rejected the recent report by AFP which claimed that this prospect was examined at a conference of NATO experts held 15-16 March in the Belgian capital.

The NATO spokesman specified that there it was merely a question of how the attainment of an accord at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe could influence the future of the bloc's nuclear forces on the continent.

The study of this question continues, but it is a not a question of any specific proposals regarding a reduction of the North Atlantic Alliance's nuclear stocks in Europe, the NATO spokesman stressed.

Krasnoyarsk Radar Destruction Proves Costly

90WC0055A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 90 p 9

[Article by Yuriy Kornilov: "Taking a Hammer to a Secret Project"]

[Text] Here is a fact that is somewhat unusual for our times, in which cost accounting and profit are becoming increasingly important: One ministry, the USSR Ministry of Defense, is proposing something different—writing off a former "major secret military installation" and dismantling its main section and using the rest for its own needs. The communications people are naturally interested: What kind of an "installation" is it? They are traveling deep into Siberia and being shown an enormously high multistory building in the form of a concrete structure shaped somewhat like an Indian wigwam. There are no good roads leading to this installations and the nearest city, Krasnoyarsk, is a hundred versts away. Of course, it is theoretically possible when dismantling these "wigwams" to convert some of them into, say, a radio center, but surely this would cost a pretty penny?... The communications people felt faint when they did the calculations, and they concluded that no, they really could not accept such an unexpected "gift."

What we are talking about is the Krasnoyarsk radar (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has already written on this subject in issue No. 4, 199—ed).

For many years the very fact of the existence of the radar served for many political figures and the press in the West, first and foremost the American, as a reason for publicly accusing our country of violating the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. The argument was used actively not only by those who really were concerned about observance of this treaty but also by those who were trying to find a pretext for justifying their aggressive plans to realize the American SDI program and spread the myth of the "Soviet military threat."

Time passed and the situation in the world changed for the better. And the more actively this process developed the more obvious it became that fierce polemic and mutual accusations are not the best form of diplomacy, and that the existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar was a clear and moreover serious obstacle on the path of strengthening mutual trust. Our diplomats faced a choice: Either admit the reality or make the progress already clearly achieved in the matter of disarmament the victim of earlier miscalculations. And then a correct and courageous, although I think somewhat belated, decision was made in Moscow— namely to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. As is known, an appropriate statement was issued in September 1989 at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Wyoming.

This statement, understood and accepted by the Soviet and international public, swept away the ground from under the feet of those circles in the United States who would have liked to slow the positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations and prevent results in the negotiations between Moscow and Washington on reducing the most powerful and threatening weapons—strategic offensive arms—by 50 percent. It gave our country the legal and moral right to demand full clarity in the question of American radars in Greenland and England. Recently, in February, agreement was reached regarding a visit to those radars by Soviet experts, who were to establish whether or not their operation is in violation of the treaty.

This is, in brief, the history of the issue. But to say only this would not be to say everything. Speaking at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 23 October 1989, E. Shevardnadze noted that having closed the subject of the Krasnoyarsk radar we were thus "saving the ABM Treaty and opening the road to the conclusion of agreements on strategic arms." "Nevertheless," he continued, "we must be interested in what led those who decided to build the Krasnoyarsk station, which cost several hundred million rubles. It will also cost money, and transportation and people, to dismantle it. Once again politics revolves about its economic aspect and its financial consequences. Once again we are convinced that ill-considered decisions are costly."

"Ill-considered decisions"; that is putting it mildly. For the essence of the thing was clear even in the early seventies when preparations were under way for the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. The American side at that time put forward the thesis that made clear that large phased-array radar could potentially be used for the purposes of ABM defense and that consequently limits should be imposed on the deployment of

such radar on the territories of the two sides. The USSR agreed with this postulation of the question and an appropriate agreement was reached and recorded in one of the joint documents (the so-called "declaration 'f'"), which is an inseparable and integral part of the ABM Treaty signed in 1972. Taking this into account, was it necessary specially to "consider and weigh" things in order to understand that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation of this treaty?

The statement by E. Shervardnazde cited above was made, as has already been said, at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and it was expected that the deputies present at the session would then receive an answer to the issue raised by the minister. But now here we are already nearing the end of the third session of the Supreme Soviet but neither the Ministry of Defense nor the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security has responded to the statement made by the foreign minister. Why? Have other matters overwhelmed it?

The story of the Krasnoyarsk radar is now coming to an end because, as is known, no civilian departments that might have wanted to use part of this installation for their own purposes have been found. Just one item remains on the agenda, namely, dismantlement. "And the issue will be closed," they told me with satisfaction in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Closed?

Has the old scheme been repeated once again, for the nth time?: The political harm to the country is obvious, as are the material losses from writing off millions of rubles, and still no one is to blame?...

Gerasimov Rejects Reports on Yazov 'Statement'

LD2903131990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1237 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 29 Mar (TASS)—A representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry today characterized as "erroneous" a report by REUTER to the effect that USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, while in Paris, supposedly said that "journalists wishing to know about events in Lithuania can go there."

On the basis of that statement, which is ascribed to Yazov, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Soviet Information Directorate, noted at a briefing here that certain foreign journalists hastened to draw the conclusion that there are differences between the positions of the Defense Ministry and the USSR Foreign Ministry with regard to allowing journalists into Lithuania (last Monday TASS reported that Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Information Directorate, announced at a briefing "the temporary halt to entry" into Lithuanian territory for all foreign citizens).

Commenting on the REUTER report on the "statement" by the USSR defense minister, Gennadiy Gerasimov said: "We decided to get to the bottom of this matter and telephoned the military attache's office at the USSR Embassy in Paris. There they reported to us that Dmitriy Yazov had not made any kind of statements about possibilities for foreign citizens to visit Lithuania. This is verified by a tape recording which is at the attache's office."

Official Cited on Domestic, International Issues

AU2903120090 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 29 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Oleg Peresipkin, rector of the Soviet Diplomatic Academy, by Heide Korn in Vienna; date not given: "The Soviet Union Will Not Dissolve"]

[Text] Vienna—In the course of their opening up, East Europe countries are looking for closer contacts with West Europe—and vice versa—also at the unofficial diplomatic level. As DER STANDARD reported, Austria is preparing a special training course for East European diplomats to be held at the Diplomatic Academy in the autumn. This week the institute invited Oleg Peresipkin, rector of the Soviet Diplomatic Academy, to Vienna, where the professor of Oriental Studies held a seminar on the Middle East and a lecture on Soviet foreign policy. Peresipkin spent many years in Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, and subsequently was also ambassador to Libya. DER STANDARD journalist Heide Korn talked with Oleg Peresipkin.

[Korn] How do you, as an expert on the Middle East, assess the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel?

[Peresipkin] This is really a big problem for the region. But we in the Soviet Union are of the view that, in the spirit of human rights, every citizen must have the right to emigrate. The problem develops in Israel itself because the government there settles the emigrants in the occupied territories. And these are Arab territories.

[Korn] And why do the Jews leave the Soviet Union in the first place?

[Peresipkin] In particular probably for economic reasons, then in order to reunite their families, and some people claim because of anti-Semitism. But I do not think that there is a significant amount of anti-Semitism, at least not among the people.

[Korn] For some days the central government has showed its muscles in a worrying way in Lithuania. Is Gorbachev risking a civil war?

[Peresipkin] No, I do not think so. Gorbachev has always stressed that the national problems must be solved by negotiations and that the use of the Army is out of the question. If he were to act differently now, I would not understand this. Because, in line with human rights, the Lithuanians have the right to secede from the Soviet Union if they so wish.

[Korn] Is the Soviet Union on the point of dissolving?

[Peresipkin] No, I think that despite all problems the Soviet Union will continue to exist because these problems are normal. So far they have just been swept under the rug and now they emerge because everyone can do what he wants. However, we will have to change the treaties between the individual republics. We are already in the process of intensive decentralization. The Moscow headquarters of the Foreign Ministry, for instance, has transferred a number of powers to the foreign ministries of the republics. These are now permitted to send their own delegations to Europe or to the United States.

[Korn] But is it not true that many things proceed too slowly despite Grobachev's promises?

[Peresipkin] Yes, parliament has harshly criticized Gorbachev because of this.

[Korn] Nevertheless, it has granted him an unusual amount of power....

[Peresipkin] Yes, after weighing the pros and the cons I have arrived at the conviction that the Soviet Union needs a "strong man." Gorbachev has great authority and his opinion is listened to. Apart from this, there is the Presidential Council at his side, which supports him in enforcing his goals. In a year's time the judgment will probably be more optimistic.

[Korn] Are you afraid of Germany's unification?

[Peresipkin] No, because all peoples have the right to self-determination. But unification must be coordinated with the process of European unification in terms of time. And, above all, Germany must become neutral.

[Korn] You want a neutral Germany, and Germany is in the EC. Why should Austria then have to remain outside?

[Peresipkin] In my view, the Austrians themselves have to decide this. If they think that EC membership will improve their living conditions, they should become a member. So far, they have done quite well with neutrality.

Data on Foreign Workers in USSR Viewed

90UF0004A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 12, 24-30 Mar p 6

[Report on interview with V. Buynovskiy, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent I. Morzharetto: "'Are We Being Helped by Foreign Countries?'"]

[Text] In recent months ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and other publications have carried a number of articles on a hitherto "closed" subject—the problems of foreign workers in the USSR and their relations with the local population. They are complex. Our correspondent I. Morzharetto met with V. Buynovskiy, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Morzharetto] Viktor Mikhaylovich, when and on whose initiative did the attraction of foreign workers to the USSR begin?

[Buynovskiy] This first occurred in the mid-1970's. The extensive nature of the economy and the neglected socio-demographic situation in our country required an immediate search for additional sources of labor resources. In turn, there were problems in the socialist countries also. So the attraction of specialists for work in the USSR, for the accomplishment of joint economic assignments particularly, was of mutual interest.

Citizens of Bulgaria, for example, participated in the installation on USSR territory of facilities of ferrous metallurgy and the oil and gas industry as well as those of a social and cultural purpose. The regular intake of Vietnamese citizens for occupational training and work at enterprises and in organizations of the USSR began as of the end of the 1970's. Bulgarian, Korean, and Cuban workers were invited for the joint development of forest resources. And in the last two years, in connection with our enterprises being accorded independence, including in the sphere of foreign economic activity, direct production and scientific and technical relations between Soviet and foreign firms have enjoyed development. Specifically, they provide for the enlistment of foreign citizens in work in the USSR, but on a contract basis now.

The economic, legal, and organizational principles of foreign citizens' work in the USSR have been recorded in the appropriate intergovernmental agreements. These international documents were signed by the ministries and departments of all parties and then approved by the governments.

[Morzharetto] Has the experience of other countries which encountered such problems earlier, France or the FRG, for example, been studied?

[Buynovskiy] No, the experience of these countries specifically has not been studied. But we familiarized ourselves with the experience of the organization of the work of foreign citizens in the socialist countries—the GDR and Bulgaria—and all our agreements have been put together according to their example.

[Morzharetto] How many foreign workers are working currently at the country's enterprises? In which sectors and regions?

[Buynovskiy] Approximately 200,000 persons from 11 socialist countries are working at industrial enterprises and in organizations and at construction projects. Most—82,000—are Vietnamese. They are deployed most widely on the territory of the USSR: at 350 enterprises and in organizations of 25 ministries: light and textile and automotive industry, mechanical engineering and construction industry. Some 74 krays and oblasts of six union republics of our country—the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—are playing host to Vietnamese youth. Workers and specialists from the DPRK, the PRC, Bulgaria, and Cuba work at forestry engineering complexes in the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast. The remaining foreign citizens have come to the USSR recently and in accordance with direct relations to enterprises and organizations of the Far East.

[Morzharetto] How beneficial is to bring in foreign workers, from the economic viewpoint?

[Buynovskiy] There are pluses and minuses here, of course. For example, the participation of foreign citizens in the work of the forestry engineering complexes makes it possible to increase considerably the procurement and processing of timber in the undeveloped areas of the USSR, where there is an acute manpower shortage. At the same time, of course, more attention will subsequently have to be paid to the environment, accounting for felled timber and the foreign citizens' living conditions and activity.

The term of the Soviet-Vietnamese intergovernmental agreement of 1981 expires this year. Experience shows that the accepted form of cooperation is profitable to both parties. The outlays of Soviet enterprises and organizations connected with the settlement and the vocational instruction (including language training) and advanced training of the Vietnamese workers are recouped within 1.5-2 years. The men, however, work in the USSR for six years, the women, four years.

[Morzharetto] And from the political viewpoint?

[Buynovskiy] Problems causing a certain social tension in connection with the presence of foreign citizens in the USSR have arisen in recent years.

Why does this Vietnamese come to work in the USSR, why is he standing eight hours at the production line? To spend all he has earned on food? After all, he does not have the right to take the money out. No, in order to buy with the money goods which are unobtainable in Vietnam. And whereas five years ago the sight of a Vietnamese carrying heaps of saucepans or flatirons out of a store elicited only a condescending smile, now, at a time of general scarcity, it is stirring in our citizens indignation. Nor is the speculation which is prevalent among foreign workers contributing to a strengthening of friendship.

[Morzharetto] Would it not be better to use the current manpower surplus in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus for the same purpose?

[Buynovskiy] Studies show that, given certain conditions, up to two million citizens of employable age could additionally be enlisted in social production. In the capital, in which approximately 3,000 foreigners work, up to 50,000 Muscovites are, according to some estimates, permanently out of work. But they do not go to enterprises where there is idle capacity, they do not care for the conditions. Young men and women from the southern republics do not go after difficult, dirty, and low-paying work with the prospect of waiting many years for housing (the indigenous Central Asian population is generally distinguished by low mobility). The enlistment of our "own" people requires far greater capital investments than the invitation of workers from abroad.

[Morzharetto] The scale of the enlistment of foreign workers is expanding, consequently?

[Buynovskiy] No, it will be cut back: Because of the unhappiness of part of our population and because the prestige abroad of travel to work in the USSR is declining—after all, there is nothing to buy for the money which is earned. And whereas 20,000 Vietnamese workers used to come here annually, this year there will be approximately 4,000.

The contract form of cooperation between Soviet and foreign enterprises will continue. It corresponds to the principles of financial autonomy and self-financing and independence. Manpower imports will be regulated by the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems with the aid of licenses.

United States & Canada

Bush Reaffirms Adherence to Stance on Lithuania

LD2903114390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 29 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] U.S. President George Bush stated at a meeting with leaders of Congress and with four congressmen who recently returned from a trip to Lithuania, that his administration will adhere to the already-known stance with regard to the events in Lithuania, and has no intention, by any hasty or poorly thought-out statements or actions, of complicating what is, for both sides, already a difficult situation, both inside and around the republic. A number of top Republican figures in Congress have appealed to the White House to make more resolute or, as they put it, aggressive measures with regard to the events in Lithuania. However, the U.S. President, reiterating that Washington has never recognized the annaxation of Lithuania to the Soviet Union, stated, nevertheless, that the United States, I quote, has a strong and consistent policy based on appeals for dialogue, and wants a peaceful settlement.

Bogachev Assesses Pine Bluff CW Project

LD2803163690 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Notwithstanding pressure from the Pentagon, two American companies—Mobay Corporation and Occidental Chemical—refused to sell the U.S. Army 160,000 tonnes of thionyl chloride, a component to produce binary chemical weapons.

According to THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper, if the U.S. Army does not get the required component by early next June, it will be unable to commission a factory to make binary ammunition in Pine Bluff (Arkansas) and to seek 47 million dollars from Congress for a chemical rearmament programme.

The Pentagon is now trying to place an order for thionyl chloride with other American companies. Should it fail, it will look for foreign suppliers, a U.S. Defence Department spokesman said.

The sensational step taken by the two American companies, which cared more for their reputation than for money, will undoubtedly shake world stereotypes about U.S. military business. But there is also a different, less reassuring aspect.

During the Soviet-American Mediterranean summit, President George Bush promised not to block efforts to end the production of binary weapons. After the summit, the Soviet side appraised Bush's stand on chemical weapons as having "new, very important elements that warrant hope for headway in the process". George Bush's statement during the election campaign also sounded reassuring. Bush said that if he was elected to the presidency and if he was remembered for something then it would be the full and universal prohibition of chemical weapons.

Many U.S. politicians supposed that the provisions for an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction could be agreed upon in time for the next Soviet-American summit, scheduled for June.

And now it turns out that the Pentagon plans to accomplish a different goal by the middle of next year—to commission a factory in Pine Bluff to produce the first million binary chemical ammunition.

One would like to believe that the Pentagon's actions, on the threshold of the next Soviet-American summit meeting, are underway without the U.S. President's sanction.

At the international Paris conference last year the Soviet Union urged all states that produce chemical weapons, have resumed their production or intend to develop chemical weapons feel responsible before the world community and to stop their actions. They would thereby help rid the world of these barbarous weapons of mass destruction.

There are now real possibilities for the complete and universal prohibition of chemical weapons. This historical chance should not be missed.

Reportage on Visit by U.S. Senator Kennedy

Legislators, Kennedy on Lithuania

LD2803171490 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—Prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations, the situation in Lithuania, and the functioning of Soviet and U.S. foreign policy structures were discussed today during a meeting between members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, who is visiting Moscow.

Greeting the American lawmaker, Committee Chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov stressed that Soviet legislators intend to promote the steady development of Soviet-American relations.

Speaking of the U.S. Senate's resolution on Lithuania, he noted that it "contains rather disquieting phrases which did not leave us indifferent". Dzasokhov told Kennedy that his committee intends "to respond to this statement in the spirit of mutual propriety".

The committee chairman noted that, as Soviet-American relations are filled with new constructive content, the

sides should treat the constitutional provisions of each country with greater respect.

Kennedy called assurances given by President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze concerning a peace settlement of Lithuanian problems as very encouraging.

The senator said that the American side hopes that all existing differences will be examined and settled by all the sides in a serious and constructive manner.

He noted that President Gorbachev intimated that that would be the case. Kennedy added that he had no doubts about the president's position.

The senator stressed that over the past five years Gorbachev managed to resolve several knotty and contradictory problems peacefully.

Kennedy Addresses Peace Committee

LD2803172190 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov:

U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, currently visiting the Soviet Union, favoured further progress in control over conventional and nuclear weapons. He spoke today at a meeting in the Soviet Peace Committee.

The senator stressed that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty should be finalised as soon as possible so that talks on even deeper reductions can begin.

He also called on the USSR and the United States to redouble efforts to reach a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear arms tests. "We must rid ourselves forever of the threat of Star Wars in the heavens, and nuclear arms." Kennedy said.

Noting the progress expressed by the USSR in human rights and emigration, the senator expressed hope for movement towards lifting restrictions on trade between the USSR and the United States if the present processes continue.

At the same time he expressed concern over "limitations on direct flights from Moscow to Israel".

Kennedy expressed satisfaction with the results of his Soviet trip. He was greatly impressed by President Gorbachev's desire to come to grips with problems between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as his desire to tackle difficult domestic problems.

IZVESTIYA Interviews Kennedy

PM2803141590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Senator E. Kennedy by IZVESTIYA correspondent I. Ivanko: "Senator Kennedy: 'The United States Is Ready To Help You'"]

[Text] The eminent U.S. politician Sen. Edward Kennedy is visiting Moscow. This is not his first visit to our country; the senator's interest in the Soviet Union goes back to the early seventies. His constructive role in the development of our relations also determined the level at which he was received—the very highest level. On 26 March a meeting took place between M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Edward Kennedy. The next day the senator agreed to answer your IZVESTIYA correspondent's questions.

[Ivanko] Senator, how do you view the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Kennedy] I visited the USSR in 1974, 1978, and 1986—in those days there was still no open dialogue or contacts between the two countries' leaders. Our relations then were dominated by tension fueled by the arms race. The atmosphere is completely different now—there is direct contact between the USSR and U.S. leaders and foreign policy department chiefs. Definite progress has been achieved in the arms control sphere, particularly on strategic arms. And I hope that the USSR-U.S. rapprochement that is in evidence will enable our governments to work even more fruitfully for the good of our peoples and cooperate in the solution of problems in other regions, too: in promoting the settlement of regional conflicts, struggling jointly for a clean environment, and helping the starving millions. Times are completely different...

[Ivanko] The Soviet-U.S. summit is drawing near. What do you think will be the main questions discussed there?

[Kennedy] I hope that a strategic offensive arms reduction treaty will be signed at the forthcoming meeting and that we shall begin moving forward in the preparation of new accords—SNV [strategic offensive armaments]-2. I think that conventional arms reduction will also be discussed. The programs that President Bush spoke about in Malta, in particular those concerning the development of trade links and the USSR's possible participation as an observer in GATT, will be given substance as will other commercial questions, whose solution will receive particular impetus when the USSR gives legislative form to its emigration policy.

We understand that the USSR is now reorganizing its entire economic mechanism—this is a complex period for many Soviet families, roughly like the one in our country in the early thirties after we carried out an economic restructuring there. And the United States is ready to help you to create new opportunities for Soviet people.

[Ivanko] The U.S. Congress is now worried by the situation shaping up around Lithuania. What can you tell us on that score?

[Kennedy] President Bush has urged the sides to resolve their problems by peaceful means. I support that view, as I believe do all Americans. The President of the USSR has assured me that force will not be used unless there is

a threat to people's lives. As I understood it, President Gorbachev is trying to resolve this problem by peaceful means within the framework of the USSR Constitution. I believe what he says. I hope that is how it will be.

[Ivanko] How do you view the changes taking place recently in the countries of Eastern Europe?

[Kennedy] Everyone understands that the economy of those countries will be substantially restructured. Poland has already begun actively pursuing economic reforms. The West is observing them, and there is interest in the expansion of trade ties. I think that initially there are bound to be uncertainties. Restructuring is always difficult—it needs a strong, prestigious authority, particularly in the Soviet Union, and I am sure that Gorbachev will manage to resolve the problems facing him. Many people in the United States want to help you in a constructive spirit. Although the problems must be resolved by the peoples of the USSR themselves, we are ready to assist them in various areas.

[Ivanko] Senator, how do you view the prospect of the unification of the two German states?

[Kennedy] As someone who lost a brother in World War II, I understand Soviet people's concern at the forthcoming unification of the two Germanys. I think that the appearance of a united Germany is inevitable and, since NATO in recent years has been a constructive force in Europe safeguarding peace, East Germany's participation in NATO in any form would benefit Europe. In the future, new security systems will be elaborated. These potential structures are being studied in the United States, the USSR, and other countries. The main thing is security and stability in Europe, and it is in that context that I see the future united Germany.

Crowe Cited on Gorbachev's Arms Control Views

LD2803150390 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] New York March 28 TASS—The Soviet Union resolutely supports signing an agreement with the United States on strategic arms limitation, Admiral William Crowe, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said here after he returned from his nine-day visit to the Soviet Union, where he met Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Crowe said the Soviet Union was very interested in signing the agreement. His meeting with President Gorbachev focused on arms control problems.

According to Crowe, Gorbachev made it clear that he was a staunch supporter of the agreement, which could, in his and President Bush's opinion, ensure considerable progress in this field this year. At the same time there are problems, and the Soviet Union approaches them very seriously.

Speaking about his impressions of the visit, Crowe said that great openness and a wide spectrum of opinions were characteristic of Soviet society. This was particularly obvious during lively discussions on the future of Lithuania, the admiral said.

Crowe said he spoke with people of various professions—from servicemen to farmers—and many seemed to oppose Lithuania's secession. The problem has yet to be resolved, Crowe said.

Soviet-U.S. Talks on Asia, Pacific Reported

PM2903132990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Consultations in Paris"]

[Text] Routine Soviet-U.S. consultations on problems concerning the situation in the Asian-Pacific region were held in Paris. The prospects of achieving an all-embracing political settlement in Cambodia, the situation in Korea, and some other aspects of military-political detente in that part of the world were discussed in particular.

Taking part in the consultations were USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev on the Soviet side, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Solomon on the U.S. side.

Article Examines Role of U.S. Spy Satellites

PM2703084590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by I. Panarin: "Spy's Space Rendezvous; Why U.S. Intelligence Is Interested in Our Telephone Conversations"]

[Text] Soviet television viewers recently watched the details of the launch of the reusable U.S. space ship "Atlantis." Here, behind the intriguing reports of the repeated delays of the launch caused by technical malfunctions, the illness of the crew commander, or the strong wind in the space ship launch and landing region, the main content of the events taking place remained virtually in the shade, to wit: the launching of the sophisticated 17-tonne spy satellite. In recent days this flight has again been the focus of attention by the mass media. It has become known that in connection with serious malfunctions in the satellite's on-board systems its transfer to calculated orbit proved impossible and the control center ordered it to be destroyed. In covering these events emphasis is being placed on the possible consequences of fragments of the "failed spy" falling to earth. But compared even with the fragments of the spy satellite literally raining down on people's heads the schemes for which the attempt was made to launch it present a considerably greater danger. It is well known that a substantial proportion of flights by reusable space ships have been reserved by the Pentagon for military purposes and primarily for the launch of spy satellites. The recent flight by the space ship "Atlantis" was distinguished from previous flights by the fact that with its aid it was planned to put into orbit an "ultra-modern"

spy satellite costing $1 billion to collect intelligence about the Soviet Union. The Western press notes that the satellite was fitted with sophisticated equipment and could monitor about 80 percent of the Soviet Union's territory including listening in on the air waves. Above our territory there are already about 40 spy satellites of which approximately six satellites constantly intercept information from radio, tropospheric, satellite, and other communications lines. With the launching of the new satellite there was a real increase in the threat to our communications. In the next few years it is proposed to launch about 30 more similar satellites. All this is evidence that the principles of the new political thinking have so far only feebly affected U.S. intelligence. As has already been reported in our press, President G. Bush signed a secret supplement to the U.S. draft budget providing for an increase in funds for the needs of the intelligence services. A considerable proportion of these funds will go on the further improvement of spy satellites, including those carrying out signals intelligence over Soviet territory. These satellites, like a giant vacuum cleaner, "suck in" and transmit for processing in the United States all information transmitted along communications lines including telephone conversations, the telegraph correspondence of enterprises and individuals, computer data, telemetric signals, and other similar information.

According to repeated statements by competent representatives of the KGB, telephone conversations in the Soviet Union are not bugged, there is a relevant constitutional guarantee. The only exceptions are in very rare cases connected with major state crimes. But this constitutional right of Soviet citizens to a private life is being constantly violated by the U.S. special services which, with the aid of spy satellites and other signals intelligence means, monitor official and private telephone conversations and telegraph correspondence conducted along communications lines.

Touching on the value of the "private" information intercepted, one U.S. intelligence leader noted that here, among other announcements about all kinds of things including money transfers, professions of love, and birthday greetings, it is possible to encounter information of an official and production nature and this information is therefore also subjected to analysis. During the interception and analysis of this information various files are created on Soviet political, military, scientific, and other figures of interest to the U.S. special services. Recently the special services of the enemy [protivnik] have begun to display increasing interest in economic information, which, according to CIA Director Webster, "has never before been of such great importance." The Western press notes that spy satellites and U.S. intelligence ground posts are increasingly geared to bugging international commercial communications lines as a result of which U.S. signals intelligence is "witnessing" many commercial deals and can show up "bottlenecks" in the development of the economy of many countries, including the Soviet Union, and use this for U.S. interests. Thus, for instance, it is known from the press that the U.S. National Security Agency received big dividends while bugging the communications lines of foreign gas and oil companies in the Near East and financial and trade organizations in West Europe and Japan and passing this information on to interested U.S. firms. Obviously this must be taken into account by the leaders of our Soviet foreign trade enterprises, organizations, and cooperatives, since the same threat arises to our commercial secrets if they are transmitted on unprotected communications lines.

It will not be superfluous to mention here that the U.S. side, while often accusing the USSR of manic secrecy, is itself toughening its secrecy measures. The U.S. Government, special services, corporations, and firms have in recent years implemented a series of additional measures to improve the standard of protection of information in the state, military, economic, and scientific and technical fields. Thus, in 1985-1990 the Americans spent about $4 billion just on the protection of their communications lines.

So, in looking at the excited, smiling faces of the U.S. astronauts setting off for the launch and feeling legitimate pride in the new achievements of human intelligence, we should not forget either the aims of these flights, which are far from being general human aims.

China

Reportage on CPC Delegation Visit to Ukraine

Delegates Take Tour

PM2803142790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Guests of the Ukraine"]

[Text] Kiev, 27 Mar—A CPC Central Committee delegation headed by Wang Renzhi, member of the CPC Central Committee and head of the CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department, has toured the Ukraine.

The guests were received at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. They were informed about the sociopolitical situation in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

The PRC party officials visited the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies, where they inquired about the new electoral system and the results of the elections of Ukrainian people's deputies and the local soviet elections. They also had a meeting at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute—a branch of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute.

Great changes have occurred in both the USSR and the PRC since M.S. Gorbachev's visit to China last year. But

the delegation head pointed out that it is an immutable fact that we are trying to strengthen relations between our parties. Our parties and states need mutual deepening of mutual understanding and support. This plays a very important role in the further development of Chinese-Soviet relations.

The guests looked around an exhibition at the Kiev branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum and visited the "Ukrainian Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 Museum" memorial complex. The delegation members were acquainted in Pereyaslav-Khmelnitskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast with new forms and methods of organizational and ideological-political work within local party organizations in conditions of democratization and glasnost.

Meetings, Discussions Held

LD2803175990 Kiev in Ukrainian to Europe 1700 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] A delegation of the Communist Party of China Central Committee is visiting our republic. The guests have had meetings in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, visited the Central Electoral Commission for elections of people's deputies of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the institute of party history attached to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. They were informed about the sociopolitical situation in the republic, about the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Medvedev Talks With Renzhi

LD2903092690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Mar (TASS)—Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting today with Wang Renzhi, member of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, who is heading a delegation of Chinese Communist Party workers.

Vadim Medvedev spoke of the main areas of the CPSU's political and ideological work at the present stage of perestroyka, of the efforts to consolidate the healthy forces of society on the platform of humane, democratic socialism. The importance of renewing society as a whole and the party itself was stressed. A decisive role in this should be played by the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress.

Wang Renzhi reported on the sociopolitical development in the PRC, shared his impressions of the delegation's stay in the USSR, wished the CPSU and Soviet people successful advancement along the path of perestroyka, and noted the importance of stability in the Soviet Union not only for the peoples of the USSR but also for China.

During the conversation, satisfaction was expressed with the onward development of Soviet-Chinese relations in various areas. The ties between the CPSU and the CPC are becoming a useful channel for the exchange of experience and for deepening mutual understanding.

Aleksandr Kapto, member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the Ideology Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and Yu Hongliang, ambassador of the PRC to the USSR, took part in the meeting.

Northeast Asia

ROK's Kim Yong-sam Concludes Visit to USSR

LD2803093390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Video report by correspondent V. Baturov, identified by caption; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Kim Yong-sam, the eminent politician from South Korea, cochairman of the current ruling Democratic Liberal Party, has ended his visit to our country.

[Baturov] To hear the guest from Seoul talking, many things in Moscow were of interest to him. For you have to admit that we still do not know enough about the changes occurring in South Korea. The lecture that the authoritative Korean politician gave at Moscow State University met with great attention. In the main, it dealt with the prospects for improving Soviet-South Korean relations, and the problems of peace in Asia on the eve of the 21st century.

At the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, at whose invitation Kim Yong-sam is already making his second visit to our country, a joint communique was signed. In particular it stresses the importance of the meeting that took place during the visit between the cochairman of the ruling party of South Korea with leading Soviet figures. And there were quite a few of these meetings.

At the news conference Kim Yong-sam noted with satisfaction the rapid growth of Soviet-Korean contacts over the last few years—for example, the swift development of mutual trade. Its volume is increasing by 150-200 percent per year. All that, in the opinion of Kim Yong-sam, imparts an urgency to the building of relations between the two countries on an intergovernmental level. At the news conference the situation on the Korean peninsula was touched upon.

[Unidentified questioner] In June this year it will be the 40th anniversary of the start of the war on the Korean peninsula. Isn't the South Korean side intending—and you, in particular, Mr. Chairman—to take advantage of this sorrowful date to come out with some kind of new initiative to put an end to the heritage war?

[Kim Yong-sam in Korean with superimposed Russian report] The Korean war, as defined by Kim Yong-sam,

was a national tragedy. It was one of the most cruel wars. The war must not be allowed to occur again. In connection with the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula, Kim Yong-sam proposes the organization of a summit meeting between the leaders of the two parts of Korea. Any questions could be discussed at it, including the issue of disarmament. In this context Kim Yong-sam noted the great role being played by the Soviet Union in resolving the Korean problem. [video shows Kim Yong-sam addressing meeting at Moscow University, exchanging documents at the institute, and answering questions at news conference]

Kim Yong-sam Grants Interview to NEW TIMES

PM2803120690 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 12, 20-26 Mar 90 p 15-16

[Undated interview with ROK Liberal Party Chairman Kim Yong-sam by Vladimir Ovsyannikov: "Kim Yong-sam: 'A Lot of Expectation and Interests'"]

[Text] Seoul—[Ovsyannikov] Mr Kim, you are the first high-ranking politician who has visited the U.S.S.R. What hopes, what ideas are you carrying with you on your second visit to the Soviet capital?

[Kim] As the first visit ever undertaken by Korean politician since the establishment of the Republic of Korea 42 years ago, my last visit to the Soviet Union has, I believe, laid down a historical milestone of opening political dialogue between the two countries. I am so appreciative of the cooperation of the Soviet authorities in allowing the Korean residents in Sakhalin to visit their homeland and to return for good, the most notable event which made my visit to Moscow the focal point of interests both inside and outside Korea. I would like also to extend my deep sense of thank to chairman of the Soviet of the Union Yevgeniy Primakov, the member of the Central Committee Karen Brutents, the director Martynov of the institute of World Economics and International Relations and the editor-in-chief Ignatenko for their kind sharing of time and reception provided to my party. In the course of fruitful and mutually beneficial discussion and exchange of view with them, we have paved the way for the improvement of relationship between our two countries.

I am going to visit Moscow again from March 20, not as a political leader of an opposition party like the last June case, but as that of the party in power.

As such, my visit creates a lot of expectation and interests and will play an important role in the future relationship between our two countries.

Because of these significances, there has established a special task force composed of the several ministers of the government and the key figures of the ruling party, which will help assist the preparation of my visit.

Taking all these matters into consideration, I am of the opinion that my second visit will become the decisive moment for the improvement of the formal relations and the acceleration of the friendship and intercourse between our two countries.

[Ovsyannikov] What does the merger of three Korean parties mean for you personally, for your former opposition party? What does that mean for Korea itself?

[Kim] Until know, politics of Korea has been carried out in the form of anti-dicatatorship democratization movement. For my part, ever since elected at the age of 25 as a member of the National Assembly, I spent whole of my political career for more than 40 years in the pursuit of democratization struggle against authoritarian dicatatorship.

During this course of political fighting, I had suffered a series of political hardship and travail such as the deprivation of the congressional membership, the house detention for more than 2 years and the hunger strike for 23 days, the event threatening the physical safety of life.

The Reunification Democratic Party, which I had led until the merger of last January, was the core of political party participated by all of the democratic forces and the leaders of democratic movement.

The democratization struggle of the RDP has culminated in the June 29 Declaration of 1987 and brought about the new era of democracy.

Meanwhile, RDP suffered an internal secession by the separation of certain elements and the consequential defeat in the presidential election in 1987.

After the series of these events, Korean politics became a four-party system based on the loyalty and personality. The result was the political tension and instability threatening the ongoing democratization started since 1987.

With the political settlement reached last December among the four parties with respect to the liquidation of the past wrong-doings committed under the authoritarian regime, the politics of Korea was destined to move into a higher stage of development geared toward policy competition instead of political fighting.

I have come to the conclusion that the political future of the country will get mired in confusion and uncertainty and the socio-economic situation of the country will be placed in a state of jeopardy, unless the political tension and instability of the four-party system are somehow brought under control and got rid of.

In addition, the swirl of upheaval and change in the socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and East European nations also call for the strong political posture of the country capable of effectivly meeting these challenges.

In order to answer all of these political exigencies and keep the ongoing momentum of democratization process

in stable condition, the union of the moderate democratic forces under a single party overcoming the decision of four-party system was felt imperative.

This is the background of the decisions I have undertaken in merging the three political parties sharing similar views and colours. I have stressed "the new thinking" to deal with newly changing situation, similar to the perestroika of Mikhail Gorbachev.

The merger paved the way for the national reconciliation and participation called for under the new political circumstances by severing the chain of political vicious circle which has characterized the previous history of Korean politics. I feel that, through the merger carried out under these conditions, the attainment of democratization goal, economic development and the preparation for national unification with the acceleration of diplomatic relations with the northern socialist countries, which constitute the main theme of RDP, is made more assured and will be realized amid the support of the whole people of the country.

[Ovsyannikov] You are known as a strong supporter of promoting closer ties between the Republic of Korea and the socialist countries. How do you assess the present level of relations between your country and East European states? Between Korea and the U.S.S.R.?

[Kim] The Korean peninsula remains the only region not yet released from the past legacy of the cold war. The country is still divided in North and South in the military confrontation.

As such, the country had a lot of difficulties and restraints in undertaking intercourse with the socialist states. I believe that these ideological political divisions have to be overcome in favour of reconciliation and coexistence of humanity. The overcoming of these ideological and cold war walls is, I think, the only realistic way to the unification of the country overcoming the present age of confrontation and hatred.

In this connection, the perestroyka reform of Gorbachev, the epoch-making event making change of the stream of world history, is not only a message of peace for the world but also a signal of the moment for change toward peace in the Korean Peninsula.

I am extending my best wish and full support for the success of perestroyka. I am of the opinion that Korea ought to do her best efforts in making the perestroika a story of success by the means of economic cooperation and political intercourse.

We are receiving the benevolent effects of the democratization of the East European countries caused by the perestroika. We already opened diplomatic ties with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia and are about to enter into similar course of acting with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. We hope to have a great step toward a similar kind of relationship with the Soviet Union.

[Ovsyannikov] The reunification of Korea is probably the most important goal for all Koreans. Last time in Moscow you met Pyongyang spokesman Ho Tam, Politbureau Members of the Workers' Party of Korea. Since then were there any new occasions for you to continue dialogue with the North? Is there any significant progress in the negotiations between the South and the North?

[Kim] My meeting with Ho Tam, in Moscow took place when all of North-South contacts had been suspended. As a first top level political meeting between North and South, it has proved a very significant event in that we have talked whole ranges of issues relevant to the peaceful unification of the country. Unfortunately there has been no contacts since that time. I am still hopeful to resume again such kind of contact and talk, because there is no other better ways toward peace and unification than talk in trust.

[Ovsyannikov] A Korean consular office was established recently within the KOTRA [Korea Trade Promotion Corp.] office in Moscow. That means that Korean-Soviet relations are being upgraded. When do you expect the establishment of full-scale formal relations between the Republic of Korea and the U.S.S.R.?

[Kim] The sooner, the better. The formal diplomatic relation between our two countries is the most beneficial mutual intercourse for the people of the Soviet Union and Korea. The relation must stand on both levels of politics and economics. The normalization of relationship in the former is the essential condition for the active promotion of the latter. Only when the two countries normalize their diplomatic relationship, the full scale and speed of economic cooperation will be ensured.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's concern about the removal of the barrier in the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet authorities favour of the Korea-U.S.S.R. foreign ministerial meeting and the remark of the Soviet officials on the necessity of pressing North Korea toward adopting similar reforms as undertaken by the East European countries are received here as welcome events prompting a speculation that the U.S.S.R. seems to be making definite position with regard to the Korean Peninsula. The opening of the Korean consular office in Moscow is a significant event in that it secured an official channel of contact between the two governments. We are hopeful that this small beginning of official contact will eventualize into a grand project of diplomatic normalization. Now as the leader of the ruling party, I am fully conmmitted to do whatever is necessary toward this goal with full responsibility.

[Ovsyannikov] What is the attitude of the people in South Korea toward our country? What do they think about the Soviet Union? Has interest among the common people, businessmen, politicians and scholars increased during the past year?

[Kim] It was unavoidable for Korean people to harbor some sense of bad feeling toward the Soviet Union which

is maintaining closer relationship with North Korea, standing in antagonistic posture with us.

The reforms and opening of the Gorbachev's perestroyka, peace and disarmament initiative of the U.S.S R. and the amendment of the Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution doing away with the power monopoly of the Communist Party have fundamentally changed the psychological map of Korean people toward the Soviet Union. In particular, the showing up of the Soviet ballet, artistic performance and good manner of large number of Soviet athletes during the Seoul Olympic Games, the Soviet authorities allowing the repatriation of Korean residents in Sakhalin on the occasion of my visit of last time, the recent trade contacts, the assumption of navigational service between Pusan and Nahodka, the regular air flight service between Seoul and Moscow and the opening of Korean consular office in Moscow, are the important events which enhanced greatly the interest of Korean people toward the Soviet Union and prompted the new surge of popular understanding and friendship between our two countries.

Seoul Diplomat in Moscow Comments on Ties

PM2903133990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Seoul Diplomat's Moscow Debut"]

[Text] Kong No-Myong is the first official representative of the government of South Korea in the Soviet Union. He is head of the Consular Department of the Republic of Korea at the Moscow KOTRA mission—an organization called upon to promote the development of South Korean trade relations with other states. On our side, the USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry is acting as the counterpart of this semi-governmental institution.

Incidentally, and strictly speaking, this department cannot as yet be described as either a consulate or a diplomatic mission, Kong No-Myong, who visited the IZVESTIYA editorial office a few days ago, said. After all, there are no diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, although his work will be de facto consular work—providing various types of consular services to Korean citizens and issuing visas and passports to Soviet people travelling to South Korea.

In addition, according to Kong No-Myong, South Korean diplomats intend to promote the development of relations between Moscow and Seoul in the economic, scientific, and cultural spheres. Cooperation in such spheres is an important step toward greater mutual understanding between the two countries.

Kong No-Myong is 58 years old . He is no novice in the diplomatic sphere. In just the last few years he has held the post of assistant for political questions to the foreign minister, ambassador to Brazil, and consul general in New York. And now he has come to Moscow.

This appointment is a great honor for me, Kong No-Myong says. I know that my work in the Soviet Union will not be easy and at the same time it will be very important. Up to a point the state of ties between Moscow and Seoul will depend on how I discharge my tasks. I hope that it will beceome possible to fill these ties with real, practical content in the near future.

Mongolia, ROK Estabish Diplomatic Ties 26 Mar

LD2703140390 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 26 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar March 26 TASS—The Mongolian People's Republic and South Korea established diplomatic relations as of today, March 26, says a communique of the Mongolian Foreign Ministry circulated here.

South Korea is the 106th country with which Mongolia has established diplomatic relations, the MONTSAME news agency reports.

Gorbachev Sends Message to New Mongolian Leader

PM2603094190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Gorbachev undated message congratulating P. Ochirbat on election as chairman of Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium]

[Text] To Comrade Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] People's Great Hural Presidium

Esteemed Comrade Ochirbat!

Accept my cordial congratulations on your election as chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural Presidium.

People in the Soviet Union are convinced that the traditional all-around Soviet-Mongolian cooperation will become still more fruitful under the conditions of the processes of perestroyka and renewal taking place in our countries today.

I wish you success in your activity in this responsible post for the good of the Mongolian people.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev.

Text of Batmonh Congratulations to Gorbachev

PM2203154790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Message of congratulations from J. Batmonh, chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium, to M.S. Gorbachev on his election as USSR president]

[Text] To Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president

Deeply Esteemed Comrade Gorbachev,

Allow me to cordially congratulate you on being elected president of the Soviet Union.

We are firmly convinced that the traditional relations of fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation between Mongolia and the USSR will continue to develop in the name of our common goals.

I take this occasion to wholeheartedly wish you every success in this responsible post for the good of the progress and prosperity of the USSR and its peoples and in the interests of the whole world.

[Signed] J. Batmonh, chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium

Mongolian Trade Union Plenum Elects New Head

LD2803124590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0340 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 28 Mar (TASS)—The 47-year-old Shiylegiyn Batbayar has become the new leader of the Mongolian trade unions. This became known today following the end of a plenum of the Mongolian Central Council of Trade Unions.

Those taking part in the plenum discussed the current situation in the country, and in connection with this examined the current tasks of the Mongolian trade unions at the present stage. Their speeches voiced sharp criticism of the leadership of the Mongolian trade unions for dilatoriness in assessing the situation and lack of prompt reaction to the changes in society and the trade unions.

Nevertheless, the participants in the plenum rejected the collective resignation of the Presidium of the Mongolian Central Council of Trade Unions. The personal requests of only eight of its members out of 13 were accepted, including that of B. Luvsantseren, chairman of the Presidium of the Mongolian Central Council of Trade Unions from 1982, and of three secretaries of the Presidium.

The new leader of the Mongolian trade unions is Shiylegiyn Batbayar, who had worked as first deputy chairman of the Executive Administration of the Ulaanbaatar Town Hural of People's Deputies. For 10 years he had been a member of the Mongolian Central Council of Trade Unions, including five years as a member of its Presidium.

The plenum took a decision to convene an extraordinary congress of Mongolian trade unions on 6 June and set up an expanded commission to prepare for it.

Embassy Reception Marks Mongolian Army Day

PM2203160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "To Mark Anniversary"]

[Text] Major General G. Dugersuren, army and air force attache at the Mongolian Embassy in the USSR, held a reception 16 March to mark the 69th anniversary of the creation of the Mongolian People's Army. The reception was attended by Army General V.M. Arkhipov, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of rear services in the USSR Armed Forces, along with generals and officers in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Those invited included army, navy, and air force attaches at foreign states' embassies in the Soviet Union.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Aung Gyi's Election Statement Reported

BK2403123390 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1430 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Aleksandr Vladimirov commentary]

[Text] (Theo Vazusin) and the ASSOCIATED PRESS have reported from Yangon [Rangoon] that one of the members of the Union Nationalities Democracy Party [UNDP], U Aung Gyi, has said he expected the forthcoming 27 May general elections to be free and fair. Moscow Radio observer Aleksandr Vladimirov comments that U Aung Gyi's comments on the forthcoming elections are interesting indeed, because he was the first politician to criticize the U Ne Win government publicly.

In 1988, U Aung Gyi distributed open letters that criticized the one-party system established by the Burma Socialist Program Party in Myanmar [Burma]. For quite a long time, U Aung Gyi was regarded as one of the leaders of the democratic reform movement. U Aung Gyi was one of the leading generals who seized power during the 1962 military coup and was one of the advocates of bourgeois development. He split with U Ne Win when the latter chose the Burma Socialist Program. He was subsequently suppressed and imprisoned.

At a press conference held in Yangon, he said doubt about a free and fair election is being entertained more outside the country than inside. He said this was due to ignorance of the local situation and also because of biased reports and propaganda by some foreign missions. Lately, Western observers have been describing U Aung Gyi as extremely accommodating to the military authorities. Some observers are of the view that he tried to win popularity by cutting his ties with the National League for Democracy to show he did not intend to oppose the General Saw Maung government.

U Aung Gyi believes the military government is not attempting to influence the course of the forthcoming elections, and he said there was no evidence that the military government was taking sides with any of the contesting parties. However, he admitted that the election campaign cannot be said to be free.

Some observers pointed out that U Aung Gyi's statement clearly showed he did not intend to have any confrontation with the military administration. They commented that like the maxim: Once you have died you know the price of timber [for a coffin], U Aung Gyi—who had been imprisoned three times—appeared to be aware of the consequences of such confrontation. However, some are of the view that U Aung Gyi, being a shrewd politician, is using a flexible strategy—which would allow a role for the military in the country's political future—to obtain his political objective. It is known that U Aung Gyi advocates freedom for private entrepreneurs and expanding cooperation with foreign businessmen. The current military government has also taken steps along this line for the future government. Hence, the future policy of the leader of the UNDP can be clearly seen.

According to U Kyi Han, general secretary of the UNDP, the elections are likely to result in a coalition government. Some observers are predicting that pre-election strategy and tactics chosen by U Aung Gyi are likely to ensure him a leading role in that coalition government. Moscow Radio observer Aleksandr Vladimirov notes that U Aung has said that so far he has not considered formation of an alliance with other organizations.

Moynihan's Criticism of Thai Attitude Viewed

BK2803124790 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Aleksandr Vladimirov Commentary: "The Situation in Myanmar and Washington's Criticism"]

[Text] According to an AFP report, U.S. Senator Daniel Moynihan has criticized the Thai authorities for establishing economic relations with the Myanmar [Burma] military government. Criticisms from Washington are becoming frequent and more strident as the election date, 27 May, approaches in Myanmar.

Only last week, a U.S. Administration spokesman, Richard Boucher, criticized Myanmar authorities for forcefully relocating thousands of families from the cities to remote villages. The NEW YORK TIMES also carried comments of Western diplomats comparing the actions of the Myanmar Government to the pogrom of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.

This time, the criticism is directed at a neighboring country for its commercial relations with Myanmar. Daniel Moynihan told the U.S. Senate that the government in Yangon [Rangoon] was surviving because it was able to sell logging and fishing concessions to companies owned and controlled by the Thai military.

The senator also accused the Thai authorities of assisting the Yangon military government in destroying minority Karen and Mon populations. Daniel Moynihan said it is no exaggeration to say that every teak log from Burma going into Thailand is being extracted at the cost of a human life. Washington directing its attack on Yangon and Bangkok [words indistinct]. The senator also made a call for solidarity with those struggling for democracy in Myanmar.

Of course, no one can deny that democratic rights are needed to assist the people struggling for democracy in Myanmar. But what is happening recently raises a question in regard to the U.S. position on Myanmar's problems. That question is, where do we draw the line between well-intended advice and a direct order to another government about how it should behave and how it should associate with other people.

Near East & South Asia

Afghan Parliamentarians Hold News Conference

LD2703225190 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS—"The Afghan problem cannot be solved without the participation of the legitimate government of Afghanistan," Habib Mangal, chairman of the International Affairs Commission of the National Assembly's Lower Chamber and former Afghan ambassador to the USSR, said.

He spoke at a news conference of the Afghan parliamentary delegation, held here today.

Deputy chairman of the National Assembly's Senate 'Ali Akbar Shahrestani and deputy chairman of the International Affairs Commission of the National Assembly's Lower Chamber Sayyed Sadi Naderi also took part in the news conference.

"The Afghan Government cannot be overthrown by force, and everyone should know that," Mangal stressed.

"After the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan," Shahrestani said, "the Western press, singing the armed Afghan [words indistinct] predicted an early downfall of the Afghan Government. But they were wrong. The Afghan Government continues to stay in power and successfully repels military attacks by the opposition forces, thus strengthening its internal and international positions. It is now an open secret that the Kabul regime is stable and steady.

"Notwithstanding Pakistan's active interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan, the latter is ready to become a demilitarised country, but this can be achieved only through national reconciliation," Shahrestani said.

The anti-government forces, which pursue the self-seeking aims, are trying to torpedo this process. An illustration is the March 6 coup attempt, staged by former Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanay. Backed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a militant from the opposition camp, Tanay wanted to seize power in the country and thereby put an end to the national reconciliation policy, Shahrestani said.

Participants in the news conference reaffirmed that a previous coup attempt, also planned by Hikmatyar, was staged in Afghanistan about three months ago. The conspirators were arrested.

Former Afghan ambasssador to the USSR Sayyed Muhammad Gulabzoy was involved in the March 6 coup attempt, Afghan parliamentarians reported.

Afghan Opposition Subversion in Central Asia

PM2803083990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Dispatch by special correspondent A. Oliynik and APN correspondent A. Pravov: "Appeals for 'Jihad.' Afghan Opposition Engaged in Subversive Activity Against Soviet Central Asian Republics"]

[Text] Kabul—On Tuesday 20 March a certain Said Nadir, who had given himself up to Afghan competent organs, was presented to Soviet journalists in Kabul. According to him, he underwent training at a special center belonging to the the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" [ISA] situated in the Pakistani village of Arbab Rud [name as transliterated], near Peshawar. There were around 60 people at this center, mainly Turkmens and Uzbeks. The teachers—advisers from the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—trained their wards in the tactics of using explosives, particularly on mountain roads. Apart from this, the students were taught methods of ideological indoctrination of the population in the Soviet Central Asian republics, particularly Tajikistan.

To what extent is Nadir's testimony reliable? To find the answer to this question we approached the Afghan Ministry of State Security. Lieutenant General Paykar [name as transliterated], chief of a Ministry of State Security administration, said:

"The leaders of the armed opposition have already been engaged in subversive activity against the Soviet Central Asian republics for a long time. Judging by the materials we have at our disposal, the organizational work started in 1983. It was then that the 'Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Northern Provinces' was created, which was headed by a certain Azadbek. His father emigrated from Bukhara to Afghanistan at the beginning of the 1920's. Azadbek was educated in West Germany and studied in Turkey. According to available figures, he has long been attracted by pan-Turkic ideas and he established ties with representatives of Western special services, which created the Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Northern Provinces. In May 1989 the headquarters of this organization, as well as weapons and ammunition depots, were transferred from Pakistan to Afghan territory to the Mokham area, which is in the province of Samangan."

Lieutenant General Paykar showed color photographs taken in Mokham. They show Azadbek surrounded by foreign advisers. The armed detachments they head are operating in other northern provinces in the country—Jowzjan, Balkh, Sare Pol, and Badakhshan.... The number of people involved altogether is several thousand. The detachments form two groups. One is named for Khazrat Imam Bukhar and the other for Imam Termezi [names as transliterated].

"The program of the Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Northern Provinces," our interlocutor noted, "notes that the basic aim of this organization is the liberation of the USSR Central Asian republics from 'communist rule and the creation of the true state of Bukhara and Samarkand.' The Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Northern Provinces is working actively in several Afghan refugee camps in the region of Peshawar, where people mainly of Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik nationality, live. In the region of Takhkel an training center has been in operation since December last year for training specialists to provoke crowd dissatisfaction based on Islamic grounds and disorder. The total number of students is 900. It is not hard to guess the aims of the representatives of nationalities living on USSR territory who undergo such training.

"It must be said," Lieutenant General Paykar stressed, "that many leaders of the Peshawar 'seven' do not hide their aims. They make appeals to continue the 'jihad'—the 'holy war'—against the Soviets, who, they affirm, are occupying the Muslim territories of Central Asia. Recently, for example, ISA leader Rabbani stated quite clearly in an interview with AFP that he intends to assist the 'struggle of Tajiks in the USSR against the invaders.' And at the very height of the dramatic events in Dushanbe, he made inflammatory appeals to 'continue the struggle.' Rabbani frequently spoke of the necessity to unite Muslims outside state borders."

Effective information on this subject arrives regularly at the Ministry of State Security administration. Here are some facts. Pamphlets brought from Pakistan by a certain Khaksar recently appeared in Samangan Province. They contain an appeal to all true Muslims in Central Asia to activate their work to "overthrow the communist system and restore Islam." It has become known that recently one of the ISA commanders, Engineer Bashir, handed over 400 brand new ISA membership cards to a certain Khasanov. Khasanov promised Bashir that the cards would be returned to him as soon as possible, with concrete names of Soviet people on them.

Extremists have recently started to circulate maps in Afghanistan on which the Soviet Central Asian republics are marked as "Muslim territories under communist occupation." Appeals to cross the northern borders with weapon in hand and "liberate fraternal Muslims" are being voiced more frequently.

"The Afghan side," Lieutenant General Paykar says, "is very worried by the opposition's action against the USSR, which is friendly toward us. For our part, we are making every effort to put an end to the subversive activity. President Najibullah spoke about this in particular at a press conference in Kabul. We know that the

USSR state border is reliably protected by border guards. But all the same, the danger must not be underestimated."

Major Asef [name as transliterated], chief of a Ministry of State Security administration department, showed us on the map places on the Soviet-Afghan border where rebels were detained when trying to cross it. There were 17 such places altogether over more than 2,000 km of the Soviet-Afghan border. They are located in regions in Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Badakhshan, and Konduz Provinces—mainly in mountain areas which are most difficult to cross, where the Darya-je Panj flows, and where the state border passes through wild mountain peaks.

These are the facts. They testify clearly to the fact that the Afghan opposition wants to carry out subversive activity against the Soviet Central Asian republics, and is setting quite specific aims.

NEW TIMES Examines Afghan Coup Attempt

PM2803120090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 12, 20-26 Mar 90 p 8-10

[Text] Tanay, who safely landed in Pakistan, declared through the Afghan opposition news agency that he would continue the war until Najibullah was overthrown.

There is a lot of talk now on whether the mutiny led by Colonel General Shah Nawaz Tanay, former Defence Minister and former Politburo member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was a consequence of the protracted factional struggle which began in the PDPA in the autumn of 1967 with the withdrawal of Babrak Karmal and his supporters form the Politburo and the establishment by them of a virtually parallel party with its own leadership, or whether Tanay wanted to topple Najibullah guided by the selfish desire to seize power. A third explanation is possible: in collusion with the extremist part of the opposition and the Pakistani intelligence, as Najibullah said, the conspirators sought to interrupt the hard-going process of national reconciliation.

The factional struggle is eroding the PDPA till now. Among its victims are Nur Muhammad Taraki, the country's first president, Hafizullah Amin, the "second man" in the leadership of revolutionary Afghanistan and the PDPA, who killed Taraki, and a great many former party functionaries and top-ranking officials of the regime who were subjected to repressions under every new change of leadership, from members of the Khalq (People) faction led by Taraki to members of the Parcham (Banner) Faction led by Babrak Karmal, or the other way round. Changes took place not only in the upper echelons of power. Once a member of one or the other faction took a ministerial post or was appointed the commander of a division, a shuffle began with the aim of expelling the members of the feuding group.

Attempts have been made to reconcile the interests of the feuding groups. Soviet advisers tried particularly hard in this respect. While appreciating their efforts, one should not forget that they themselves were products of the "stagnation" period and therefore did their best to implant the administrative-command system, which has now been condemned but not completely rejected. There was no malicious intent, however. Soviet advisers were simply ignorant of the specific features of Afghan society.

The "counsels" given by Soviet experts, who often did not understand the complicated social and tribal structure of the state and the basic alignment of political forces, did an irreparable harm to the PDPA and the CPSU, and the Soviet Union's prestige as a whole. But the work of Soviet advisers is a special subject. The main thing is that, having no idea of the objective causes for the appearance and growth of differences in the PDPA, advisers fell under the influence of their own "advisers," becoming even more ardent Khalqists or Parchamists than Afghans themselves.

Tanay belonged to the Khalqists and, in the almost unanimous opinion of his colleagues, was "absolutely illiterate politically," though he was given glowing testimonials as an officer. Both Tanay and Najibullah are Pashtuns and come from one and the same tribe in Paktia Province, but belong to different factions of the PDPA. So the promotion of Tanay in the scale of ranks seemed natural. However, he was not appointed defence minister right away. The post remained vacant for about two months. In this connection I recall my conversation with an Afghan driver. With our car pulling up almost every 300 metres, I asked him why he did not replace the battery. The driver replied that the permission was given by the defence minister, and no one had been appointed yet to this post. And then he added with a gibe: "This can happen in Afghanistan only: the country is fighting, but the post of defence minister is vacant."

Tanay's appointment was evidently preceded by a sharp struggle in the party and government leadership. It was finally decided to "counterbalance" the predominance of Parchamists (Najibullah's supporters) in the upper echelons of power by the appointment of a Khaiqist, moreover a highly competent officer, to the post of defence minister.

The discord was also aggravated by the situation that had arisen in the PDPA. The PDPA Central Committee, at its plenum in October 1987, decided to convene a party congress. The previous founding congress took place on January 1, 1965. The Central Committee also decided that the next congress should be held not later than April 27, 1988, that is, before the tenth anniversary of the April revolution. However, the congress was never convened. The various explanations can be reduced to the following: in view of the approaching conclusion of the talks in Geneva and the need to think of how to hold out after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the congress would be an inopportune measure.

The Khalqists were obviously displeased with such a turn of events because they--and the Parachamists felt that—wanted to proclaim a division of the PDPA into two separate parties. They claimed it would be a division, not a split, because the two parties could sign an agreement on cooperation within the bloc of left democratic parties that had been formed by the time. The Khalqists regarded the ignoring of the plenum's decision on convening a party congress as President Najibullah's intention to retain his personal dictatorship and the dictatorship of the Parachamists led by him.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops has put the PDPA in a difficult situation. The disarray in the party ranks has considerably diminished the combat ability of the armed forces. Sober-minded leaders, first of all President Najibullah, were well aware of the mortal danger and insisted on the need to waive mutual claims at a time when the discord would inevitably lead to the physical annihilation of the members of both factions. Such an approach proved instrumental in the consolidation of forces in the fight against the opposition near Jalalabad last spring and made for the successful conduct of other military operations.

Then came a lull. The mujahidin are licking their wounds and indulging in recriminations which sometimes erupt into armed conflicts. The national reconciliation policy is having little effect, if any, because—despite Kabul's new concessions—the opposition stubbornly refuses to negotiate, demanding first the removal of President Najibullah from power.

In the meantime, the war continues, though with less intensity. In the diplomatic field, Soviet representatives are trying to persuade the United States not to raise preliminary terms and give the Afghans an opportunity to decide the question of a future government in the course of U.N. supervised elections. The more so that President Najibullah said: "I will go if in the course of national reconciliation policy the people elect another leader in a democratic way..."

It was optimistically predicted at the beginning of this year that the Mujahidin may begin negotiations with Kabul in spring or early summer. Figuratively speaking, generals are "bred" and "fed" by war. So, if the prediction came true (and it may come true), the question of the army and its generals would arise inevitably, for the opposition is unlikely to accept the maintenance, under a coalition government, of the armed forces raised by the PDPA. Nicaragua's recent experience provides some clue in this respect. In my opinion, it is one of the reasons which prompted Tanay to stage a coup.

Spring has come, and instead of an expected positive shift in the positions of the opposed sides, we are witnessing a mutiny on the Kabul government's ship. Alarming indications of a discord in the higher echelons of power in Kabul, incidentally connected with Tanay, appeared in July of last year. It was rumoured then that the general had been arrested because of the opposition's increased activity in the army. But a few days later he appeared on television, inspecting combat units.

Last December the security bodies arrested members of an anti-government conspiracy connected, according to press reports, with the Islamic Party of Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Among them were many Khalqist officers, and also men of other political orientations, Parchamists included. In Kabul, it is not a secret for anyone that some of the party and government officials in central and provincial bodies maintain contacts with the opposite side. Part of them do that, and even pay a tribute to the opposition, in order to make themselves and their families secure in unforeseen circumstances. Others establish contacts because they have relatives in the opposition. There are, of course, people who ally with the opposition for ideological motives or, getting disappointed with the revolution, hope to win the favour of "the other side" in the event of a change of government.

Last December, having surrounded the defence ministry building with tanks and guns, Tanay demanded that the arrested officers should be freed. He took his ultimatum back when documentary proof of the guilt of these officers was shown to him. This month the course of events led to an explosion.

It is difficult to say how "irrefutable" the proof shown to Tanay was. In January 1980 Babrak Karmal said he had "incontrovertible" evidence showing that Hafizullah Amin was a CIA agent. He promised that all the documents would be published while all members of Amin's "fascist clique," that is, the members of his government, would be prosecuted. Ten years have passed, and no trial, open or closed, has been held. The documents have not been published. Two years ago the authorities began to release quietly one member of the "fascist clique" after another.

There are a number of curious coincidences. The mutiny began on March 6, the anniversary of the offensive launched by the opposition on Jalalabad in 1989. The coup attempt was made next day, while a statement calling for a return of ex-king Zahir Shah was circulated in Peshawar on March 5. The document, adopted by 30 influential tribal chiefs, ulemas and field commanders from different provinces, says that neither the provisional government of the mujahedins nor the Kabul regime express the interests of all Afghans and "exist only thanks to support from abroad." One more coincidence can be noted: it was also declared on March 5 that the members of the December plot would be brought up to trial.

In the tangle of reasons which led to the March coup were also the protracted factional struggle, the thirst for power and, possibly—as a means of attaining the goals—ties with the opposition, for there was no one to whom Tanay could flee after it became evident that the coup failed. Nevertheless, it seems that it was not Tanay who

led the mutiny. Other forces had instigated him, playing on his political shortsightedness and personal ambitions.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentary Examines Elections in Zimbabwe

MB2803154990 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Mikhail Tsirilov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] The people of Zimbabwe will go to the polls later in this week to elect by direct ballots for a five-year term a national president and members of the parliament. There is a total of more than 270 candidates for 120 seats in the parliament. Five political parties have registered for elections, and also several politicians who call themselves independent. As for the post of president, the present head of state, Robert Mugabe, has only one rival, the leader of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement [ZUM], Edgar Tekere. His party is taking part in the election campaign together with the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, the party of the former Rhodesian premier, Ian Smith.

Whether fair or not, it is this decision of opposition that has made the ZUM a target of sharp criticism in the national media. The elections cover has aggravated the political situation in the country. In some regions, there have been armed clashes between supporters of the ruling party and the ZUM. Both sides are accusing each other of building up tensions.

Meanwhile, as analysis of the situation shows, the opposition alliance has little chance to win any considerable number of seats. On the other hand, sharp criticism by the ruling party's leaders of their rivals makes it possible to conclude that the ZANU-PF [Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front] is concerned at the growing activity of opposition.

The very fact of the ZUM's emergence on the wave of exposures of corruption in the top echelons of power put to doubt the plans of creating in Zimbabwe, at least in the nearest future, a one-party system. Whether this idea is expedient or not is a different question, but criticism of a one-party state, on the background of the current events in eastern Europe, certainly secures additional points to Edgar Tekere.

In the first two weeks, President Robert Mugabe himself has been actively involved in the election campaign. He holds on the average two meetings a day, calling on the people to vote for the ZANU-PF. Among his chief arguments, which incidentally are well-grounded, are a greater stabilization in the country, the end of a dissident movement, and a certain rise in living standards. Emphasis is also laid on the changes in the land legislation to ensure a clear distribution of plots among the African farmers, and promote the program of their resettlement.

Despite the large number of candidates, the elections will be held tomorrow on a nonalternative basis. President Mugabe has warned civil servants against voting for any opposition party; otherwise, they will be dismissed from work. The army has received a similar warning.

A French press report says that at one of the election meetings Robert Mugabe made a special mention of civil servants wishing to vote against the official candidates. Give us their names, he demanded. There are people who believe they will be protected by the ZUM. We will give them a good kick.

An editorial in the newspaper THE HERALD calls on the Zimbabweans to display wisdom and observe order during the voting. The main thing to do is ensure that supporters of the rival parties after the elections agree with their results and refrain from violence.

Mozambique Prospects for Peace, Settlement Viewed

LD2803143190 Moscow in Portuguese to Africa 1800 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Excerpts] President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique has again reiterated, in an interview with the 'NOTICIAS' newspaper, the government's willingness to start a direct dialogue with Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. Vladimir Valentinov writes in this connection:

Only a month ago the Mozambican leadership had a tougher and more intransigent stance on the question. During his visit to Zambia Chissano said it was too early to speak of any talks with Renamo. There were reasons for this attitude, first and foremost the utter intransigence and obduracy shown by Renamo during the discussion of the terms of the negotiations. [passage omitted]

However, the Mozambican leadership gave proof of a constructive spirit and of a firm commitment to securing an internal settlement by political means. It is significant that these efforts should have been acknowledged during Chissano's recent visit to the United States by a top official in the Bush Administration, who voiced the certainty that talks between the official Mozambican Government and Renamo are inevitable.

In effect, the political, economic, and social reforms undertaken by Maputo, and first and foremost the new draft constitution, fully meet the demands put by the Renamo leaders. Moreover, interviewed on the results of his trip to the United States, Joaquim Chissano raised a new aspect of the attitude towards the rebels: In the event of the will of the people prompting the decision to give up the one-party system, Renamo would be able to operate in Mozambican politics as a political party. Previously the Mozambican leadership categorically rebuffed Renamo's claim to the status of political opposition or political party.

Chissano's statements on his willingness to engage in direct dialogue with Renamo have given rise to new hopes in Mozambique for an end to the war in the near future. In neighboring countries too, it is expected that soon the highest point of the positive changes in the region will occur in Mozambique.

The only concern is over the resistance leaders' failure to respond positively to one of the principles laid down as a basis for the talks, namely the recognition by Renamo of the Republic of Mozambique and its constitution and laws. At the moment this is the only stumbling block in the path of dialogue. But Chissano has told reporters that the Mozambican leadership understands that Renamo is leaning towards revising its attitude on the matter and on the question of talks. This is altogether possible, but for the moment Renamo is continuing its terrorist activity which destabilizes the situation in the country. [passage omitted]

It is highly unlikely that the continuing clashes can do anything to bring closer the day when the Mozambican leadership and the Mozambican National Resistance will start talking to one another. So Joaquim Chissano's optimistic policy unfortunately crumbles against the useless policy of the Renamo leaders, who up to now have been pinning their hopes on armed conflict and not on political dialogue, Vladimir Valentinov writes.

Moscow Comments on Status of RSA Groups

MB2803083490 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Mikhail Tsirilov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] In his remarkable speech on 2 February, South African President Frederik de Klerk announced the lifting of the ban on the activities of the African National Congress [ANC], the South African Communist Party, and other antiracist organizations. Among them were the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] and the Pan-African Movement [PAM]. In his commentary, Mikhail Tsirilov writes about some aspects of the political activities of these organizations.

The PAC and the PAM were set up in December of last year, and they are to the left of the South African radical forces speaking out against apartheid. One characteristic feature of their position is their irreconcilability to any form of compromise in the political struggle.

Their representatives took this tough line at the consultative conference in Harare at the beginning of March. The main approach taken by the participants of the conference to the emerging situation in South Africa was an orthodox point of view.

In the communique issued at the end of the conference, they stressed that at the present time there exists no base for holding talks. All the same, the PAC and PAM are prepared to discuss the working out of a mechanism which will allow for the establishment of a constituent assembly, elected on the principle of one man, one vote, and on the basis of a nonracial general election.

The constituent assembly must resolve the questions of representation and work out a new constitution for a free Azania.

Mr. Clarence Makwetu, the PAM president, again repeated what has become traditional for the leaders of the Pan African group: the demand to Pretoria to move to a high level for the beginning of talks.

The demands include, first and foremost, introduction of the principle one man, one vote, and redistribution of resources—in the first place, the land—in the interests of the African majority.

In speaking about the lifting of the ban on the activities of the antiracist organizations, he noted this decision had revived the situation at the end of the fifties, and therefore there was no joy in it whatsoever.

Zeph Mothopeng, president of the PAC, took a similar stand on many questions. Beside this, he called on all not to give up their dreams, but to take into account the realities of the present situation in the country.

The realities are seen by the leaders of the PAM in their own peculiar way, in accordance with the basic principles of pan-africanism. Inasmuch, in their opinion, the conditions for talks do not exist. The PAC is calling for an activation of all forms of struggle, including armed struggle. We do not believe the reconciliation, said Zeph Mothopeng. We intend to fight for our freedom.

It's not difficult to see in that slogan the direct contradiction to the course chosen by the ANC to achieve a comprehensive solution to the problems of doing away with apartheid by political means, and sitting down to the negotiation table with the government.

The various ways of approaching the question of relations with the white South Africans is one of the acutest problems in today's South African political life. At a time when Nelson Mandela is appealing for national reconciliation and the carrying out of the example of the successful solution of this problem in Zimbabwe, the leaders of the PAC call a move toward the whites unnecessary compromise. I cannot believe the whites in anything, Zeph Mothopeng stressed.

Open argument with the ANC sets up certain difficulties in rallying all the forces in opposition to the apartheid regime. Although Nelson Mandela has more than once called for a consolidation of the antiracist movement, the reaction by the PAC leaders to any move to bring them closer to the ANC has always been a negative one.

All the same, the situation is changing. In the opinion of many observers, it cannot be excluded that in the near future the conditions will arise, if not for unity, then at least for the coordination of actions in the struggle for a democratic renewal of South Africa.

The rejection of such coordination could lead to a dragging out of the process of doing away with apartheid. This does not seem to fit in with the political aims or plans of the PAM in South Africa.

CPSU Sends Greetings to Senegal Party Congress

PM2703100590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Undated greetings message from the CPSU Central Committee to the Third Senegal Independence and Labor Party Congress]

[Text] We cordially greet delegates to the Third Senegal Independence and Labor Party Congress.

We wish you success in the struggle for Senegalese workers' interests, and in the joint search with other patriotic forces for ways of resolving the problems facing your country.

We express our confidence that friendly relations between the CPSU and the Senegal Independence and Labor Party will continue to strengthen.

Comparison of Soviet-Nigerian Statement

PM2903092590

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 29 March 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 4 the apparent text of the "Soviet-Nigerian Statement [zayavleniye]." Comparison of the PRAVDA item with the item headlined "Joint Soviet-Nigerian Communique Issued," published in the Sub-Saharan Africa section of the 27 March issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 32-33, reveals the following variations:

Page 32, PRAVDA begins: [Text] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, paid a two-day working visit to Nigeria...(expanding Shevardnadze's title, adding "working," picking up second paragraph, sentence one);

Second paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...had extensive and thorough discussions with the...(substituting "thorough" for "wide-ranging");

Column two, second paragraph, sentence two, PRAVDA reads: ...Ibrahim Babangida to pay an official visit to the USSR. The...(substituting "pay an official visit to" for "visit");

Third paragraph, sentence two, PRAVDA reads: ...end, they expressed a desire to work out...(substituting "a desire" for "determination");

Sentence three, PRAVDA reads: ...and a consular convention between the two...(substituting "convention" for "agreement");

Last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

Both sides...(adding "economic, scientific, and technical");

Fourth paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...support for anti-apartheid organizations should be intensified...(substituting "organizations" for "in the country");

Page 33, column one, first paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...was accepted with gratitude. (substituting "gratitude" for "pleasure").

Comparison of Shevardnadze Lagos News Conference

PM2803114190

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 28 March 1990 carries in its Morning Edition on page 4 a report on a question and answer session during Shevardnadze's press conference in Lagos 26 March. Comparison of the IZVESTIYA item, under the general heading "Dictated by Common Human Interests," with the item headlined "More on Lagos News Conference" published in the Sub-Saharan Africa section of the 27 March issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 30-32, reveals the following variations:

IZVESTIYA begins: [Text] Question: Now that...(picking up paragraph two, sentence one, omitting dateline and introductory paragraph);

Page 31, column one, fifth paragraph, sentence one, IZVESTIYA reads: Question: You have adopted the doctrine...(omitting "actively").

East Europe

Slovene Proposals Seek Disbandment of LCY

PM2703111790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "It Is Proposed To Disband the League of Communists of Yugoslavia"]

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Mar—TANJUG reports that the League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Renewal [LCS-PDR] Central Committee Presidium is proposing the disbandment of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] and the elimination of all its organs.

In the opinion of the Presidium, cooperation should continue in the formation of new coordinating bodies, comprising representatives of parties formed from the LCY's former republic organizations. These bodies, in the opinion of the LCS-PDR leadership, should prepare new program fundamentals and organizational decisions. The convocation of the new organization's constituent congress or conference is feasible on this basis.

TANJUG points out that these are the most important elements of the so-called new policy for Yugoslavia mooted by the LCS-PDR, which will be proposed to members of its Central Committee at tomorrow's plenum.

Slovene Reluctance To Secede From SFRY Viewed

PM2703112390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 5

[Dispatch by "our own correspondent" V. Khlystun: "The Richer, the Friendlier; Why Slovenia, the Most Developed Republic in Yugoslavia, Is Not Anxious To Leave the Federation"]

[Text] Belgrade—The Slovene assembly recently decided to remove the word "socialist" from the republic's official name. People throughout Yugoslavia immediately began to speak of Slovenia's desire to leave the SFRY. And not for the first time! Six months ago the republican leadership was accused of the same thing. At the time it adopted amendments to the republican Constitution which were aimed at strengthening Slovenia's independence and made real the previous "on-paper" opportunity to secede from the federation. There was a lot of noise but it gradually abated. There has not even been any news from the country's constitutional court which is investigating the "affair."

About two months ago Slovenes again came under the fire of public opinion. And again on the same subject. This time the reason was that a Slovene delegation from the League of Communists headed by their leader, Ciril Ribicic, left the hall of sessions of the 14th, extraordinary, congress of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] when it disagreed with the provisions of the declaration, as our newspaper has already written. And now there is a new wave of gossip about secession: Slovenia does not want to be socialist—that means it is "looking to the West" and is splitting Yugoslavia. But in fact everything looks rather different. What is Slovenia seeking?

Let us recall that Slovenia is the most economically developed republic. Many goods produced here compete successfully on the European market. Would that not seem a good reason for secession? It is this which is extolled by shortsighted and economically unsophisticated politicians from the numerous parties and unions newly organized here. But economists, production workers, and sober politicians think otherwise. They have already understood the meaning of the loss of economic relations with just one republic belonging to the federation—Serbia.

It seems to me that this happened precisely because of the shortsightedness of some politicians. Inasmuch as Slovenia often disagrees with how Serbia is pursuing its policy of stabilizing the situation in the autonomous province of Kosovo, Serbian public figures suggested that a meeting of Serbs and Montenegrins be held in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. The Ljubljana authorities were angry and banned the meeting. Sanctions followed. Serbian politicians suggested an economic boycott against Slovenia.

What ending cooperation meant became evident very rapidly. Slovene enterprises ceased to receive raw material and Serbian stores ceased to receive many foods and goods. And, of course, this in no way favored economic reform—the creation of a single general Yugoslav market. Production was cut back and unemployed appeared. The country,s premier, Ante Markovic, had to reconcile the Serbian and Slovene businessmen like squabbling schoolboys. Nearly three months have elapsed since then yet the consequences of the unconsidered economic blockade have still not been eliminated. Despite the fact that the Slovenes have learned to compete worthily with Western firms, the main market for them still remains the domestic one—the Yugoslav market, including the Serbian market, their biggest. That is why realistically minded Slovenes could see behind this isolated instance serious consequences which zealous politicians sometimes fail to see.

According to a recent poll in Slovenia only 25 percent of its inhabitants are seriously in favor of the republic's secession from Yugoslavia. In the event of a referendum they will obviously be in a minority. According to the same poll over half those polled are in favor of confederative status for Slovenia. Not, I stress, in favor of a confederative structure for Yugoslavia but for confederative status for the republic. That means that it wants to achieve a special position in the federation. As Milan Kucan, the Slovene politician, put it, the republic must take the place in the SFRY's political life that it occupies in the economy. Slovenes advocate this because they can see that some union federal laws are constraining their initiative and preventing them from working better and living more affluently. Can they be blamed for this? Can the Slovenes be condemned for not waiting idly but suggesting thousands of options for improving life today? They are afraid of losing time. Ciril Ribicic, chairman of the Slovene League of Communists, recently renamed the Party of Democratic Reforms, believes: "For some changes two years used to be required but now two months are enough. Progress. But I would not like the fate of socialism in Yugoslavia to be decided shortly in two days or even two hours. You cannot take it to that point. And we in our organization always try to look at least two years ahead. It is on this basis that we act. And not under immediate pressure from the public and meetings! We try to persuade dissatisfied people with our long-term policy."

In conclusion to all the kind words addressed to the Slovenes I should like to add one more: They are patient. And patience even toward those who do not understand you is a necessary element of political culture.

Kosovo Unrest Laid to Albanian Nationalism

90UI0466A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 3

[A. Poroshin letter from Belgrade: "Blinded by Nationalism"]

[Text] March—When the disturbances reached their apogee in Soviet Azerbaijan, the local vendor from whom I purchase a newspaper every morning sympathetically inquired: "How are things in Baku? Will it be civil war?"

It was calm at that time in Yugoslavia's Kosovo. But then events started up in this autonomous region also. My newspaper man acquaintance would say dejectedly on a morning: "You have Azerbaijan, we have Kosovo." And would add in a fit of temper: "The hell with it, what do these nationalists want!"

Truly, it is hard for the normal individual to understand people blinded by nationalism. For a long time I naively believed that the root of all Kosovo's troubles was the region's underdeveloped economy. I recall that I once even "tossed up" such an idea in the form of a question to A. Markovic, chairman of the Federal Executive Council. The head of the government partly agreed with this, but added that the causes of the Kosovo crisis were far more complex and profound.

In my reports from Yugoslavia I have often emphasized the fact that Kosovo is the least developed area of the country with the highest birthrate. This is not contrary to the truth. But it would be fair to add that Kosovo is given considerably more benefits than the other underdeveloped republics—Montenegro, for example, or Macedonia. The Kosovo economy receives from federal funds approximately $1.5 million daily. Resources for the development of this region arrive through other channels also, including international ones. Kosovo has rich deposits of coal, iron ore, and other minerals. Finally, there are many large-scale industrial enterprises there capable of competing successfully with their Slovenian counterparts, which have come to be considered the model here. Capable if....

If the Kosovo economy had not consistently and purposefully been destroyed. And this is not hard to prove with available data on where the allocated federal resources have for many years been channeled. As a rule, priority has been given to the construction of official establishments, which could by their outward appearance stun the imagination. Of course, industrial facilities have been built also. But, owing to the ill-considered nature of the production programs, many plants and factories are even today operating at half-strength or are standing idle altogether. The federal authorities linked big hopes to the creation of a piping system for the irrigation of 200,000 hectares of land. Immense resources were invested, but the result has been practically nothing. Just one percent of the planned area is being watered. There was a time when federal resources were shamelessly squandered on the purchase of foreign automobiles and the construction of comfortable villas for high-ranking functionaries.

Was such an ugly development fortuitous? I believe not. The roots of this policy need to be sought in the ideology of Albanian nationalism, which is pursuing as its goal the creation of an ethnically pure Kosovo and its complete separation from Yugoslavia. In subjecting Kosovo to slow economic destruction, the nationalists have endeavored to create in the region an intolerable situation which would push its inhabitants into mass protests against Yugoslavia as a federation. Only this could explain the popularity of the "Kosovo Is a Republic" political slogan advanced by the nationalists.

At the end of this January this slogan appeared once again above the heads of demonstrators in many cities of the autonomous region. The so-called "third phase" of nationalist protests, which did not preclude armed clashes with the law enforcement forces, had begun. It continues. Disturbances and demonstrations are flaring up now in one, now in another city. Enterprises are coming to a halt one after the other, schools and higher educational institutions are being closed and transportation blocked. Shots, which lead to return fire from the local police detachments, are heard frequently. The number of dead and wounded is growing. On both sides. The link between Albanian separatists and Muslim fundamentalists has been uncovered in the course of this "third phase". Religious persons have frequently taken part in inflammatory street demonstrations.

Economic terrorism has developed further. There have been days when the number of strikers has been in excess of 25,000. This has meant in practice the paralysis of the entire Kosovo economy. Its losses have been three times as much as the savings, and many enterprises now find themselves in the position of bankrupts. But in this seemingly hopeless situation the enterprises have found the money to pay for the "labor" of the strikers and demonstrators. Where? In that same federal fund for assistance to Kosovo. Is it fair that the Yugoslav working class is paying for the anti-Yugoslav activity of the Kosovo nationalists?

In any country nationalism avails itself of the identical arsenal of weapons. The Kosovo separatists have, it seems, had everything: the distribution of leaflets, strikes, disinformation, armed threats, direct armed assaults, and arson. Blacklists of people whom the nationalists have sentenced to death have begun to be distributed in the region lately. These lists contain the names not only of individual leaders of Yugoslavia and Serbia but also of Albanians living in Kosovo. Those who no longer wish to live in an atmosphere of terror and violence and who do not want to separate from Yugoslavia and create a separatist republic.

The police authorities have uncovered several clandestine groups engaged in anti-Yugoslav activity. But the centers of subversion have yet to be eliminated completely. In the opinion of the Yugoslav press, they are being fed from outside by reactionary Albanian exiles. The newspaper NARODNA ARMIA maintains that Albania itself, into which Kosovo nationalists cross illegally to receive instructions and to train the youth in terrorist methods, is involved in this also.

This is why the Yugoslav authorities have now pointedly raised the issue of ascertaining all the persons who arrived from Albania during and after the war who do not have Yugoslav citizenship and who are illegally resident in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It cannot be ruled out that many of them will have to leave the country.

The Kosovo problem has been discussed repeatedly in all the country's highest forums.

Yugoslavia's overall domestic political instability has throughout recent years stoked the tense situation in Kosovo. The interrepublic contradictions, the interethnic discord, which has been intensifying with every passing year, dissimilar approaches to the solution of the Kosovo problem and, finally, the indecisiveness of the country's leadership in implementing adopted measures—all this has added fuel to the burning bonfire of Albanian separatism and pushed the extremists into new adventures and provocations. The burgeoning of "street democracy," in which the main arguments came to be cobblestones and bottles containing an incendiary mixture, set in following the split in the League of Communists at the recent 14th Congress, which virtually signified the country's division into north and south. Perceiving the support of Slovenia and Croatia, the Kosovo separatists conclusively emerged from underground operations and united under the cover of slogans of democracy and pluralism.

But their aims have remained the same—violation of Yugoslavia's integrity, the division of Serbia and the creation on its wreckage of a Greater Albania, which would also incorporate certain areas of Montenegro and Macedonia. But it is this purely nationalist right—their being assured all others—which the federation denies them. Denies them on the grounds of historical regularities and the current legal instruments determining the federal arrangement of Yugoslavia and ensuring the inviolability of its state borders.

Peace and tranquillity in Kosovo are being maintained currently by special police squads and army subunits. The leaders of separatist formations are insisting on their withdrawal. Only on such conditions will they agree to conduct a dialogue with the central and Serbian authorities. But they are giving no assurances here of a normalization of the situation in the region or the protection of the life and property of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and the few representatives of other ethnic groups resident there. Events at the same time show that on each occasion following a troop withdrawal or an indulgence the separatists start up, bringing the situation in the region to the point of a new explosion.

At the plenum in February the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee adopted a specific program of measures aimed at a normalization of the situation in Kosovo. Politically, a further democratization of the region is envisaged, but only on the principles of its autonomy within the framework of Serbia and a united Yugoslavia. Specific steps pertaining to a stimulation of the Kosovo economy have been mapped out. Stricter measures to strengthen labor discipline are being introduced at the operating enterprises. Whoever does not wish to work and spends his time in strikes and demonstrations will be fired without right of reinstatement.

It is planned to create in the next few years a uniform system of education. The university in the city of Pristina, which is considered the ideological center of Albanian nationalism, will be strictly purged.

A campaign for the return to Kosovo of Serbs evacuated there has been announced in the Republic of Serbia. Volunteers who agree to live in Kosovo are being selected within the framework of this campaign.

Thus Serbia intends to cardinally change the national structure of the region, in which Albanians now constitute approximately 90 percent of the population. Serbia's decision to deport from Kosovo Albanians who do not have Yugoslav citizenship and who are engaged in subversive activity should also play a positive part in the process of stabilizing the situation.

Yugoslavia has entered a period of the most important political and economic transformations in its history, which, as the majority of its citizens hope, will lead the country to the level of the highly developed European states. The reforms which have begun in the country are being implemented with difficulty. Their realization is being complicated by the old painful problems—the absence of unity in the leading strata, the weakness of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and interrepublic estrangement. But I would, for all that, give pride of place among these troubles to the growing nationalism.

While nationalism lives it will bring evil and destruction. And this, in my view, is the main lesson which ensues from the whole excruciating Kosovo business.

Dubcek Queried on 1968 Events, Hopes for Future

90UI0458A Moscow TRUD in Russian
18 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Dubcek by special correspondents Yu. Vasilkov and N. Shevtsov: "'I Think More About the Future Than the Past'"]

[Text] Prague, March—This name is known to everyone. Aleksandr Dubcek. A man whose fate has been dramatic and in many respects symbolic. In 1968 he was first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee. His name personifies the exciting events of the "Prague Spring," which was interrupted by the commitment to Czechoslovakia of Warsaw Pact troops. A. Dubcek was initially removed from high office and then expelled from the party. He worked for several years as a mechanic in a remote timber procurement establishment.

But all this time people did not forget this name. They remembered it. Outside of Czechoslovakia also. Foreign

journalists repeatedly attempted to get in touch with him, hoping to hear an assessment of current events from the fallen leader of the "Prague Spring." But prior to November 1989 meeting with him was extremely difficult.

When the elections that followed the "gentle revolution" made him chairman of the Federal Assembly—essentially number two man in the country—he became even less accessible to journalists. In the Federal Assembly Secretariat, where we had forwarded our questions to A. Dubcek, we were told that there were already more than 90 requests from various overseas editorial offices for an interview. And Dubcek's private time was extremely limited.

Our meeting was postponed from day to day and to be honest we had begun to lose hope, when the telephone rang one evening in TRUD's Prague correspondents' center: "Hello, this is Aleksandr Dubcek. Please excuse the fact that I have been unable to get around to preparing answers to your questions but I believe I will be able to do so this evening. Let us schedule the meeting for tomorrow after 10 o'clock. They will call you."

And, indeed, the following morning we were invited to the Federal Assembly. A. Dubcek received us in his office. He began with an explanation:

"I was writing out answers yesterday until 2:30 in the morning and, as is my wont, made crossings-out and insertions in the margins. But there is only one person capable of rapidly making out my handwriting in the office. And he, as luck would have it, is sick. Please be patient a little while the typists cope with my handwriting."

In fact, our conversation was a free retelling of what we later read in the prepared written answers to the questions that were sent in advance. The text was written by Aleksandr Dubcek in Slovak. We permitted ourselves in the translation just a few abridgments in no way altering the meaning.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] Following the 1968 events did you ever expect to return to leadership of the country?

[Dubcek] The entry of the "allied" forces into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 initiated a profound setback in our development. Our post-January policy aimed at democratic transformations in society was essentially blocked, and shortly after all its gains were eliminated.... I personally, as a person who had a particularly close relationship with the Soviet people, saw what had occurred as a tragedy both for Czechoslovakia and for the Soviet Union because neo-Stalinism had been strengthened. Nonetheless, I remained hopeful that common sense would prevail. I never lost hope of making a personal contribution to surmounting the barrier of the Husak-Jakes policy of "normalization". Unfortunately, the recovery of sight was a long time coming.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] In what direction have your views on socialism, your philosophy generally, changed in these two decades?

[Dubcek] In my opinion, what we understand today by the word "socialism" has been experiencing a grave crisis—initially in the USSR, and subsequently in the East and Central European countries. Where are the causes of this to be found? I believe that Stalinism and neo-Stalinism deformed the concept of socialism, passing off for it super centralism, total coercion and, finally, the impoverishment of the masses. Communists and noncommunists, groups of people and whole nations had been wiped out in the name of such "socialism." Socialism had become an ideological concept without profound spiritual content and humanitarian practice. During the "Prague Spring" of 1968 we wanted to overcome these negative phenomena and rehabilitate the concept by converting it into "socialism with a human face."

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] How do you evaluate the overall outcome of Czechoslovakia's postwar development—with a plus or minus?

[Dubcek] Mathematical sciences are no use in this case. Postwar Czechoslovakia possessed a developed economic system, strong industrial potential, and a robust agriculture. If we add to this the people's democratic tradition and quite high domestic culture, it has to be acknowledged that we had a sound basis for overcoming the consequences of the war and for further progress.

But the events that followed 1948 expunged these hopes. The Stalinist understanding of socialism fortified the negative trends and led to a gradual lagging behind countries that had in developmental terms been our equals or even far behind us. Profound moral destruction occurred in society. In other words, the price paid for the mistakes of monopolized power was too high. In the next few years we will have to make up for what was let slip.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] The CPCZ is today going through hard times. Does it have a real chance of revival?

[Dubcek] The chance of revival lies with the party itself. No one else can revive it if it itself does not wish to be revived. But this will be a difficult process. Following the military intervention in 1968, the "normalizing" leadership kicked 468,000 members out of the CPCZ—one-third of the party—the most enterprising, industrious, and educated part. This could not have failed to have been reflected in its activity.

I would like to emphasize that when I speak of the Communist Party, I refer primarily to its leadership, which became the grave digger of its own party. I know many honest communists who could lay the foundations of a revival of the CPCZ.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] The new forces that have appeared on Czechoslovakia's political scene are putting forward

the most diverse programs. Does their composition mean a cardinal change in Czechoslovakia's political course or is this an extended search for new ways to build a society of social justice?

[Dubcek] When, last November, the invincible power of the Czech and Slovak peoples rose up against the amorality of the governing circles, it was obvious that a whole palette of political movements expressing the pluralism of interests of various social groups and currents could not fail to have emerged in the place of the destroyed monopoly structure of the deformed CPCZ. In the pluralist system that emerged after January 1968 four noncommunist parties and two main civic action groups appeared: the Active Nonparty Club and Club 231, which united people who had been unjustly convicted in accordance with Article 231. This did not at that time mean an antagonistic position in regard to the Communist Party thanks to the fact that it had itself discovered the pluralist path at that time. In the "normalization" period, communists expelled from the party and activists from civic action groups and societies created a number of action committees, the best-known of which was Charter 77. And inasmuch as the authorities in the 1970's and 1980's artificially held back the natural aspirations to freedom and democracy, in doing so they also contributed to the appearance of destructive sentiments.

Approximately 30 political parties, frequently with similar programs, are currently registered in our country. There are five social democratic parties alone! This process is natural. The fate of each party will ultimately be determined by the electorate at free elections.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] The most popular slogan in Czechoslovakia was for a long time "With the Soviet Union forever." Despite the elements of pseudo-pathos and formalism, the basis of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations was, for all that, you will agree, sincere friendliness and traditional trust. What is the outlook for these relations under the new conditions?

[Dubcek] It is true that friendly feelings toward the Soviet people have, it may be said, historical roots. The liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 from Hitler's fascism, in which the Soviet Union played the decisive part, considerably strengthened these traditions of mutual affection.

However, after the war, the "deposits" of negative aspects of Stalinist policy gradually grew. On the one hand the arrogance of the Stalin-Brezhnev leadership of the USSR, on the other, the passive copying by our leadership of the "Soviet experience," which was at times utterly senseless under Czechoslovakia's conditions. All this contributed to the implantation of formalism, which spread like an infectious disease. Our working people lost their trust in empty slogans and at times interpreted them in an entirely opposite fashion.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 completed this process. Your soldiers who took part in this action recall how spontaneous was the resistance of the unarmed population.... Just 23 years had elapsed since the war, and the image of the Soviet soldier had changed fundamentally in the consciousness of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia! The image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of our people, particularly the young, who had not experienced 1945, faded considerably....

Now the situation is changing, given the realization of the new policy in our two countries. A joint declaration was signed during CSSR President V. Havel's recent visit to the USSR and his negotiations with M.S. Gorbachev, which laid the foundations of the new relations between our countries and imparted new content to the traditions of our mutual relations and friendship. I am pleased that the Soviet leadership officially expressed regret in connection with what happened in 1968 and pleased that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia has begun. The dark spots in our relations will thus gradually disappear.

[Vasilkov, Shevtsov] You once worked and studied in the Soviet Union. What would you say today to your Soviet contemporaries, primarily your classmates and former colleagues, who are now agonizingly reflecting on the results of the past?

[Dubcek] My parents went to the Soviet Union in 1925 because the CPCZ had resolved to help the young Soviet Russia. Money that had been earned in the United States was invested to purchase machinery and equipment for the "Intergelpo" cooperative. There were two brothers. The elder—Julius—was born in Chicago, I in Czechoslovakia. I recall the delight that possessed us in the cooperative! We took up residence in the former army stables of Pishpek (present-day Frunze). I still remember clearly how we kneaded the clay with our feet in a pit for the first small houses. We built a school ourselves, but before this we had all, regardless of age, attended one class. Incidentally, a week ago I received from the USSR a photograph of my classmates, and I found it very moving.

The first electric light bulb was switched on, a textile works and tannery were built and a sawmill and mechanic's workshop and house of culture were put up in the cooperative with our labor.

Since 1932 my father worked at the auto plant in Gorkiy, where I was born. At the end of 1938 we returned to Czechoslovakia. I lived through the time of the collapse of the republic and its liberation from the forces of occupation.... I lost my brother on 22 January 1945. I was wounded twice at the front. And the fascists dispatched my father to the Mauthausen concentration camp....

The enthusiasm at the appearance in Czechoslovakia of the liberating Soviet Army is impossible to describe. I am linked with the Soviet Union also by the pivotal Khrushchev period, during which I studied in the Higher Party School in Moscow. I had experienced various political processes in the Soviet Union in the 1930's—

from Tukhachevskiy through Bukharin. I had initially known them as major revolutionary figures, but it was subsequently impressed upon all of us that they were enemies and traitors. In the 1950's I witnessed political processes in Czechoslovakia. All this has enabled me to comprehend much in this life in even greater depth....

I would like to say to all my fellow students and colleagues, and all those I got to know in the Soviet Union: I was never an "anti-Soviet element." I had simply come to know life in all its contradictoriness and had reached the firm conviction that Stalinism and neo-Stalinism and the "Brezhnev doctrine" were the "Bastille" on our path toward social progress, democracy, humanity, humaneness and morality.

I think more about the future than the past. I believe that our current relations will lead to our people and the Soviet people being bound in a truly friendly fashion.

I know that this is not in the traditions of your propaganda but I would be happy to drink with my old Soviet comrades. We would take herring and boiled potatoes and rap on the table with dried vobla [Caspian roach]. I would say to them: we are living in difficult times. The former leaders bequeathed us a difficult inheritance. Let us not, however, cry over spilled milk. Let us think about the upturn of our countries, about a better life for our people—your people have deserved this.... Let us think, looking forward.

Our meeting with Aleksandr Dubcek drew to a close. We took our leave. We exchanged final words at the door. "It will be very pleasant for me to address Soviet readers in your newspaper," the chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly said.

Leaving the office, we turned around. We were being seen off by a warm smile from a courageous man who, despite all the trials that have befallen him, has remained true to his beliefs and ready resolutely to defend them.

CSSR's Havel Comments on Visit to Moscow

PM2103183090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 10, 6-12 Mar 90 p 4

[Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel "Private Opinion" commentary under the rubric "Highlight of the Week"]

[Text] At my talks with Mr Gorbachev, we decided to draw up a special declaration that we would both sign and that would become the point of departure for further bilateral relations. Though it is a brief document, I think it extremely important, as it says that henceforth the relations between our two countries and peoples will rest on equality and full reciprocal respect for state sovereignty.

This declaration opens up broad prospects for new agreements in the economic, cultural, political and other spheres. We think that this general declaration of principle will promote diversified cooperation better than a detailed treaty, which in some degree could limit and constrain such cooperation. Further, the declaration has a universal and principled character, and we hope it will retain its importance for long.

At the talks I had with Mr Gorbachev, we naturally, touched upon a broad range of issues, including the German question. We set out our respective positions and discovered that they were very close. Though I am not authorized to explain Mr Gorbachev's view, but as far as my own stand is concerned, let me repeat that I am convinced that German refunication should accompany the all-European process. Far from obstructing that process, it should, on the contrary, expedite it.

During the visit, as is known, our two foreign ministers signed an agreement on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops based in Czechoslovakia. A specific pullout time-table has also been agreed. The last Soviet troops are to quit Czechoslovakia before June 30, 1991. True, I asked Mr Gorbachev to expedite the process so that Soviet combat troops, consisting of five divisions with military equipment and attached auxiliaries be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia within one year, that is, before February 26, 1991. Mr Gorbachev agreed that that would be good provided both sides could bring it off. However, we agreed to keep the June 30 date, so that if one year proved not enough, no one could say that the treaty had been violated.

During our conversations I said we attached great political significance to this action, in the belief that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia would serve to stabilize the situation both there and throughout Central Europe. I also notified Mr Gorbachev of the suggestions advanced in Czechoslovakia to faciliate this by no means simple operation. Thus, the railwaymen proposed special voluntary shifts and teams to assist in bringing out combat equipment and men. It has also been suggested that river transportation be used as being cheaper than railway carriage. Building firms are prepared to supply the U.S.S.R. with prefabricated housing for 100,000 people.

I listened to the Soviet arguments with understanding. Besides the certain domestic issues associated with the need to provide adequate conditions for the servicemen and their families, there is also the circumstance that over the twenty years in Czechoslovakia, Soviet troops brought in large amounts of armaments and military equipment and built sundry installations that simply cannot be disassembled and brought out so speedily. This must necessarily be kept in mind.

To promote the principles stated in the declaration, signed was not only the troop pullout agreement, but also an accommodation to have the security agencies of our two countries cooperate in the drive against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking. This is in the nature of an agreement between two equal states and is not directed against any third party. It may furnish an

example for drafting similar documents for cooperation with the security services of other friendly states.

I think the 1968 occupation inscribed the gloomiest tragic pages in the entire history of the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. I personally think that water under the bridge, especially starting from today—now that we have signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and the declaration on relations between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, the more so as the top Soviet authorities have already critically reassessed that invasion and have expressed their disapproval of it.

We agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev that the best way to put paid to the dark pages of the past is to look ahead.

Brno Conflict Splits 'Civic Forum' Movement

PM2103165790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent S. Vtorushin dispatch: "City Hall Crisis"]

[Text] Prague—Several demonstrations have taken place one after another in Brno, the capital of Southern Moravia. Those participating in them are demanding the resignation of Josef Pernica, the city's communist mayor, who was elected to this post at the end of February. The demonstrations have been organized by a faction headed by Petr Cibulka.

The conflict in Brno is the first one to result in a split in one of the largest organizations in this social movement which came to power in the country after the events of November last year. [sentence as published]

Although "Civic Forum" is indeed the largest social movement, it is having to resolve all basic questions of political life at a "roundtable" together with the political parties operating in the country.

On the basis of an accord with the other parties and "Civic Forum," the Communists gave up to their opponents some of the seats they held on the city's national committee. They now only hold 80 deputy seats out of 214. However, the Communist Josef Pernica was elected mayor of the city for his professional and business qualities. It must be said that the decision on this was adopted at this same "roundtable" and the mayor's candidacy was approved by all participants. But the decision proved unacceptable to the group of "Civic Forum" members headed by Petr Cibulka. Another section of "Civic Forum" activists headed by Jaroslav Sabata is in favor of closely observing the accords reached at the "roundtable."

The conflict between the two wings of "Civic Forum" became so acute that when Sabata emerged onto the street one evening following a "Civic Forum" leadership session he was attacked by a group of representatives of the opposing faction. Only the rapid intervention of people who happened to be nearby saved him from assault. Even the president of the republic was dragged into the conflict, although he stated, however, that the question of who occupies which post in the city must be resolved by Brno residents themselves. So what is behind the conflict within the Brno City organization of "Civic Forum"?

Primarily, two conflicting views of what democracy should constitute. On the one hand, respect for democratic forms of government, and the recognition and observance of all accords. On the other hand, reliance on street demonstrations, and the desire to achieve one's end by means of constant forceful pressure.

The Brno conflict alarmed the "Civic Forum" leadership: It is damaging the movement's prestige. And with less than 3 months to the free parliamentary elections.

In response to the street demonstrations the city national committee council reexamined the question of the appointment of Brno's mayor. And... left the previous decision in force.

Prague got involved in settling the conflict between the two opposing factions in Brno. Five representatives of the capital's "Civic Forum" coordination center came to Brno. A new city council was elected for this organization which did not include either Cibulka or Sabata, who is, incidentally, a Federal Assembly deputy. This was clearly done as an example to others. But will the conflict not flare up again, but not necessarily in Brno? Democracy requires objectivity in everything, and the ability to hear not just yourself but others, too; and it puts society's interests above individual and group interests.

Monday evening [19 March], the conflict at city hall was unexpectedly given a new lease of life. Pernica, in whom the city parliament had placed complete trust, himself handed in his resignation. Pernica stated that not just he but members of his family, too, are being subjected to blatant pressure. In these conditions there can be no question of the normal execution of mayoral duties. As we can see, all possible means are being used to attain the goals being pursued by a certain group of people. The street methods have won a victory. But is this the civilized democracy to which Czechoslovakia today aspires?

CSSR Plans for 'Radical Economic Reform'

PM2103132190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Czechoslovakia: New Approaches"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak Government has drawn up a plan for a radical economic reform based on the introduction of the market system of management and the development of private enterprise.

The first to acquaint themselves with this program were IMF experts, and their assessment is highly complimentary. At the same time an IMF representative declared

that if Czechoslovakia wants to join the IMF, an even more rigorous economic reform concept would be desirable.

In the light of IMF recommendations, Czechoslovakia has drawn up a number of proposals for the withdrawal of the country from a number of agreements concluded within the CEMA framework. Official spokesmen for the federal government have so far not disclosed which agreements, in particular, are concerned. However, media sources close to government circles are intimating that at present Czechoslovakia is more attracted to advantageous contracts and proposals offered by major businessmen and companies from Western countries—which fits in with the plan to open Czechoslovakia wide to the world economy.

While strategic questions of the further development of the economy are being decided, the Czechoslovak Government is taking tactical steps to curb the effect of tourists from neighboring countries on the stability of the Czechoslovak internal market. If earlier the main trouble were tourists from Hungary, Poland, and the USSR, it is now guests from Austria and the FRG who are coming in increasing numbers to make purchases in Czechoslovakia's border areas.

Repudiates Exchange Rate Rules

PM2603142990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Vtorushin dispatch under the "Topic of the Day" rubric: "Toward a Foreign Currency Market. The CSSR's New Financial Policy"]

[Text] Prague—Czechoslovakia has officially notified the CEMA Secretariat of its repudiation of all agreements concerning mutually agreed exchange rates for the national currencies of this organization's member countries.

This was announced in a televised speech by Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus. He declared that in three months' time Czechoslovakia would unilaterally set an exchange rate for the Czechoslovak koruna and the currencies of other allied countries which would be advantageous for the Czechoslovak economy. This step is without precedent in CEMA's entire existence hitherto. What prompted it, and what effect will it have on our mutual trade relations?

The bases for reciprocal settlements between CEMA countries are laid down in several agreements concluded at different times. The main ones among them are the treaty on settlement of nontrade payments signed in Moscow in 1963, the treaty listing nontrade payments, and the treaty on the application of discounts and surcharges to national currency exchange rates. They provide that national currency exchange rates are set jointly by all CEMA countries, subject to mandatory use of the Soviet ruble as a medium.

It was obvious from the very start that this system was unbearably unwieldy, complex, and ineffective. For example, in order to change the currency exchange rates between two countries by as little as five percent either way, it was necessary to give the partner at least three months' notice. During this period the value of currency in one of the countries could have fallen severalfold. Consequently, the country with the stable currency exchange rate would end up the loser. This is what happened to Czechoslovakia when prices in neighboring Hungary and Poland started going through the roof. Thousands of tourists from these countries made they way to Czechoslovakia's border regions and literally emptied the stores. Something similar also happened along Czechoslovakia's border with our country. Tough customs restrictions had be introduced in order to protect the domestic market.

The withdrawal from agreements regulating nontrade payments offers an opportunity to set an exchange rate for the Czechoslovak koruna and another country's currency to Czechoslovakia's best advantage unilaterally, without bilateral—never mind multilateral—agreements. The exchange rate will now be determined on the basis of market demand...

This will primarily affect tourists and USSR citizens traveling to Czechoslovakia on official business. Hitherto the exchange rate of rubles to korunas was 1:8. Now it is hard to predict the rate in three months' time. Soviet tourists arriving in Czechoslovakia sell each ruble for three korunas on the Prague market. Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the agreements on nontrade payments will obviously have an effect on the cost of maintaining our missions in this country, on tourist exchanges, on royalties received by Soviet citizens for the publication of their works by local publishing houses, and so on. It will also have an effect on our bilateral trade.

Preliminary Hungarian Election Results Viewed

PM2903090990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov report: "Outcome of the Voting: Preliminary Results of General Election Results Published in Hungary"]

[Text] Budapest—Just as during the nationwide referendum 6 months ago, the electronic vote-counting system broke down again. Instead of producing the preliminary results by Monday evening, that is, 24 hours after the voting ended, as had been promised, the system kept people waiting until Tuesday.

So, the preliminary results of the 1990 Hungarian parliamentary general elections as of Tuesday 27 March, when two-thirds of the votes had been processed, look like this:

Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]—24.5 percent of the votes; Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]—21.18

percent; Independent Smallholders' Party—12.1 percent; Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]—10.65 percent; Alliance of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]—8.77 percent; and Christian Democratic People's Party—6.42 percent.

The remaining parties taking part in the elections polled less than 4 percent of the votes which, under the electoral law, automatically bars them from entering parliament. Those parties included the Social Democrats (3.57 percent), the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] (3.63 percent), the Agrarian Union (3.3 percent), the Patriotic Electoral Coalition (1.98 percent), and others.

I repeat that these are only the preliminary results of the voting on the so-called party lists. These figures may still change. Not radically, though, I think; by tenths or hundredths of 1 percent. Thus on the basis of the preliminary figures we can already speak of a clear success for the opposition parties; they have polled in total more than three-fourths of the votes cast. That, in my view, is the main result of the elections, which means that in the near future the leadership of the parliament and government will include people who advocate fundamental changes in all spheres of sociopolitical life and the replacement of the so-called administrative-command system which has existed in Hungary for the past 40 years.

The first round of voting clearly showed the new favorites in the country's political arena in the form of the MDF and the SZDSZ, which have a number of satellite parties around them and which constitute two autonomous political centers. Although the MDF leads by around 3 percent after the first round of party list voting, many people are still reluctant to view it as the outright leader. This is because in the majority of constituencies (around 80 percent) the result of the voting on the individual lists has still not been decided. As expected, because of the great competition, only in a few constituencies did candidates manage to poll the crucial number of votes (50 percent plus one) and become a deputy in the new parliament. Therefore, the fate of most of the individual-list seats will be not be settled until round two of the elections.

In this connection the SZDSZ leadership stated at a press conference Monday evening that according to their calculations the second round of voting on the individual lists will give them an advantage of 10-20 or possibly even 30 seats but then the overall picture of the arrangement of forces will change and the SZDSZ, it is said, will overtake the MDF and come first in terms of the total number of parliamentary deputies.

In principle, the success of the MDF and SZDSZ was not unexpected. Public opinion polls conducted beforehand reflected quite accurately the degree of their support in society: The forecasts were just two-three percent out. The forecast that none of the leading parties would be able to form a majority government on its own and would find this quite hard even with its closest allies has also essentially been borne out.

As for the MSZP and the renewed MSZMP, which polled in all around 15 percent of the votes, the MSZP leadership stated on Monday that it regards the results of the first round of the voting as encouraging and that they allow it to continue taking part in political life and in the future parliament as an influential political force.

So the first round of the general elections is over. On the whole the voting took place in a calm atmosphere if you disregard a few incidents involving supporters of various parties. The international observer commission headed by former U.S. Vice President Mondale which attended the elections (the 64 commission members visited 300 electoral precincts) came to the conclusion that the preparation for and conduct of the elections fully met international norms.

As for the second round of voting, which is to finalize the disposition of forces in the future parliament and, consequently, in parliament, the precise date has not been fixed. The most frequently mentioned date is 8 April. In any event, the desire of the majority of the country's political forces to hold the second round as quickly as possible and thus eliminate the state of relative uncertainty is still great.

Bulgarian Communists Favor Changing Party Name

PM2803144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "Party Changes Name"]

[Text] Sofia, 27 Mar—Following the collapse of T. Zhivkov's regime of personal power Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] organizations have begun to propose changes in the party's name. Various options have been proposed: "Party of Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria (Communists)," "Communist Party of Democratic Socialism," "Bulgarian Socialist Party," and others. Some of these proposals were reflected in the Manifesto for Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria ratified at the 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress. Congress delegates decided to hold a referendum on the question of the party's name.

It took place 21 through 24 March. According to the preliminary results, 86 percent of party members who voted, voted in favor of changing the BCP's name.

The referendum was preceded by a general political debate. BCP leader A. Lilov was one of the first to say that he would vote in favor of the title, Bulgarian Socialist Party.

Process of Bulgaria's Party 'Renewal' Viewed

PM2903124190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent A. Chupakhin report: "Leading Force in Society"]

[Text] Sofia, 27 Mar—Since the beginning of the renewal process in Bulgaria, that is in the last four months, about 8,500 persons have joined the ranks of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. Some 1,450 persons have voluntarily left it. In spite of the complex period in the country's life and the emergence of numerous new parties and organizations, including opposition ones, the Communist Party is having a significant influence on Bulgarian society. This also indicates that although the actions of the former party and state leadership damaged the BCP's authority, as a whole they did not change attitudes toward its healthy nucleus.

Reports about the recruitment of new members to the BCP's ranks are now coming from virtually all regions of the country. The desire of young people and adults to join it confirms the fact that the party, which is almost 100 years old, cannot perish. Fresh young blood is now flowing into it, R. Serbezov, secretary of the BCP Supreme Party Council, stressed in an interview with the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO. The country is going through a real political and social upheaval, he noted. The party is also being renewed: The composition of its leading organs has significantly changed, and the center of gravity has shifted to the municipalities, to the basic organizations. The reform forces, which are united in various ideological tendencies and which can to a large degree help the BCP's renewal, are becoming increasingly active. I am sure that the Bulgarian people with their very profound sense of realism are correctly assessing the processes occurring in the party and support us, the BCP secretary stressed.

Period of Polish-Lithuanian Alliance Recalled

PM2703085990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Shutkevich under the general heading "What Do They Think West of Vilnius?": "Warsaw"]

[Text] The Lithuanian parliament's decision to leave the USSR has led some Warsaw journalists to indulge in fond recollections of the former greatness of the Polish-Lithuanian state, which once stretched from "the Baltic to the Black Sea." "For four whole centuries the history of Lithuania and Poland developed in parallel," writes the government newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA, which published in its entirety "The Declaration on the Restoration of the Lithuanian State." "Joined initially by personal union and then by a real alliance, our two states experienced a period of supreme prosperity." At the same time it depicts the Soviet period, as a rule, in somber tones. "The Lithuanians realize that what was officially described as accession to the USSR was actually brutal annexation."

True, the most sensible politicians in Warsaw are warning that there is scarcely any point today in fostering the illusion that a new Polish-Lithuanian alliance could be concluded, since many inhabitants of Lithuania are convinced that they were the weaker partner in the "rzeczpospolita [res publica] of the two peoples" and the cream of the Lithuanian national elite has been subject to Polish assimilation.

FRG Parties Interfere in GDR Elections

90UI0445A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent V. Nikitin: "The GDR on the Eve of Elections"]

[Text] Berlin, 13 March—On 18 March the GDR will hold elections to the parliament of the republic—the People's Chamber. This will be the first test of strength for parties, movements, and groups following the stormy events of autumn 1989.

The law permitting a multiparty system has prompted the emergence of dozens of diverse social organizations. One simply cannot even remember the names of many of them. There is even the "German Union of Beer Lovers." More than 20 parties and pre-election alliances have been permitted for elections to the People's Chamber alone.

It should be emphasized right away that they are conducting the election campaign under far from equal conditions. And it is not local procedure and regulations which are to blame for this, but rather the massive presence of West German parties which have shamelessly and rudely interfered in GDR domestic affairs. The Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Free Democrats from the FRG have created here—sometimes on a voluntary basis, sometimes forced—parties and alliances similar to themselves. For two days, for example, Chancellor H. Kohl was in West Berlin attempting to prevail upon representatives of the Christian-Democratic Alliance, the organization "Democratic Breakthrough—Social and Ecological," and the "German Social Alliance" of the GDR to join the "Alliance for Germany," so as to present a united front in the coming elections under Kohl's political positions. Material assistance and generous promises were used as arguments.

The aims of "Alliance" are concise and unambiguous—beginning 18 March, its program states, socialism in the GDR must be ended and the GDR itself simply annexed, according to Article 23 of the FRG Constitution. State enterprises in GDR territory are subject to denationalization and return to their former owners. The unified Germany is to become a member of NATO.

Under pressure from Bonn and West Berlin, the "Alliance of Free Democrats" was born, encompassing three liberal GDR parties—the Free-Democratic, Liberal-Democratic, and German Forum Party. Their charter document is not just ratified by representatives of GDR parties, but by FRG representatives as well—the signatures of O. Lambsdorf, Free Democratic Party chairman, and V. Mishnik, chief of its Bundestag faction, are affixed. The demands of these liberals are not all that

radical and are related to policies of their idol, FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher, who advocates uniting the two German states within the framework of the European process and is calling for respect of neighbors' interests, acknowledgement of Poland's western borders.

Addressing a liberal rally last Saturday in Magdeburg, Genscher tried to assure potential voters that, in the event of unification, the GDR might in the next few years turn into a prosperous region of the European community, for which a "German Marshall Plan" was required. I do not know when this moment will arrive, but the liberals readily treated the Berliners to beer from barrels marked "Made in FRG"—"If you want to keep drinking this, vote for us."

Look at all the things they're carting in from the West prior to the elections—beer and lollipops, pencils and erasers with advertising, pins and leaflets, posters and magazines... When you read the newspapers or watch the latest news on television, you sometimes forget you are in the GDR, whose cities have turned into a merry-go-round of rallies with dozens of Western politicians participating.

Not lagging behind Kohl and Genscher are the FRG's Social-Democrats, whose patriarch W. Brandt has become honorary chairman of the GDR's Social-Democratic Party. It seems he, E. Bar, H. Fogel, current chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, O. LaFontaine and J. Rau, his deputies, traveled all over the republic, calling upon people to cast their votes "for their future, which has prospects once again."

With all their differences, these three forces are united in one aspiration—to inflict a heavy blow primarily against the Party of Democratic Socialism (the former Socialist Unified Party of Germany), which advocates humanistic ideals of socialism, peace and freedom, social justice. Recognizing the historic nature of the unification of the two German states, the Party of Democratic Socialism is in favor of this process taking place in a controlled, circumspect fashion, that it be mutually beneficial to GDR and FRG citizens. The party declares that everything positive which has been gained by the republic in the social sphere over 40 years must not be dismantled. The GDR must remain a partner with equal rights in the process of unification, and not be the object of Anschluss.

As G. Gizi, chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism, noted on many occasions, his party is resolutely fighting to prevent a situation in which the people of the GDR become poorer, as a result of unification, while the "sugar-daddy from the West" becomes richer. The Party of Democratic Socialism is not alone in these demands. These or similar programs have been proposed by many other leftist parties and movements. Among these we see primarily the pre-election "Alliance-90," comprised of three civic movements—"New Forum," "Democracy—Now," and "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights." The Greens Party and Independent Alliance of Women have joined forces, the voice of the latter resounding more and more actively and boldly on the political scene of the republic.

A competitive pre-election alliance was organized by two other parties—the "United Left" and "Carnations," advocating that public ownership be preserved in the GDR along with cooperative and private ownership, that the unification process be conducted in stages, preserving the honor and dignity of the republic and its citizens.

All leftist parties are united in what is perhaps the main question today—they are against selling out GDR interests. Responding to the call of more than 10 leftist parties, including the Party of Democratic Socialism, not to permit annexation of the country, thousands of residents of the capital gathered last Sunday at a rally in the center of Berlin. Demonstrations and rallies were conducted in many other cities of the republic under a slogan of unity of leftist forces.

Results of a new public opinion poll have been published, apparently the last prior to the elections. The poll was conducted by the Institute of Research Into Youth Problems, in Leipzig. In the view of institute experts, voter activity is expected to reach 84 percent. A third of those polled favored the Social-Democrats (this was 53 percent in mid-February). And the "Alliance for Germany" seems to be gathering force—30 percent in favor, as compared to 17 percent in February. The Party of Democratic Socialism has improved its chances by five percent, approximately one-fifth of the voters intending to vote for it.

A number of leftist parties and citizens' initiatives suffered perceptible losses which just two to three months ago enjoyed the popularity of broad segments of the population. These include "New Forum," "Democracy—Now," the "United Left," and others. If this trend continues, it cannot be ruled out that the majority of votes will accrue to two forces—the Social-Democrats and "Alliance for Germany," and then a large coalition will loom on the political horizon. But we need not guess—just four days remain prior to the elections.

West Europe

Thatcher Congratulates Gorbachev on Election

LD2803151590 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Mar TASS—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in a telephone conversation today, congratulated Mikhail Gorbachev on his election to the post of president and confirmed her appraisal of profound processes worldwide in connection with the USSR's perestroyka.

The exchange of views was held, as always, in the spirit of mutual understanding and trust. Both stressed the

importance of their forthcoming summit meeting during the British Week festival in the Soviet Union next summer.

On the agenda are issues of bilateral relations and world politics, especially with regard to Europe.

Thatcher and Gorbachev also discussed the German unification issue.

Replying to Thatcher's question, Gorbachev described the developments in Lithuania, which have emerged as a result of the violation of the Soviet Constitution. Thatcher and Gorbachev agreed to continue informing each other about topical issues of international politics.

Thatcher Cited on German Unification Issues

PM2903092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Problem of the Western Alliance"]

[Text] British Prime Minister Thatcher has said in an interview given to the magazine DER SPIEGEL: "The process of German unification is not just a German question or even just a European one, it affects the whole Western alliance. Germans should coordinate this process with NATO and work together with the European Community, but they should not forget the Helsinki Act either. And all this should take place before rather than after unification. We should preserve stability and security. We cannot put all our achievements at risk through mistaken actions."

Thatcher spoke critically about Chancellor Kohl's not giving the allies enough information about the specific steps being taken by him to achieve German unity. "He did not inform even his own ministers about his 10-point program. The affairs of his cabinet do not concern me. We are concerned, however, by the consequences of this policy for international stability and security. I therefore considered it necessary to point out the importance of prior coordination."

Dwelling on the Polish border problem, Thatcher pointed out that "at least a treaty between a united Germany and Poland" is essential. "You know what happened to the previous assurances. The German courts deemed them invalid, and I myself heard Kohl say in Strasbourg that he gives no guarantees of and does not recognize the present borders. That is one of the questions which needs to be clarified."

In reply to a question about the military-political status of a united Germany, Thatcher pointed out the necessity of its belonging to NATO. Here she noted that some Soviet troops will be able to stay in East Germany, as a long transitional period is involved until new long-term structures of peace are created. "I think that the fundamental changes in East Europe and in the new Soviet Union make it possible for the troops of both military alliances to be present on German territory," she stated.

UK Bill To Prosecute Nazi Criminals Introduced

PM2203095890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov report: "Westminster Faced With a Choice: In the British House of Commons, a Bill on the Punishment of War Criminals Is Introduced"]

[Text] London—British Home Secretary David Waddington has formally introduced a bill on the criminal prosecution of Nazi war criminals residing on UK territory at the present time. The bill's second reading and the debate over it are due to take place in a few days.

This is unquestionably a very important step on the long (45 years) road to historical justice, which must triumph in the end even in the United Kingdom, where, after the end of World War II, many of those who had taken part in the Hitlerite reprisals against the civilian populations of regions occupied by the Third Reich found refuge.

Thousands of war criminals made their way to other countries via Britain at that time, fleeing retribution for the evil deeds they committed in Belorussia, the Baltic region, Poland, and the Ukraine. In the years of the "cold war," the West took these torturers and murderers under its wing.

The demand for a change in British law acquired special force only in very recent times. The international Simon Wiesenthal Center, which searches the world for former Nazis guilty of crimes against humanity, presented the British authorities with the relevant lists. The public discussion which subsequently opened led to the creation of a special parliamentary commission made up of representatives of all parties.

In December last year, the House of Commons by a significant majority of votes (348 to 123) came out in support in principle of changing the law. And now a corresponding bill has been formally introduced by the British Government.

Theoretical disagreements are over, but the parliamentary debates, however, are still to come. A number of conservative members of parliament stated their opposition to a change in the law which allows current British subjects not to be answerable for crimes which they committed on alien territory when they were the subjects of other countries. A number of Labour members also show some reservations. But especially forceful opposition is evidently to be expected in the House of Lords.

If the bill, which is above all a matter of high principle, becomes law, then a special commission will be set up in Britain even before the end of this year, consisting of detectives, lawyers, historians, and translators—these people will study material on present British subjects suspected of being war criminals.

The findings of the commission will then go to the British courts, which are to examine the cases of the

former Nazis. It is suggested that videotapes and the written testimonies of eyewitnesses of the crimes perpetrated by the defendants will figure as valid evidence in the court hearings.

Defense Minister Yazov Visits Toulon Naval Base

LD2803231390 Moscow TASS in English 2256 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS special correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Toulon, France, March 29 TASS—Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov, on a visit in France at the invitation of his French counterpart Jean-Pierre Chevenement, on Wednesday visited Toulon, where a major French naval base is located.

Yazov was shown the base and ships of the French Navy's Mediterranean Squadron from a helicopter which then landed on the Clemenceau aircraft carrier, France's largest warship.

Squadron Commander Vice-Admiral Tripier and Clemenceau Commander Captain First Rank Celerier told the Soviet minister about the ship's characteristics, armaments and tasks. Then the Soviet delegation was shown the ship and the carrier aviation.

Yazov told TASS that he was impressed by the way the service on the ship was organised and by the order there, and added that Soviet military could learn from the French side's experience.

"Exchanges of practical experience by the military, which are promoted by such visits, and meetings between them, no doubt, will promote the growth of our combat skills," he said.

Gerard Renon, French secretary of state for defence issues, told TASS that the visit by the Soviet defence minister to France—the first in more than two decades—"has much importance, and far from symbolic.

"It shows how our relations are changing. These changes are based on the sides' desire to reduce the number of their armaments, at the same time preserving sufficient defence potentials.

"Hence the more open attitudes of the sides to one another and the readiness of each side to acquaint the other with its military achievements and thus to show that it maintains its defence capability and does not seek superiority," Renon said.

Speaking about the French attitude to the Soviet Armed Forces, Renon said: "We proceed from such realities as the current negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of some East European countries.

"Naturally, all this makes us work on disarmament issues. But I should emphasise that, in our view, this should not affect the fundamentals of France's defensive strategy concept."

Later in the day, the Soviet delegation returned to Paris.

Yazov was received by President Francois Mitterrand. In a friendly conversation they discussed issues of mutual interest. The meeting was attended by Soviet Ambassador to France Yakov Ryabov.

The Soviet minister laid a wreath to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe.

The Soviet Embassy, on Yazov's behalf, gave a dinner for Chevenement.

IZVESTIYA Reports Ryzhkov-Beregovoy Talks

PM2903094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-French Cooperation"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received P. Beregovoy, French minister of state and minister of the economy, finance, and budget, who is taking part in the work of the first session of the Soviet-French Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, in the Kremlin 27 March.

Having voiced a positive opinion of Soviet-French cooperation, N.I. Ryzhkov pointed out that the current session is unusual since this is the first time that Soviet and French representatives have met since the "grand" and "small" commissions were amalgamated with a view to coordinating more precisely the actions taken by the two countries' organizations involved in developing economic and scientific and technical ties. A firm legal foundation for further deepening mutually beneficial relations in a number of promising sectors of industry was laid as a result of the signing of a number of new intergovernmental documents during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Paris last summer, particularly the declaration on principles for the development and improvement of economic, industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation.

At the same time, it has already been pointed out on previous occasions that the opportunities to expand traditional trade have in many respects been exhausted and the future of Soviet-French trade and economic relations depends primarily on updating the structure for reciprocal trade and making more active use of new forms of cooperation. The prospects for deepening trade and economic relations between the two countries will be largely determined by the progress of the economic reform in the USSR.

P. Beregovoy noted the French Government's willingness to help step up the work of French firms and organizations on the Soviet market. Regarding the

Soviet market as highly promising, France attaches great importance to its presence in this market, despite the current difficulties in the Soviet economy.

Expressing appreciation to the French Government for its support for perestroyka, N.I. Ryzhkov briefed P. Beregovoy on the development of the economic reform in the USSR, including in the sphere of foreign economic activity. He noted that recent meetings at the USSR Council of Ministers with industrial enterprise and association managers and financial and banking system staff have shown that economic leaders firmly favor progress along the road of deepening economic reform and the establishement of a plan-and-market economy.

During the exchange of opinions questions pertaining to more active involvement of the Soviet economy in world economic relations, including its participation in international economic organizations, the improvement of conditions for the operation of joint ventures, and Soviet-French cooperation in the training of highly skilled foreign economic cadres were also touched upon.

The following took part in the conversation: L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister; G.F. Rakhimbayev, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic ties; and J.M. Merillon, French ambassador to the USSR.

USSR-France Economic Commission Meets 'Success'

LD2803093990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 March (TASS)—The meeting of business circles of the USSR and France was a success. That was the assessment of Lev Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, on the session of the Soviet-French Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation which ended here today.

France, he said when interviewed by a TASS correspondent, is one of the USSR's leading trading partners among Western countries. Last year the volume of bilateral trade amounted to 2,600 million roubles, the USSR's trade deficit with France was reduced somewhat, and the structure of reciprocal deliveries was improved. This was helped to a large extent by the progressive development of joint enterprise in the production field.

The session examined in detail the state of affairs in the field of priority areas of cooperation: in space research, atomic power, agriculture, and television. During the commission's work, a new field for cooperation was also identified: exchange of ideas and the organization of joint research in developing market relations in the USSR. There was discussion, as a separate theme, of issues of personnel training for foreign economic activity.

The final protocol of the session stressed the substantial simplification of the unwieldy structure of the commission by making its standing and ad-hoc bodies more flexible and independent in working out and adopting decisions.

In conclusion, Lev Voronin emphasized that the visit by the French government delegation headed by Pierre Beregovoy, minister for the economy, finance, and budget, will serve as the basis for further promotion of economic ties between the USSR and France, and will promote the development of a mechanism for closer integration of the Soviet economy with the European market.

More on Economic Commission Meeting

LD2803091490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 March. (TASS)—The first session of the Soviet-French Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical cooperation took place in Moscow on 26 and 27 March. Lev Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet section of the commission, and Pierre Beregovoy, French minister of state, minister of economy, finance and the budget, and chairman of the French section of the commission signed a protocol on the results of its work. The protocol reviews the results of and outlines prospects for trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and France.

The commission examined progress in implementing agreements in the area of economics, science, and technology which were signed during the Soviet-French summit in July last year and which renewed and expanded the framework of bilateral ties. Those taking part in the session spoke in favour of strengthening cooperation in the areas in which agreements were signed, and in particular the areas of cadre training, digital television and high definition television, civil aviation and aircraft construction, telecommunications, scientific and technical research, the agro-industrial complex and forestry, as well as transport. The commission expressed its desire that the implementation of these agreements should lead to concrete results in the very near future.

The two sides decided to reorganize the machinery for bilateral cooperation with the aim of stepping up direct ties between interested partners. They also adopted new regulations on the intergovernmental commission.

Results were reviewed and prospects outlined for cooperation in such traditional areas as nuclear power, color television, research and use of space for peaceful purposes, agriculture, and the agro-industrial complex. The activity of the Franco-Soviet Chamber of Trade was also examined at the session.

Sweden's Andersson on Soviet Actions in Vilnius

LD2803135490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Andersson, the Swedish foreign minister, has stated in an interview to the Swedish telegraphic bureau that the USSR is displaying an attitude towards Lithuania that no great power has demonstrated in the past. Sweden considers that the Soviet leadership's actions are in keeping with international agreements. Independence and alteration to the borders that existed at the moment of the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki cannot be proclaimed by Lithuania unilaterally. The Baltic republics, an expert of the Swedish Defense Ministry's research institute has stated, should build their policy in such a way as to take into consideration the vital interests of the Soviet Union. He described the Baltic Antiaircraft Defense Region as vitally important for the USSR.

Soviet-Swedish Talks Held on Legal Issues

LD1703142590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Stockholm, 16 Mar (TASS)—Soviet-Swedish consultations on legal aspects of multilateral and bilateral cooperation have taken place at the Foreign Ministry of Sweden.

The representatives of the foreign policy departments of the two countries examined topical issues concerning the strengthening of the primacy of law in world politics, the struggle against terrorism and the narcotics trade, and the formation of international legal structures that are required to guarantee the strengthening of peace and universal security. An exchange of opinions also took place on such matters as the deepening of interaction in the sphere of nature protection, particularly in the Baltic area.

The participants in the consultations shared information about the main directions of legislative activity in their countries. The experience of formation of democratic state services of a highly qualified character was thoroughly discussed.

I.I. Yakovlev, head of the International Law Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry and B.D. Pankin, USSR ambassador in Sweden, took part in the consultations on the Soviet side, and H. Korell, head of the legal and consular department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, took part on the Swedish side.

Karpov Receives Scandinavian Ambassadors

PM2603113890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Announcements"]

[Text] On 23 March USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov received K.O.O. Berner, Swedish ambassador to the USSR; V. Egebjerg, Danish ambassador to the USSR; R. Baltzersen [as transliterated], Norwegian charge d'affaires; Yu. Karenen [as transliterated], Finnish charge d'affaires; and P.G. Torsteynsson [as transliterated], Icelandic charge d'affaires, at their request.

Latin America & Caribbean

Commentary Views American TV Marti Station

LD2703131590 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 27 Mar 90

[By TASS commentator Sergey Kutikov]

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS—The American TV Marti station, which will soon be ready to go on the air and transmit its programmes to Cuba, seems certain to heighten Washington-Havana tensions. Reports indicate that Cuba aims to retaliate starting "a war of the airwaves."

Cuba sharply reacted to the Voice of America announcement of test transmissions in the near future. Cuban television demonstrated a few days ago technical facilities to jam TV Marti transmissions.

Reports meanwhile have come from Miami, saying that the frequencies of six medium-wave radio stations in the State of Florida were occupied on Saturday not with usual programmes but with Cuban leader Fidel Castro's speech transmitted from the island.

The American Administration has not yet proved the legality of TV Marti, and it will be difficult for it to do so, since the international convention on telecommunication, concluded in Nairobi, bears the signatures of both Cuba and the United States.

From the viewpoint of the document, Cuba's sovereignty will be impaired, should transmissions from abroad be beamed to Cuba and occupy one of its TV slots.

Many prominent politicians and public figures from differing countries, as well as competent international organisations, for instance, the Latin American and Caribbean Basin organisation of government news services and agencies, protested against TV Marti broadcasts. Not all U.S. Congressmen support the TV station.

The Cuban authorities, which earlier tried in vain to find ways to convince the U.S. Administration to give up the planned transmissions, are likely to take more drastic steps. Specialists believe that "the war of the airwaves" will be detrimental to radio stations in 30 American states.

Compliance with the principles of mutual respect, that should underlie relations between states in general, and

especially between large and small countries, is exactly what can help find ways to settle the conflict between the United States and Cuba.

The Soviet side holds the same view. The Soviet Foreign Ministry believes that the United States' TV Marti project runs counter to the present-day tendencies in interstate relations.

Cuban Jamming Reported

LD2803083790 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Havana March 28 TASS—The United States is preparing for armed aggression against Cuba and the broadcasting of TV-Marti programme is part of that process, says a statement of the Cuban Foreign Ministry circulated here.

According to the statement, the U.S. Government began a trial of Spanish TV-Marti programs at 01.45 on Tuesday. It is directed only against Cuba, because the TV station occupied the frequency used by the Tele-Rebelde station of Cuba. "This counterrevolutionary radio, managed by the Voice of America, is a gross violation of our national sovereignty and the international law. Taking advantage of its legitimate right to repulse any aggression directed against its sovereignty, Cuba jammed the U.S. TV signal 10 minutes after the beginning of the broadcast and intends to prevent such attempts in the future," the statement said.

The policy of the Bush administration is becoming more and more anti-Cuban, the statement stressed. The world community should act resolutely in order to stop the "U.S. electronic aggression against Cuba and to avoid the deterioration of the situation, which can disrupt peace and security in the region.

Expressing the resolve of the Cuban people and government to repulse further airwave aggression, as well as any other aggression, and to protect its sovereignty and national independence at all costs, Cuba holds the U.S. Administration responsible for all possible consequences of its "arrogant policy violating international norms and standards."

Castro Cited on Cuba's Adoption of 'Firm Stance'

LD2503080390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 24 Mar 90

[From "The World in the Mirror of Events" presented by N.Agayants and G.Vedenyapin]

[Text] [Agayants] The only way for Cuba to survive is resistance, not a policy of concessions. And if in the course of its history our country has not been swallowed up by the United States it is only because we have adopted a firm stance in response to all the hostile actions of imperialism. Our people will be ready not only to offer resistance, but to win as well if the United States dares to carry out armed action against the island of freedom. So stated Fidel Castro at a press conference in Havana.

For Cuba, he stressed, it is a great honour to be the enemy of an empire, but we more than any other people are well prepared for any action by the United States and will make no concessions. If it has pleased fate to choose us for the role of socialism's standard-bearer, this is a great historical privilege.

So there you have it: Fidel Castro's speech in Havana on the results of his visit to Brazil, where he took part in the festivities to mark the swearing-in of the country's new president, Fernando Collar de Mello. The press conference went on for three and a half hours, ending after midnight local time, and was broadcast on both of Cuba's TV channels and a number of radio stations.

[Vedenyapin] Yes well, it's an interesting speech in its own way, but it seems that the new political thinking is by no means making easy headway everywhere.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 28 Mar Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD2803160690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 28 March begins carrying a recorded relay of the 28 March session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Video shows deputies milling around and Lukyanov in the chair. He greets deputies and asks them to register: 379 deputies are present. Lukyanov announced that another 64 people's deputies are also in attendance. He tells deputies of an agreement that government ministers will answer deputies' questions on the last Wednesday of each month. Today will be the first such encounter. Lukyanov touches on the interest which the prospect has aroused among deputies. He criticizes some deputies for not being tactful in formulating their written questions. On procedure for question time, he observes that other parliaments allocate one hour for such sessions. As this is our first go, we shall spend three hours on it.

At 1507 GMT Burlatskiy observes that other parliaments operate orally, without written questions and answers, and suggests that the available time be split between written and oral questions. Lukyanov replied that we shall proceed as already suggested. Other deputies raise questions on the proposed procedure.

At 1509 GMT Lukyanov calls for questions to First Deputy Premier Nikitin, to whose sphere most questions have been addressed. Nikitin says he will deal with questions concerning the agro-industrial complex. The overall situation in this field is growing more complex. The rate of growth in output is slowing down. He cites figures indicating the state of affairs. There has been no obvious progress in the processing industry. Rural depopulation is continuing. The financial situation is inadequate, as are foreign economic ties and discipline in relations with industry. The government is seeking regulated market relatons and reaching the conclusion that there is no alternative to this.

At 1518 GMT Nikitin answers specific questions, firstly from Veprev on supplies of equipment and raw materials last year. He cites figures for supplies of various items and commodities to farms and contracts concluded for such deliveries. He also answers a question submitted by Veprev on lack of progress in gasification of the non-chernozem zone.

At 1522 GMT Nikitin answers a written question from Stepanov on numbers of cattle. Another question concerns rural housing: Nikitin cites more statistics. Stepanov also asks about production figures for various types of farm output; Nikitin obliges. He also answers questions on improvements in housing and other facilities for rural inhabitants.

At 1528 GMT Matviyenko asks about supplies of children's food. Nikitin regrets lack of progress in this sector and cites figures for specific types of such food.

At 1530 GMT answering a question about supplies of agricultural produce from areas affected by Chernobyl, Nikitin says that no dangerous foodstuffs are being supplies. He complains about poor supplies to central stocks from individual republics, notably the Baltic and Ukraine, but gives no figures.

At 1532 GMT Lukyanov hands Nikitin a question about the lack of fuel for fishing trawlers. Nikitin admits that transport is a big problem.

At 1533 GMT Sobchak, from the floor, calls for those responsible for shortcomings to be named. Another deputy urges Nikitin to confirm his answer about supplies from the Chernobyl area; Nikitin gives a one-sentence answer in the affirmative.

At 1534 GMT the floor if offered to Belousov, who says he will answer just the most important questions which he has received. He begins with questions on nuclear tests. A question from Ivanov on cessation of tests for industrial purposes is answered. Such work was done until 1988, at depths up to 1,500 meters, with no effects on the environment, but they have not been carried out since that date.

Belousov Answers Nuclear Questions

LD2803161690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1538 GMT on 28 March continues its recorded relay of the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Belousov adds that industrial nuclear tests have only ever been conducted on government instructions. None of the tests carried out for the national economy has been performed for the Defense Ministry. These industrial tests are included in the total figure for tests carried out by the USSR.

At 1540 GMT Yarin asks about measures to eliminate the conseqences of the explosion of a nuclear reactor in the southern Urals. Belousov says that this refers to an explosion in 1957 at a nuclear waste storage plant, which did take place. A significant area was polluted, and people were evacuated. The land has now been disinfected, and people have returned. He invites deputies to visit the region and see for themselves.

At 1542 GMT Shabanov asks about the need for a government program on power engineering. Belousov replies that the Academy of Sciences is working on one, and the government is keeping an eye on progress. Serious preparatory work has still to be done. The USSR

cannot do without nuclear power for its energy needs; it now accounts for 13 percent of power output. Further development will be accompanied by serious measures to ensure safety of nuclear power plants.

At 1545 GMT Belousov answers a question from a Gomel Oblast deputy about whether equipment has been installed to test for radionuclides in food by citing figures for projected output of dosimeters.

At 1547 GMT an unidentified deputy asks whether tests on Novaya Ze mlya violate agreements with the United States. Belousov replies that all tests conducted by the USSR are within the terms of all international treaties.

At 1548 GMT to the question of whether the government has data on harmful effects of Semipalatinsk blasts, Belousov replies, after interventions from unidentified deputies, by dividing the test range's history into two periods: up to and beyond 1963, when tests above ground and in the air were banned. All tests since then have been conducted underground.

The USSR has decided unilaterally to hold its tests at Semipalatinsk well below the previous level agreed with the United States. The government will inform the Supreme Soviet on further developments, to ensure that there will be as few tests as possible in future, with the aim of convincing the United States to stop nuclear tests altogether.

At 1555 GMT Tsybukh asks what is being done regarding the position of construction detachments in the army. Belousov replies that the question is being examined. Such detachments work both for the defense sector and for social facilities. The number of these detachments will be reduced significantly from 1 January 1992. It will take a long time to phase out all detachments as they are working under various ministries.

At 1558 GMT another question is asked concerning a program to provide for Afghan veterans and soldiers invalided out of that country. Belousov talks about enormous respect in Afghanistan for Soviet soldiers who served there and says that the government has approved a plan of measures to help veterans. Biryukova is heading a working group to prepare a program, he adds.

At 1600 GMT the continuity announcer informs viewers that the relay will continue after a 15-minute interval.

ANT Affair Discussed

LD2803172790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1614 GMT on 28 March resumes its recorded relay of the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Belousov, still at rostrum, answers a question on production of disposable syringes, saying that the task is fulfillable. A system of machinery to produce them has been developed, but its production is nearly two years behind schedule. Two ministers—of general machine-building and of the medical industry—are responsible for this sphere. Belousov cites planned figures for output of syringes by the two ministries this year.

At 1620 GMT Belousov answers briefly a question about how much hard currency has been spent in the last five years to purchase licences for medical equipment.

At 1621 GMT another question is asked about production of artificial limbs and wheelchairs. Belousov cites projected production figures for these items.

At 1625 GMT Belousov is asked whether aviation ministry works should be producing consumer goods while there is a shortage of aircraft. Belousov stresses the importance of producing more consumer goods, from which task the aviation industry ministry cannot be exempted. Regarding equipment for the civil aviation sector, he refers to a government decision on its long-term development. He quotes general projected aircraft output figures for the next 5-Year plan.

At 1630 GMT Belousov is asked what is being done to ensure that enterprises' orders for equipment for light industry are met. Belousov admits that work is not going as well as it should. The government wants to use conversion to bring defense industry plants into this activity.

At 1633 GMT Shcherbak, from the floor, asks about production of needles for disposable syringes and receives a brief answer from Belousov. Another deputy asks about planned reductions in military construction detachments. Belousov promises that comprehensive examination of the issue is underway in government.

At 1636 GMT an unidentified deputy expresses dissatisfaction with Belousov's answers on disposable syringes, complaining about inefficiency in fulfillment of targets. Belousov reiterates projected production figures.

At 1654 GMT Lukyanov proposes that the session return to Belousov's answers to written questions. Belousov responds to Lukyanov's request to him to answer a question on the ANT cooperative. The government and party control committee and international affairs commission have examined the issue. The story is not yet over. A decision has been made on investigating all aspects of the issue, so we should await the results of that investigation before going further. The investigation should last several months. The matter raises the question whether the USSR should seek new forms of economic activity at all: The government believes that additional ways of entering the international market have to be sought. The creation of ANT was aimed at obtaining commodities which the country needs. Its failure should not mean a rejection of the whole policy, which will continue.

The ANT affair also raises the question of the cooperative movement overall. The government believes that

there is a correct area of cooperative activity, and the principle of that movement's development should not be rejected. There are problems which have to be corrected, such as the need for greater concentration on production of goods for the people, but the ANT affair should not be used to discredit the whole cooperative idea.

Regarding the T-72 tanks involved in the ANT affair, Belousov says that it is illegal to acquire such equipment. These tanks were removed from the defense industry ministry; responsibility rests fully with the Nizhniy Tagil works from which they were taken. Documents signed by Gusev have nothing to do with this case. Belousov states that conclusions have been drawn regarding the weakening of discipline which has also affected the defense industry. On whether the tanks could have been smuggled across the frontier, Belousov replies in the negative. All measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of the ANT affair.

Belousov says that existing regulations are adequate to prevent illegal export of tanks. Full conclusions must await the results of the investigation.

Biryukova on Consumer Goods

LD2803182590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1701 GMT on 28 March continues its recorded relay of the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Belousov reiterates that there can be no more such affairs as ANT.

At 1702 GMT a deputy complains from the floor about the delay of several months in the investigation of ANT, and calls for more information. He takes issue with Belousov over various aspects of the affair.

At 1709 GMT Belousov says that he wants attention to be concentrated on preventing similar incidents from occurring again in the future.

At 1711 GMT Deputy (Okipyan) says that the ANT affair should not be connected with the name of Ryzhkov and criticizes the government's inability to discover which country the tanks were destined for.

At 1713 GMT Belousov says work is necessary to uncover the destination of the tanks. The government is not in possession of any information about this and he cannot give deputies any further information on it.

At 1715 GMT Lukyanov announces a 15-minute interval.

At 1716 GMT a recorded relay of the afternoon session begins.

At 1718 GMT Belousov speaks about the investigations into the ANT issue. People must be patient and wait and see what happens.

At 1721 GMT Aleksandra Biryukova starts to speak, giving figures for the increase in the production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods and other statistics related to the production of consumer goods. There are occasions where insufficient goods have been provided. Enterprises are to be encouraged to increase working hours. Biryukova relates plans for increasing the production of soap and detergents to alleviate the current shortages. She answers a deputy's question on goods produced at socially low prices, such as children's goods. She gives production figures and speaks about the level of state subsidies on them.

She continues by replying to a question on the provision of construction materials to the market. The increase in provision is not sufficient to meet demand. Much work still needs to be done to increase the volume of production.

Biryukova then speaks about the role of local soviets in the production of consumer goods. Following a deputy's question about the situation with regard to the allocation of private cars, Biryukova states that things are very difficult. The militia is being given more cars to help them in the battle against crime. The disabled are also being given special provision—numbers of cars allocated to them have been increased.

At 1743 GMT Biryukova answers a question about action being taken in the sphere of sports goods production. Their production has been increased over the past four years. Various statistics are given. New enterprises are being set up for the production of such goods.

The next question deals with measures being taken for the protection of the population's health. Biryukova speaks about the state plan on this issue which is being prepared by the Health Ministry. The draft is being discussed in committee. A deputy asks about the creation of a pediatric center in the USSR. Biryukova recounts which centers are already in existence. But the question of setting up a new one should be studied.

At 1753 GMT Biryukova answers a question about compensation to newlyweds regarding increased gold prices. This compensation was cancelled in 1987. She answers a question about luxury goods being sold by auction.

Biryukova Continues Answering Questions

LD2803193690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 28 March continues its recorded relay of the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Biryukova says that all the money from the auctions of luxury goods will be used for the social programs. This year the amount received by this means is expected to be R800 million to 1 billion. She says that R1 billion in hard currency has been allocated for the purchase of nonfood goods abroad. Almost all of this sum has

already been spent. More goods are being purchased by other means, for example, barter agreements.

Biryukova then outlines measures that are being taken to speed up the modernization of the light and textile industries and purchase machinery in this sphere. During the next five-year plan the amount of investment in the textile and light industry is to be doubled.

At 1810 GMT she answers a question concerning the distribution of consumer goods to the countryside and rural inhabitants. Measures are being taken to guarantee supplies to them from consumer cooperatives.

At 1812 GMT Biryukova is asked by a deputy whether the government is taking measures to provide the poorer groups of the population with guaranteed living standards. She speaks of the measures being taken.

At 1817 GMT Lukyanov informs the deputies that a U.S. delegation headed by Senator Edward Kennedy is taking part in today's session. The cameras show Kennedy and delegation receiving applause. Biryukova continues to outline measures being taken to bring conditions at cooperatives and state enterprises involved in consumer production closer together.

At 1820 GMT a deputy asks about sugar allocations in different parts of the country. Biryukova says there are historical reasons for discrepancies which cannot be eliminated overnight. A deputy asks about provisions for invalids. Biryukova says the government has a program for the development of computers for the deaf. She can't answer a specific point about books.

At 1825 GMT Deputy Burlatskiy asks about the money allocated for medicines and other goods. Biryukova says the money is being strictly assigned according to the allocation.

At 1830 GMT a Kirghiz woman deputy asks about protective clothing for animal husbandry workers. Biryukova says let the republic get on with it.

At 1833 GMT Deputy Zhuravlev asks for a forecast of the consumer market in 1990/91. Biryukova says Voronin is coordinating consumer goods matters, whereas she is involved in interrepublican light industry affairs. It is no business of the government to get involved in the trivia of individual consumer goods. A Kazakh deputy is worried that Biryukova's replies are not precise enough.

At 1838 GMT Deputy Orlov is concerned about the procedure for ministers' question time: time limits, better replies etc. Deputy Gritsenko has a point about the future agenda. Deputy Babchenko wants written replies to unanswered questions.

At 1842 GMT Lukyanov sums up the debate. The syringes issue will have to be looked into. All of today's issues will be presented to the government.

At 1846 GMT a deputy asks about railway troops. Lukyanov asks for a vote on amendment to the law on military service. There is a quorum; 391 are present. Vote: 367 for, six against, 13 abstentions. Lukyanov gives the break-down for the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

State of Emergency Debated

LD2803210590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1852 GMT on 28 March continues its recorded relay of the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow. At this time, the members of the Soviet of Nationalities are dismissed and Lukyanov continues to chair the session sitting as the Soviet of the Union.

Lukyanov says that Primakov is to go to the Presidential Council, and therefore seeks to be released from chairmanship of the Soviet of the Union. Votes on releasing him: 175 for, 16 against, one abstention. Before the vote, Lukyanov pays tribute to Primakov's merits.

At 1858 GMT proceedings continue with Nishanov chairing the Soviet of Nationalities. Nishanov reminds deputies of the previous debate on taxes. After a few interventions from the floor, Kucherenko of the planning, budget, and finance commission, speaks about the draft law on taxation, confirming that it contains relief for Afghan war veterans. Answering other questions, Kucherenko outlines more aspects of the taxation law. Nishanov calls for a vote on the first reading of the income tax bill: 134 for, 37 against, 11 abstentions. There is disagreement over figures. A revote is taken: 141 for, 37 against, four abstentions.

At 1922 GMT Nishanov introduces Minister of Justice Yakovlev to talk about the state of emegency regulations. He says situations dangerous for a large number of people can emerge in any society, and recent Soviet history has regrettably had a wealth of such incidents. There is as yet no law regulating the legal regime of states of emergency, and that is why the law is necessary. The new law meets the Soviet Union's international obligations and agreements. Yakovlev outlines who can call a state of emergency. The measures must be relevant to the particular situation that has arisen. Yakovlev mentions what state of emergency laws in other countries say.

At 1937 GMT Deputy Oripov asks about what resources are used in implementing a state of emergency. A woman asks what the current measures in Nagorno Karabakh are to be called. Yakovlev says they are special measures.

At 1941 GMT more questions are asked about grounds for dismissal from work, apparent contradictions between the state of emergency law and normal regulations, the definition of mass disorders, measures against violators of discipline at work.

At 1954 GMT Yakovlev states that the law should protect the interests of minorities when they are under

threat; a deputy recalls the events of Alma-Ata in December and in Tbilisi last year; Yakovlev states that army divisions may need to be used where there are emergency situations to protect people and maintain public order.

At 1957 GMT Golik, chairman of the law and order committee, speaks about the role of the president in the declaration of emergency situations. This needs to be elucidated but the constitution as it currently exists does not provide for this. The Congress of People's Deputies as well as the Supreme Soviet needs to discuss the issue. It is possible that a new law will need to be created specially to regulate the president's role. No questions are asked of Golik.

At 2006 GMT an unidentified deputy talks about control of the press under the state of emergency measures. He believes the law should be adopted.

At 2013 GMT a deputy is worried about house arrest for the elderly or infirm.

At 2018 GMT a deputy says the law should be adopted.

At 2022 GMT another deputy says he is worried that appeals from a region for the imposition of a state of emergency could again be ignored, as happened with Abkhazia. Article 2 should say that local organs should be able to introduce a state of emergency in autonomous oblasts etc.

At 2024 GMT Golik reminds deputies that state of emergency regulations will inevitably involve departures from normal legislation.

At 2028 GMT Nishanov proposes a vote on the draft law in the legal regime of the state of emergency, bearing in mind that the relevant commission will still have to consider the latest proposals. For: 171; against: five; abstentions: five.

At this point the recorded relay ends.

Ministers Answer Deputies 'Loaded' Questions

LD2803140290 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 28 Mar 90

[by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 28 (TASS)—In a question and answer session at the Soviet Parliament, government ministers were made formally accountable to legislators for the first time. In addition to members of the Supreme Soviet, the joint session of the two chambers was attended by 60 people's deputies who are not members of this permanent legislative authority, as well as by a group of American legislators led by Senator Edward Kennedy.

The Council of Ministers had received some 140 written questions from deputies by this morning. As was to be expected, most of them dealt with the implementation of the government program to improve the economy.

The first package of questions dealt with food shortages in the country. Responding to those questions, Vladilen Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, said that "moving up the introduction of regulated market relations" is the only way out of a very difficult situation. He called the deputies' attention to a number of negative trends in agriculture. For instance, the food production growth rate shrank by more than 50 per cent between 1988 and 1989. The growth of processing capacities runs seriously short of demand. Social relations in the countryside lag far behind, resulting in a migration to the cities at a rate of 1 million a year.

Then the floor was given to Igor Belousov, deputy head of government, who is in charge of the military-industrial complex. Responding to a question, he said that 126 nuclear explosions for economic purposes, specifically for oil and gas extraction, had been conducted in the USSR before 1988. They had been conducted at a depth of 1,500 meters and did not harm the environment. He categorically rejected suggestions that the explosions could serve the interests of the Soviet Defense Ministry. However, taking into account public attitude to them in the USSR and abroad, they have not been conducted since 1989.

Belousov was asked many loaded questions about the recent deal of the ANT state-cooperative enterprise, which tried to export tanks illegally. The case is being investigated, but the deputy prime minister's answers did not dispel the deputies' concern.

Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the parliamentary committee for international affairs, demanded that the investigation into the ANT case be accelerated in order to determine personal responsibility of not only rank-and-file executors of the deal, but also of those in high places who authorised it. He pointed out that "general conclusions should be drawn from this case" in order to avoid the recurrence of such incidents.

Deputy Prime Minister Aleskandra Biryukova, head of the social developments bureau under the Council of Ministers, answered deputies' questions for about an hour and a half. Most of them dealt with the production of consumer goods. Biryukova said that the production of consumer goods in the first two months of the current year went up by six per cent in comparison with January and February 1989. However, production targets for some types of goods were not reached. Biryukova believes that the main reason for it is the unstable situation in the country—strikes, work stoppages because of rallies and so on.

But she is optimistic about prospects for the development of consumer goods production this year. She believes that it is to increase by more than 20 per cent as against 1989.

Imports of consumer goods to the sum of 1 billion roubles will also help improve the situation on the consumer market. Imports of non-food products will be worth 730 million roubles. The remaining money will be

spent on the import of tea, coffee and baby food. In addition, 500 million roubles was allocated for the import of medicines and medical equipment.

The first experience of the question-and-answer session fell short of the expectations of many legislators. Summing up today's work, they called attention to the fact that some questions were too general, while some answers were too vague. The procedure will certainly be improved. Ministers will answer questions of people's deputies on the last Wednesday of every month.

Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov will make a report on the implementation of the government program to improve the economy on Wednesday, April 25. Cabinet members will answer questions of deputies on the same day.

Nikitin Airs Food Supply Problems

LD2803114690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] As we have already reported, a joint sitting of chambers of the Supreme Soviet is taking place at the Kremlin today. Members of the government are replying to questions put by people's deputies. More than 140 questions have been submitted. Comrade Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission for Food and Purchases was the first to provide replies. He spoke for half an hour. You will now hear an excerpt from his speech and deputy Sobchak's rejoinder. This excerpt from today's sitting gives one an idea of how this system, now to become traditional on the last Wednesday of each month, is working.

[Begin recording] [Nikitin—in progress]...to which it is shameful to reply—this is an answer to deputy Matviyenko concerning the situation with regard to the provision of children's foodstuffs for the country's population. We have a program here. It was adopted in 1987 and is to remain in force until 1995, for this is the date up to which the issue has been examined. It was necessary in this period to commission 14 facilities. Facilities are under construction, but the pace is sluggish. The process of creating new types of equipment is lagging behind. To be specific: The 15 new types represent 22 percent of the plan. The questions of packaging and packaging materials are being tackled, but the process is a complex one. This issue will be examined by the commission the day after tomorrow. Measures have been drawn up. All in all, these measures are all-embracing. As for the figures, this is what they look like; here are some figures concerning provision of children's foodstuffs:

Dry dairy produce for children: 43 million standard cans in 1988; 54 million in 1989, 57 million in 1990, and 80 million are planned for 1995. This year only 67 percent of what should have been supplied has been supplied.

Liquid and dough-like dairy produce: 19 percent of what should have been supplied this year has been supplied. It is planned to increase the program I have mentioned five-fold by 1995.

Meat-based tinned food for children: 21 percent of the demand has been met—this is 29 million standard cans—and 135 million cans are planned for 1995, as provided for in the program.

Fruit and vegetable-based canned food for children: 43 percent of the demand has been met, 752 million standard cans. In 1995 there ought to be 1.4 billion, twice as much.

It is a very complex and multifaceted program; it can be solved and the government will do everything necessary to this end.

A question has come in while things were in progress: Does the government have at its disposal the figures concerning supplies to all regions of the country of meat, milk, vegetables, mushrooms and other produce from the Chernobyl contamination zone?

Well, no supplies of any kind, of produce that is dangerous to the population, are not taken out from the Chernobyl contamination zone.

All in all, we have daily figures for supplies. It is one of the main concerns of the food commission. I can tell you about the situation with supplies of main produce as it was yesterday, if you are interested.

So, here are some figures about how March has been shaping up: The monthly plan said that 172,000 tonnes of meat should have been supplied. It is interesting for me to name these figures: 111,000 tonnes have been supplied, 64 percent, yesterday's balance. Well, who has done worse in this? Yesterday's figures show that Estonia delivered 22 percent of meat. They eat 90 kg themselves, they are increasing production, but, I mean, they fail to deliver to other regions. So there. Lithuania's performance with supplies is poor. Latvia's performance here is poor, although these republics have, all the same, given a promise to deliver this month, but so far they have delivered 57 percent each. So, due to this, suffering... [changes thought] I mean the Ukraine's deliveries are poor, and let me say that Belorussia's performance is nothing to write home about either. Moldavia and Russia are coping with this work better than anyone else.

[Sobchak] I mean I think that reports of this kind are not something we need. But when it is reported to us that some program is not being fulfilled, that something has not been done, then let the specific guilty parties be named to us, and let us be informed about what measures have been taken: Who has been punished and how? But we do not need general conversations. [voices, applause] [end recording]

Following a brief interval which has now been announced at the session, replies to questions will be continued.

Agriculture, Nuclear Testing Discussed

LD2803113290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Video report by correspondent V. Tsygankov from the 28 March USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Tsygankov] [video shows Supreme Soviet session in progress; Nikitin, Sobchak, and then Belousov at rostrum] Deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers spoke at a joint sitting of the chambers to answer questions from people's deputies. It has been decided subsequently to assign separate sittings of the chambers at the end of each month to this sort of dialogue, which is being conducted for the first time today.

A large group of questions related to the activation of the country's agro-industrial complex. Vladilen Valentinovich Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, described the situation in the agro-industrial complex as deteriorating: The speed of procurement of agricultural produce is slowing, and social problems in the countryside remain strained, as the exodus of rural inhabitants to the town is continuing. Furthermore, industrial enterprises are slowing down their regular deliveries to the countryside.

[Begin Nikitin recording] With regard to 1989: Production of grain rose 8.2 percent, of beet 10.8 percent, oil crops 14 percent, meat two percent, milk 1.3 percent, potatoes 15 percent, fruits and berries 11 percent. However, the increase does not lessen strains on the supply of food produce. A total of food produce worth R145 in retail prices was produced; the target was R151 billion or R6 billion under target. [end recording]

[Tsygankov] Nevertheless, many deputies were not satisfied with the replies. This is Sobchak's opinion:

[Begin Sobchak recording] If it is reported to us that a program is not being fulfilled, that something has not been done, then let us be told the names of those actually responsible, and what measures have been taken—who is to blame, and how he has been punished. [end recording]

[Tsygankov] Then Igor Sergeyevich Belousov spoke at the rostrum. Anwering questions about underground nuclear explosions, he stressed that these have not been carried out since 1989, nor will there be any this year. The government has thus taken account of the strong public reaction. With regard to similiar tests at Semipalatinsk, he said:

[Begin Belousov recording] We made the decision not to conduct tests at Semipalatinsk at the very least until the measures you have entrusted the government with have been thoroughly examined and ratified. This is being strictly carried out, and there have been no tests at Semipalatinsk whatsoever in December, nor in November of last year, nor in January, February and March. Nor will there, I believe, be any in April. Comrades may be assured on this point, so to speak.

In addition, We will be obliged to brief the Supreme Soviet on the long-term prospects for conducting nuclear tests in our country, in order to ensure our country's security, in order to do everthing possible to make sure that there are as few of these tests as possible, and both through the USSR Supreme Soviet, as I understand, and also through the government as well as through all other channels, in order to convince the United States of America not to conduct nuclear tests and at the same time to completely cease nuclear tests. This is the line that our government and the leadership of our country will strictly implement. [end recording]

[Tsygankov] The session is continuing its work.

Belousov Answers Deputies Questions

LD2803203990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1534 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Answers to written questions given by Igor Sergeyevich Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at 28 March session of the USSR Supreme Council—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Belousov] Esteemed comrade deputies, I have quite a lot of questions. All of them are without exception very serious and show that deputies are not only concerned over the state of affairs in various sectors of our country's national economy, but also that deputies are seeking a solution of issues and are demanding that the government adopt these measures. The questions relate to the work of my own industry and the work of the associated industries with which I work. I shall endeavor just to answer the main questions as some of the questions are of a private nature and demand an answer on a personal level.

Let me start with qustions that are connected to varying degrees with nuclear tests and certain other questions associated with this. Here is a question from Kliment Yegorovich Ivanov about the halting of underground nuclear blasts in permafrost conditions in the form of explosions for industrial purposes. This is a very serious question and I shall answer it.

Firstly, up to and including 1988 the Soviet Union had conducted 126 underground nuclear explosions of relatively low yield for national economic purposes. These were in the spheres of gas extraction, oil extraction, geological surveying, and for other purposes. This work was carried out up to 1988. This work in the interests of the national economy was conducted at depths of up to 1,500 meters, that is to say at very great depths, and it has had no effect on the environment. Nevertheless, since 1989 these underground explosions in the interests of the national economy have not been taken place. Nor will they take place in 1990.

The government is taking account of the fact that at the present time there is a fairly tense public reaction to matters connected with atomic energy, and the government is obliged to take account of this public reaction and will do so. Therefore, such work will not take place in 1990, and in the ensuing period these issues will be jointly discussed. I think that the government will not have the need in principle for conducting such explosions in the next few years and it will not have grounds for taking such a decision.

Second, all these underground explosions in the interests of the national economy were conducted in our country only on the instructions of the Council of Ministers, that is to say with the permission of the USSR government. No independent nuclear explosions in the interest of the national economy have been conducted by anyone, and ths is categorically prohibited. I would ask deputies to bear this in mind.

Finally, the third question. The following words occur in this question: Under the guise of explosions carried out for production purposes. That is to say, as if explosions were made in the interests of the national economy, whereas tests were carried out in the interests of defense. I tell the deputies of the Supreme Soviet that this is categorically not the case. Not one of the 126 explosions carried out in the interests of the national economy had anything at all in common with the interests of the Ministry of Defense. I say this with responsibility and in this respect you can absolutely rest assured.

Finally, the last thing. Despite the fact that all 126 explosions were carried out in the interests of our country, and when we say that altogether rather more than 700 explosions have been carried out in our country, as against 1,070 atomic, nuclear tests in the United States, then in this number of rather more than 700 that have been carried out up to the present time we have also included the 126 explosions in the interests of the national economy.

[indistinct voice from floor asks about Semipalatinsk]

[Belousov] Later, perhaps, because on Semipalatinsk I....

[Lukyanov] There will be several questions there....

[Belousov] I will answer, only at the end, perhaps.

[Lukyanov] Are there questions on this?

[Belousov] I will answer on Semipalatinsk. I'm simply worried that it'll take a lot of time. But I will certainly answer.

Questions from Comrade Veniamin Aleksandrovich Yarin: What measures are going to be taken by the government to eliminate the consequences of the accident during the 1950's at the atomic reactor in the Southern Urals? Evidently this is what it is about: The explosion was in 1957. An explosion took place at one of the combines belonging to the Ministy of Medium Machine-Building in the southern Urals. However, it was not the explosion of an atomic reactor but an explosion at a radioactive waste storage facility. It was an explosion for which there were full physical grounds, that is to say an analysis of the causes of the explosion confirmed fully the causes of what happened in 1957, and such an explosion with the discharge of radioactive waste—and this I want to stress—did indeed take place in 1957. However, this was not the explosion of a nuclear reactor, but the explosion of a waste storage facility.

A significant territory was polluted, and people were evacuated from that territory. They were all provided with housing for living in at state expense, naturally—it could not be any other way. After all these years a proportion of the territory which was subjected to pollution has been completely disinfected, and people have returned there, to a significant degree. That was in 1957. I should like to do the following here. If some kind of questions have appeared here today among the comrades who live there, then I should like to know about it, and, of course, measures will be taken to send some comrades there, to analyze the situation and clarify the issues which are causing concern there. According to all official data—I want to say this—in all the years of observation, no kind of deviation from the sickness norm for the country as a whole or for the region has been noted in the population in the zone of that chemical explosion.

A question from Comrade Vitaliy Mikhaylovich Shabanov: Does not the government consider it necessary to elaborate a well-founded program for power engineering, including the nuclear sector, in 1990?—and so on. This is a very serious and important question. I want to draw the esteemed deputies' attention to the fact that in the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 27 November 1989 an urgent measure for the ecological recovery of the country—well, in accordance with that decision, the Academy of Sciences, the State Planning Committee, the Council of Ministers Bureau for the Fuel and Energy Complex, and Bureau for Machine-Building, and other departments which are connected with and engaged in the creation and development of our power engineering will be instructed to work through this power engineering program, which is needed very seriously, for the subsequent future period. It requires serious amendment. You know the causes of the amendments which will need to be made: the attitudes in a number of regions to nuclear power, the difficulties in a number of regions, problems in setting up nuclear power stations, and so on.

That is to say in the first place some very serious preparatory work lies in front of us here, and on the other hand some very responsible preparations for the making of decisions. At the same time I would like to remind you that we are going to have to deal with questions of nuclear power generation. We cannot get away from the use of nuclear power generation for the purpose of providing energy for the program. Today we in the Soviet Union use nuclear power generation for producing 13 percent of all the electricity that we have in our country. Let me remind you that in France this proportion is 70 percent for nuclear power generation, in

Belgium it is 66 percent, in Hungary it is 49 percent, and in the FRG 34 percent. But without any doubt—and this work is being carried out, we in the government keep it under special monitoring—the further development of nuclear power generation will be linked without fail with additional and extraordinary measurs to ensure the safety of the work of all our nuclear stations. That is to say it is going to be necessary to create systems of such a kind as will have to work without interruption not only when the rules governing their operation are observed but in the event of any emergency, incorrect, deliberate or otherwise, actions taking place. Furthermore, systems are being developed which exclude the possibility of any breakdown altogether. We are working on this. It is a very serious question.

Has a state order been fixed for enterprises for the production of instruments used in monitoring the presence of radio-nucleides in food products? How may of these will go to Gomel Oblast, which suffered most from the Chernobyl accident? This is a correct question, of course, it is of concern to Tamara Vasilyevna. I will be very brief here. A state order for the production of these instruments has not been fixed, but this has not lifted responsibility from the systems. In addition to the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry we have involved two more defense ministries in the production of dosimeters for the population. This year 260,000 such instruments will be manufactured. All requirements of Gomel Oblast which have been stated for 1990 will be satisfied in full.

Perhaps there might be some point in dealing with Semipalatinsk here then. There are questions which I have only just received, and an oral question. I will try to answer these questions. To begin with those questions which I was given today, and then the additional question on Semipalatinsk which you had.

A question from Comrade Nikolay Semenovich Petrushenko. It has only just been handed to me. With reference to the (?90th) nuclear blast—as it says here—on Novaya Zemlya, is this not at variance with the agreement with the United States, and so on; is it not at variance with the agreement?

All tests held in our country, nuclear tests, are held at two testing grounds, in the area of Semipalatinsk and on Novaya Zemlya. I have already reported to you the numbers of blasts carried out at both of these. All this remains and will continue to remain within the limits of the adopted international accords and solutions. We have not allowed any divergence from the international agreements and do not intend doing so. On the contrary, we are going to require of ourselves and of others that international agreements are strictly observed.

Does the government have scientifically substantiated data about the harmful effects of the nuclear blasts at the Semipalatinsk testing ground? After all, we took many hurried decisions and then had to change them because they were not based on scientific data. So how are things in this respect? What are we to believe—emotions or scientifically substantiated data?

Esteemed comrade deputies, I will answer briefly, because if you find it necessary to devote more time to this issue and to hear my answers to any questions connected with the nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk or on Novaya Zemlya, or generally any questions connected with this direction, the government, and myself naturally, are prepared to provide exhaustive, comprehensive answers. Now I shall answer very briefly, in light of the procedure you have adopted.

[Unidentified speaker] (?Well, that was my question, Boris Mikhaylovich.) We want an appointment with you.

[Belousov] You are welcome. In this respect I, we in the government, have a well-known procedure for the deputies. Any deputy who wants to meet with members of the government has every opportunity for that. I have gladly been meeting many deputies of the Supreme Soviet, just like other members of the government have. I consider these meetings to be mutually beneficial.

So, as far as Semipalatinsk is concerned, I shall be brief, seeing as the question has been raised, without going into details.

As for the whole question of Semipalatinsk, it is fairly wide-ranging, serious, and difficult. First, I want to inform the deputies of the Supreme Soviet straight away that you have given the government instructions for necessary measures connected with nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya to be prepared in the first quarter. In full accordance with that instruction, the government has elaborated these measures in the first quarter, and they should be approved in the immediate future.

The whole of Semipalatinsk has to be divided into two parts: tests at Semipalatinsk up to 1963, when tests of nuclear systems, nuclear weapons, were conducted above ground and in the air. That was a complex and serious period of testing. That period could not pass by without a trace, so we have to speak about this directly and with a high level of responsibility. As we know, immediately after the end of the war the Soviet Union proposed an overall ban on nuclear arms, but you know, esteemed comrade deputies, that the United States did not agree to this at that time. Since 1963, when a joint decision was adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States on banning the holding of explosions above ground or in the air, not one explosion above ground or in the air has been conducted either on Novaya Zemlya or, definitely, at Semipalatinsk; and all tests since 1963 have been underground. I do not want to say that there is much joy, in inverted commas, as they say. It is, of course, an unpleasant feeling, because we have not managed and are not managing, at fairly high levels of explosion, to evade seismic effects and influence and the feeling of conducting nuclear tests. Nevertheless, the government, knowing the very great anxiety of the comrades who live

in the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan, has adopted a whole series of decisions which I consider very responsible.

I shall mention just two of them. First, we have adopted the decision not to conduct tests at Semipalatinsk at the very least until the measures you have entrusted the government with have been thoroughly examined and ratified. This is being carried out strictly, and there have been no tests at Semipalatinsk whatsoever in December, nor in November of last year, nor in January, February, and March, nor, believe me, will there any in April either. Comrades may be assured on this point, so to speak.

The second question—this is on the first question. Second, in spite of the fact that this, of course, influences the development of complex equipment which is necessary in our conditions to guarantee our country's security, we have agreed and adopted the decision, unilaterally and of our own will, to conduct test explosions in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk—and we have done so recently—at a threshold level several times lower than we decided with the United States.

This is to say that, instead of the 150 allowed we went down to a level several times lower. We follow this line in the interests, so to speak, of the cause. I consider that this question is so serious and so great that we shall be obliged to provide the Supreme Soviet with additional information on the further outlook for the conducting of nuclear tests in our country—on the one hand to ensure the security of our country and also to do everything possible to ensure that these tests are as small-scale as possible and thereby do everything possible both through the USSR Supreme Soviet, as I see it, and also through the government and all other spheres in order to convince the United States not to conduct nuclear tests and at the same time to totally halt nuclear tests. This line of our government, our leadership and our country will be strictly observed.

I now move on to the next group of small questions. Comrade Valeriy Ivanovich Tsybukh has a question that certainly concerns everyone. Therefore, I shall just answer his question. What has been done and is being done to settle the issue of the expediency of maintaining military construction detachments and how is the question being tackled of enshrining in law the legal position of the military construction workers? I shall answer briefly in view of the time situation.

The government has been engaged on this issue. The USSR Ministry of defense has already put forward proposals for the disbandment of the military construction detachments, which work in a fairly large number of our ministries. I must say that the military construction detachments are employed not just on projects that are being created or have been created in the interests of the country's defense. Naturally they are employed on Ministry of Defense projects, but they are also employed on many social projects. This issue, therefore, is already being considered by the government.

One thing that is certain is that a decision will be adopted on this matter. At the very least we shall fix a final date somewhat later, but from 1 January 1992 the number of military construction detachments, and naturally their strength, will be considerably reduced compared with the present strength of the military construction detachments forming part of the Ministry of Defense. I think that we shall bring about—and the government's actions are directed toward this in the final analysis—the elimination of the military construction detachments, but this will require quite some time, and probably the whole of the next 5-Year plan period will be required for the total elimination of the military construction detachments which are employed in other ministries and not in the Ministry of Defense. However, we shall achieve this.

But from the first day of 1992 a considerable number of military construction detachments will already be reduced in a whole number of ministies. This work is now taking place in the government. We are naturally dealing with it.

The next group of questions is as follows. Pavel Vadimovich Shetko: Is there in existence a commission of the Council of Ministers to prepare a state program on issues concerning former servicemen of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, invalids, and members of the families of those who died? At what stage is the working out of such a program?

Well what must I say, comrade deputies? To begin with, what there is and how things actually stand. I was in Afghanistan recently. But you know the situation, it is complicated, but the people of Afghanistan have enormous respect—I want to stress that—have enormous respect for those internationalist servicemen who were in Afghanistan. For our own part we must do everything to help those who have served in Afghanistan in resolving social questions and all other questions which are linked with the life of these remarkable people who are now in our country, both those at work and the invalids.

Therefore, in accordance with a decision of the presidium of the Council of Ministers a plan of measures was confirmed on those decisions which were adopted by the Second Congress of People's Deputies. In accordance with this plan a working group has been set up and the bureau on social development—it is headed by Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova—and a whole range of other departments has been instructed to prepare the program you are talking about and this question is at the stage of being worked out and during the first half of the year, as the government has prescribed, that program will be presented and I hope confirmed. [passage omitted]

Yakovlev Views State of Emergency Law

LD2903103190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1922 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Speech by USSR Justice Minister V.F. Yakovlev, introduced by session chairman Nishanov, at 28 March session of the Soviet of Nationalities—recorded]

[Text] [chairman Nishanov] Today, dear comrades, our chamber will discuss the draft law on the legal regime for the state of emergency. This draft law has been discussed by the Soviet of the Union and has been adopted in the first reading. We will consider it today. We have invited Comrade Veniamin Fedorovich Yakovlev, minister of justice of the USSR, to give a report. If you please: Comrade Golik, I ask you to prepare yourself. Veniamin Fedorovich asks for 20 minutes [noise from the floor] That's a lot? Veniamin Fedorovich, the chamber of the Soviet of Nationalities works very efficiently. I ask you to take this into account.

[Yakovlev] I have understood.

[Nishanov] If you please.

[Yakovlev] That is, I have been allotted only half the time as in the other chamber. Well, what does it matter? More efficiently means more efficiently. Respected chairman, respected comrade people's deputies, you know that it was really a month ago that the Soviet of the Union considered in its first reading the draft law on the legal procedures for the state of emergency and approved it in the first reading.

I am giving a report here on the instructions of the government but I would like, as first thoughts, to state the following. First, the draft law on the legal procedures for the emergency situation has been prepared on the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Second, I would like to say that there are in the draft, in the text distributed to you, two variants for the name of this law: On the Legal Procedures for the State of Emergency, and the Law on the Emergency Situation. We have once again attentively worked on this issue and think that the first name is, all the same, more precise and better—On the Legal Procedures for the Emergency Situation. Because, strictly speaking, in itself the emergency situation is not created by the law but is created by the circumstances which are taking shape for some reasons or other. Therefore, the appropriate bodies declare the introduction of the state of emergency, introduce the procedures of the state of emergency, but they do not create the situation which leads to the introduction, which brings about the introduction of this regime. For this reason we think that the first name on the legal procedures for the emergency situation is, all the same, the more exact one.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that the presence of such a law is essentially a necessary element in the normal legal system of any society. Why? Because those situations, as a rule are extreme situations which suddenly arise and which are dangerous for a large number of people. These situations arise, may arise in any society, and consequently it is essential to have legislative acts which would regulate the measures which are applied in such situations. Our reality has in recent times, unfortunately, also been quite rich in such situations, equally tragic and large-scale, although diverse by nature.

These are the very major earthquake—let us say in Armenia; Chernobyl, and also the events known to everyone in Fergana, in Novvy Uzen, around Nagorno-Karabakh, and so on and so on. I will not enumerate all of the circumstances which have created great danger for a significant number of people. The second reason why it is essential to have a law of this type is that in essence the introduction of an emergency situation is envisaged by the USSR Constitution, in particular by those amendments which you quite recently submitted.

So the introduction of a state of emergency is envisaged by the law in the Constitution, but there is no regulating law. It is clear that this is absolutely necessary because its absence either condemns the bodies of power and government to inaction and indecisiveness in precisely those cases where resolute actions are required to ensure people's security or to protect public order; or alternatively unjustified and excessive measures can sometimes be used in the absence of a law. Thus the law makes it possible to avoid both things—both inaction and the use of excessive or unjustified measures.

The purpose of the law is to create legal possibilities for urgently taking effective measures to normalize a situation, to provide people with the essentials for life and to restore and maintain public order.

Naturally the question arises whether the law in itself that has been proposed and its contents conform to our obligations in international law and the international standards that exist. We have carefully analyzed the draft bill from this point of view and I can state quite categorically that yes, the draft bill does not conform to our international obligations and standards. Article 4 of the international pact on civil political rights makes it possible to introduce a state of emergency and the conditions of a state of emergency, though of course it does so under definite conditions.

These conditions are as follows: First, the introduction of a state of emergency has to be announced officially. Second, an appropriate state, introducing a state of emergency, can apply measures in deviation from its obligations under the pact on citizens' rights and restrict these rights, to a certain extent, in extreme situations, but restrict them to the extent that is dictated by the gravity of the situation and on condition that the measures being introduced are not incompatible with other obligations in international law and do not introduce discrimination exculsively on the grounds of race, sex, language, religion, or social origin. At the same time, deviation must not be permitted from the right to life

and must not be accompanied by the use of torture, treatment that is inhumane or degrading to human dignity, slavery or forced conditions, deprivation of liberty, or failure to fulfill undertakings under agreements; or retrospective criminal laws which establishes new liability —new criminal liability—or more serious measures of punishment. These measures must not be accompanied by the deprivation of the right to subjectivity, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

I think that a careful analysis of the draft that has been proposed shows that it is in accordance with the requirement that I have listed.

The law in the first place sets the grounds for the introduction of a state of emergency; second, the order for its introduction; third, it gives the measures that are introduced under the conditions of a state of emergency; and finally, it names those measures which ensure that measures within the framework of a state of emergency are applied in real terms.

Article 1 of the law points out the grounds for the introduction of a state of emergency. Those grounds are as follows: the need to ensure the security of citizens in cases of natural calamities, major accidents or disasters, epidemics, epizootics, and also during mass disorders. Those are the grounds for the introduction of a state of emergency.

The procedure for introducing a state of emergency is defined by Point 13 of Article 13 of the Constitution and also by Point 15 of Article 127-3 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the bill being put forward for your consideration.

At the same time, the draft bill, following its examination at the Soviet of the Union, has been changed considerably. It has been changed because during this time, as you know, changes have taken place in the constitution in connection with the introduction of the post of president, and you are already considering the draft law in a different form, with due consideration for the changes which have taken place in the Constitution.

The text of the law conforms in full to the constitution in its present-day, so to speak, state. It provides for a state of emergency on the territory of a union republic or individual localities within a union republic, within the limits of a union republic, to be carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the appropriate union republic, and in the period between sessions, by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the union republic. However, in the interests of ensuring the security of citizens, the USSR president gives notice of the declaration of a state of emergency and if necessary introduces it in individual localities in three cases; either at the request of the union republic, or with the agreement of the union republic, or more precisely its bodies; or, as an exception and when such agreement is absent—when it is necessary. But in that case the president is obliged to immediately table for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet the confirmation of his decision.

As far as a state of emergency throughout the whole country is concerned, it is introduced only by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The president does not have the right to introduce it.

The procedure also provides that when a state of emergency is introduced the territory which it covers, the period for which the state of emergency is being introduced and the grounds, that is to say the reasons for its introduction, are given without fail.

The measures forming the legal regime of a state of emergency are contained in Article 5 of the draft bill. This article is a key article in so far as it does indeed point out these measures which can be introduced under conditions of a state of emergency.

I will break these measures up into four groups.

First of all there are measures here aimed at ensuring that the population has the essentials for living. These are measures like the protection of special facilities connected with the provision of life essentials for citizens, like water supply facilities, for example. It means ensuring the activity of enterprises linked with the life activity of the population, the mobilization of resources, the strengthening of production discipline under conditions of a state of emergency, and so on.

The second group of measures are measures for maintaining public order. It is precisely these measures that affect the rights of citizens to some extent or other as a rule. To some extent they restrict them, but they are essential under conditions of a state of emergency. In particular there is the introduction of a curfew, the temporary removal of weapons, the restriction of entry into and exit from territories where a state of emergency has been declared, and so on.

The third group of measures are measures of a compensatory nature for making housing available to citizens who have been victims, repairing material damage, and so on.

Finally the fourth group of measures are safeguarding measures, measures of administrative and criminal liability which ensure, which ensure in real terms, the conditions of the state of emergency.

The draft establishes that not all measures envisaged by Article 5 must of necessity be introduced in every case where a state of emergency is declared. Only those measures that are necessary in the specific conditions are applied, in other words, the measures have to be adequate to meet the specific situation. Consequently these measures depend upon the scale, territory, and reasons for the introduction of a state of emergency. In a word, these measures must be introduced each time in a differentiated form. The introduction of a state of emergency certainly does not mean that all the measures are introduced. This law must not be understood in that way.

In conclusion I would also like to say that legislation of this kind exists essentially in all countries, or virtually in all countries of the world. I don't think that it's necessary for me, perhaps, to describe the content of the legislation on the state of emergency in other countries of the world, but as an example let's say that the French law on the introduction of a state of emergency provides for the police to be given extremely wide powers under the conditions of a state of emergency, such powers, for example, as the right to carry out searches of dwellings at any time of day, and any measures to ensure control of the press and radio broadcasting. Martial law is brought into operation upon representation of the minister of justice, and so on.

In the United States a state of emergency can be introduced by the federal authorities to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters and also to put an end to mass internal disturbances which are regarded as posing a threat to U.S. interests. At the same time both units of the National Guard and military units can be brought in and the country's president has the right to use any means and measures which he considers necessary to stop or to prevent the unfavorable development of an internal situation.

Consequently, I do not think that our legislation, the proposed legislation, differs for the worse in this respect from its overseas counterparts, so to speak. It is no tougher, and I would say that in many cases it is less tough and consequently it is fully in keeping with the international standard that is coming into being in the area.

The population of our country is deeply interested in the leading revolutionary changes in the political, economic, and social spheres. But today people have no less great a need to be provided with normal living conditions, to be rid of uncertainty and fear, and for their security to be ensured. The state is called upon and is under an obligation to ensure the security of its citizens and perhaps this is done in part with the help of the law which you are examining today.

Thank you.

Moiseyev Explains Amendment on Military Service

LD2803133390 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—Soviet conscripts will no longer be called up by an order of the Soviet defence minister, but by a government resolution, according to an amendment passed by the Supreme Soviet today.

Explaining the amendment, First Deputy Soviet Defence Minister Mikhail Moiseyev said that certain troops are not under the command of the defence minister, including the railway, interior and border troops.

It is the government that allocates human resources for the army, he said.

During a debate on the issue, several deputies pointed out that in some republics, for instance in the Baltics, nationalists were agitating against service in the Soviet Army.

State of Emergency Bill Passes First Reading

LD2803173190 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—The bill on a state of emergency passed the first reading at the Council of Nationalities, which met in the afternoon today after a full-house sitting of the Soviet parliament.

The bill was approved by the Council of the Union, the other house of the Soviet legislature, last February.

Presenting the bill to deputies, Soviet Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev described it as "part of a normal juridical system found in any society".

The minister remarked that although the Soviet Constitution envisages the possibility of introducing a state of emergency, there is no law. In the past few months this lack has often resulted in inaction on the part of authorities and the adoption of inadequate measures.

People "are greatly interested in current revolutionary changes in the political, social and economic spheres," Yakovlev said.

"But people also need normal conditions for life, safety, and freedom from uncertainty and fear. The state is called upon to ensure the safety of its citizens, including through use of the proposed law on the state of emergency."

Under the bill, a state of emergency can be announced by the Supreme Soviet or the president of the USSR should there be a need to protect the life or health of a large number of people during natural calamities or mass disorders.

A state of emergency should be introduced with a mandatory statement about the grounds, territory and duration of the declaration. The population should be warned about the introduction of the state of emergency in advance through the mass media.

Several amendments were suggested during the debate. Nikolay Ignatovich of Belorussia and several other deputies proposed denying managers the right to dismiss workers during a state of emergency, as suggested in the bill. Instead, they proposed temporary suspension from work.

TASS Sums Up 28 March Supreme Soviet Session

LD2803203390 Mosco TASS in English 2119 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS Parliamentary Correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—In a question and answer session at the Soviet Parliament today, government ministers were made formally accountable to legislators for the first time.

The questions were answered by Vladilen Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov and another deputy premier—Aleksandra Biryukova.

From now on, such procedures will be regular—ministers will answer questions of people's deputies on the last Wednesday of every month.

Today, Parliament passed an amendment to the military service law. Soviet conscripts will no longer be called up by an order of the Soviet defence minister, but by a government resolution.

After the full-house sitting, the Parliament's chambers held separate sittings.

Yevgeniy Primakov, who was appointed a member of the Presidential Council, today resigned as chairman of the Council of the Union.

The Council of the Union failed to find a successor to Primakov. Both candidates—IZVESTIYA Editor-in-Chief Ivan Laptev and Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Legislation Committee Konstantin Lubenchenko—failed to get the required simple majority of the total chamber membership.

The issue will be discussed again on Monday.

The Council of Nationalities approved an income tax bill in the first reading. Yesterday, the bill was passed by the Council of the Union.

The Council of Nationalities also passed a bill on a state of emergency in the first reading. The bill was approved by the Council of the Union last February.

Under the bill, a state of emergency can be announced by the Supreme Soviet or the president of the USSR should there be a need to protect the life or health of a large number of people during natural calamities or mass disorders.

On April 2, the chambers will hold separate sittings, at which they will discuss in the second reading the bills on a state of emergency and on the strengthening of responsibility for encroachments on the national equality of citizens and for the violation of the country's territorial integrity.

Political & Social

Establishment of USSR Presidency Examined

90UN1224A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Mar 90 p 1

[Comment by Yuriy Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Law and Order and the Fight Against Crime: "The President Carries the Responsibility...."]

[Text] **The third special USSR Congress of People's Deputies came to a close late in the evening on 15 March. During its work we came out regularly with reports and commentaries. Now the time has come to single out what was most important. Yuriy Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Law and Order and the Fight Against Crime, has this to say.**

The special congress convened to consider and establish the presidential form of government in the country, and it handled its task well.

No, the deputies did not simply rename the first person in the state and assign him additional powers. It is a question of a fundamental change in our entire political structure and the division of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" has lost its all-encompassing meaning.

We will recall that it was not long ago that we tried to follow the principle of the so-called "collective leadership." The Politburo was the de facto president: It was only a year ago that the Supreme Soviet just "stamped" the decisions of the Politburo. To this day we cannot figure out who, for example, gave the order to introduce troops into Afghanistan. It turns out that the soldiers got themselves under way and went.... The necessity for a similar kind of examination is henceforth fading: According to Article 127 of the USSR Constitution, the president is the head of state. He answers personally for his decisions—with honor and with the post....

Although it is still difficult to consider our congress a professional working organ, the difference by comparison with past convocations, however, is noticeable. Under the circumstances, we were able to introduce certain fundamental amendments. We will recall that according to the initial draft, the Committee for Constitutional Oversight was formed on the recommendation of the president. The deputies considered this inadvisable and justly reasoned that the committee must be independent of the head of state, with expert analysis of the normative documents that he issued. Now the right of recommending candidacies is transferred to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which, of course, is more democratic. This amendment to today's situation, perhaps, seeming to be a formality, can become vital in the future. At the same time, the right of the president to deprive citizenship has been preserved. During the voting on this question, in my opinion, a deficiency in the professionalism of the deputies had an effect.

Depriving anyone of citizenship is an amoral act, and, moreover, it is at variance with pertinent provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948. We will hope that our presidents will never use this right.

Is the establishment of the presidency at the same time also a weakening of the authority of the Supreme Soviet? I do not believe so. A strong president and a strong parliament have a vested interest in each other. The Supreme Soviet remains one of the main guarantors against the usurpation of power. In fact, the president can apply only one "sanction" against it: to make a recommendation concerning its election in a new composition if insurmountable differences arise between the chambers. But nonetheless the decision remains with the congress.

One more structure in our political system attracts attention—the Presidential Council. The head of state himself forms it. Suspicions have already been expressed that, as they say, warm chairs are provided for the current Politburo members on such a council. I am not going to predict the resolution of this question. But I am confident: Competent people will come onto the president's "team" no matter what they worked at before. No one will keep "dead weight" in such an important organ.

The Law on the Establishment of the Presidency adopted at the congress is, of course, imperfect, and it will have to be worked on more. In what way? The list of individuals who have the right to nominate candidates to the new post will certainly be expanded. The number of rights and powers of the president will be subject to refinement. We still have to develop the procedure on general elections and include it in the law.... Adjustments will be introduced by life itself—you cannot envision all fine points under laboratory conditions.

A few words about the problem of holding the posts of president and leader of the party at the same time. Today this is critical, and the desire of people to separate the two forms of authority is understandable. But this is today, under the conditions of a one-party system. When at least one more party that is not "exotic" appears in our country, arguments on this question will become pointless. The leader of the party that wins the elections will become the president—this is considered natural in many countries of the world.

...What do I already expect today from President M.S. Gorbachev? That in keeping with the unwritten rule in international practice, he would come out with a program of the first 100 days of his activity in the new capacity. To what would I like to summon the people's deputies? To a greater responsibility for the fate of the country. We need not set our hopes on the omnipotence of the president. He must sense support for himself in the Supreme Soviet and in the entire deputy corps.

Presidential Council Member Shatalin Interviewed

90UN1330A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Academician S. Shatalin by Vladimir Sokolov, editor of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA economic and science department: "One of the President's Team"]

[Text] For the first time in our history a Presidential Council has been set up. The economist Academician S. Shatalin, who has been appointed to the council, gives a first interview in his new capacity to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

[Sokolov] It seems to me, Stanislav Sergeyevich, that you were one of the first to formulate the need to create a permanent group of advisers for the country's leadership ("Losses Are Inevitable, But...." LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 41, 1989). This has been done. Will the Presidential Council change the structure of power today? And if so, how?

[Shatalin] This is exactly what is not yet clear, and indeed cannot be. As you see, there are ex officio people in the council whose briefs are the central problems—foreign policy, defense, security, internal affairs. In addition, the prime minister is also a member of the council by virtue of his position. People occupying key posts in the state now find themselves directly subordinate to the president via the council.

[Sokolov] Without a "buffer" in the form of the Politburo?

[Shatalin] Yes, directly. This will accelerate the implementation of instructions issued by the head of state and will ensure collegiality in operational decisions, and—the main thing—will increase the responsibility of these persons to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Oversight Committee, and other democratic institutions, for it is no longer possible to shift the blame to some "buffer."

[Sokolov] With key posts, this is clear, but what will be the function of writers, scientists, and deputies who do not wield administrative power?

[Shatalin] They are by no means all advisers. Because formally I now have the same status as, for example, Yu.D. Maslyukov. Of course, my new colleagues will also be able to offer advice on the most important directions in the development of society, but their rank is higher than just that function. Special groups of experts and technical associates will be set up under each of them and each will have his own advisers whose task will be to prepare each day a very complete and objective picture of the state of society and the life of the country and provide an adequate basis for decisionmaking.

[Sokolov] Essentially, to finally set up a feedback system, is this not so?

[Shatalin] Precisely. Here, a member of the council will not simply offer the president particular recommendations but be responsible for their accuracy and effectiveness. For this, of course, he must monitor how accurately his advice is implemented and he should have opportunities to intervene in the process of implementation and correct it if necessary. This is already partly a power function.

[Sokolov] And for what specifically will Academician Shatalin be responsible?

[Shatalin] In some sense for the economic reform. Primarily for the new types of entrepreneurship in the USSR—joint stock companies, collective enterprises, cooperatives, lease enterprises and farms, foreign investment in the Soviet Union, the securities market....

[Sokolov] What will your relationship with the committee and commission for economic reform be?

[Shatalin] In fact it will be "monitoring" the science behind their operations. I think that here, subordination will not have any meaning. In general, it seems to me, it would be more correct even to call the new organ the Council for National Security and National Consensus, and to understand its functions from this viewpoint. Some nongovernmental part of the council should also ensure communication with the president, and between the president and the entire structure of power and the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, and the spokesmen for the sentiments and aspirations of nations and entire regions. In addition, we shall, of course, be cooperating inside the council—Shatalin with Yanin, Aytmatov with Kauls.... whatever the combination; this will also promote agreement between nations and social groups.

[Sokolov] We are also in favor of seizing on agreement with both hands, for, let us be candid, nothing is of greater importance than the survival of the nations. However, let us return to day-to- day matters. How do you evaluate the state of the economy in February?

[Shatalin] It has not improved. Perhaps it has even gotten worse. In industry growth rates are negative, they are behind the rates for last year. Money incomes continue to grow very quickly and present measures are simply ineffective. The time has come for radical measures and the public must now prepare itself for inevitable price increases, and producers for the harsh conditions of today's market. Without this there will be no turn for the better.

[Sokolov] Yes, the public seems somehow ready; without paying out a great deal it is impossible to acquire even essentials, so it is better to give it to the budget than to the speculators. And a final "everyday" question: Where will the council work?

[Shatalin] In the Kremlin, alongside the president. Since the Supreme Soviet set us up not as a representative body but for intensive work, suitable premises are being prepared.

[Sokolov] Thank you, Stanislav Sergeyevich. I think that the readers will support us in our sincere good wishes for the success of the Presidential Council.

Yarin on Presidential Council Appointment

PM2703110190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy V. Yarin by Captain Third Rank V. Urban: "First Interview. Worker in the Presidential Council"—date and place of interview not stated; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] V.A. Yarin, USSR people's deputy from the Urals, is well known to our readers. His political credo is well known too: To return the worker to the political arena. He himself is a worker.

The other day the operator at the Nizhniy Tagil V.I. Lenin Metallurgical Combine was appointed a member of the USSR Presidential Council. So it would be useful to recall some of his biographical details. He was born in 1940, is a CPSU member with 20 years experience, and has a high school education. He has been at the combine since the age of 18. He was involved in constructing "Field Camp 650" there and stayed to work in it. He won 78 percent of the votes in the election for USSR People's Deputy.

Yarin has often given interviews in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Today's conversation is his first interview as a member of the USSR Presidential Council.

[Urban] How do you view your appointment?

[Yarin] I always say that I am an optimist. So I reacted to my appointment quite calmly, although I do not deny the surprise element. But the point is that back in the summer, at the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] plenum, I made a proposal to include workers in all the country's leading state and political echelons. Of course, by "worker" I do not just mean the man at the lathe. I use this definition much more broadly.

So. Since the summer, I have been pursuing this line, that is, the line of participation by real representatives of the people in the political and economic leadership. And not in vain, it seems. For example, a worker has appeared in the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau. He is Anatoliy Korolev, a fellow lathe operator from the "Uralmashzavod." And I think there will now be more examples like this.

And what about my appointment? I must admit that I was expecting the president to take such a step. Of course, I was not thinking of myself but rather, quite

simply, about other workers. But, I repeat, I was expecting it. I do not see this as a personal victory. But it is a victory for my views.

[Urban] Under the USSR Constitution, the Presidential Council's tasks consist in drawing up measures to implement basic directives in our internal and foreign policies and ensure the country's security. That is why I ask you this next question, Veniamin Aleksandrovich: How do you personally understand the concept of "the country's security?"

[Yarin] It lies in economic and political stability. Personally, I do not rule out the possibility of a threat from outside. Such things happen. It is in the resolution of these very questions that I would very much like to be useful to the president. That is how I view my work. First of all consultation with the people, then discussion at the Presidential Council of problems that really worry people.

Incidentally, a great deal has recently been said about backing perestroyka. But there are many political forces which, while paying lip service to perestroyka, take steps in the opposite direction. The situation in the country is very complex. A tough stance is also needed in implementing the reforms of perestroyka's leader, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Those are my views. If I can be useful to the president's team and, more importantly, if we manage to take a real step forward, that means that I will achieve my aim in life.

[Urban] Do you often meet with Gorbachev?
[Yarin] I wouldn't say often, but it does happen.
[Urban] What problems does your electorate raise?

[Yarin] The point is that the situation in the Urals is very unstable at the moment. For example, it is very difficult to obtain meat products. I have started finding out the reasons—after all, it concerns my voters. These reasons suggested that intervention from the central power is vital here. I do not mean that the position has now significantly improved. But there has been progress. The Council of Ministers has adopted measures effectively and is supervising the structures which started breaking down recently for no good reason. The good slogan of self-government resulted in considerable losses for us in the Urals. Supply contracts with other oblasts were broken. People demanded of us directly: Apart from money, give us some of your production as well. A railroad car-load of steel, for instance. This was some kind of state racket! After all, supplies of food products were being boycotted. Could we just stand by?

[Urban] Will you raise questions concerning our Armed Forces?

[Yarin] That is the direct duty of the Presidential Council. As for me personally.... A great deal has been said in defense of the Armed Forces in parliament recently. This coincides with my position. I served in the Army at a difficult time during the Caribbean crisis. There is no need to explain what the Army was created for, and the question of whether it is necessary or not simply does not arise. My opinion is simple: Our Armed Forces deserve a great deal of attention and a better understanding of all their problems.

[Urban] Thank you for your good words. On behalf of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers, allow me to congratulate you on your appointment as a member of the Presidential Council and wish you successes in your work.

Disagreement Over Primakov's Successor Reported

LD2803133490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1230 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 March (TASS)—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet of the Union (one of the two chambers of the Soviet parliament), which today relieved Yevgeniy Primakov of the post of chairman of the chamber, following his appointment as a member of the presidential council, has been unable to choose a successor.

Neither of the candidates nominated—Ivan Laptev, chief editor of IZVESTIYA, and Konstantin Lubenchenko, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on issues of legislation, legality, and law and order—gained the simple majority of the roll of chamber members required by law.

The question of the chamber chairman will be discussed against next Monday.

Ligachev, Journalists Discuss Party, Perestroyka

LD2803163390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Today Ligachev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, met correspondents working in the republics, krays, and oblasts in the editorial office of the newspaper SELSKAYA ZHIZN today. Questions of preparation for the 28th party congress, the work of rural party organizations in contemporary conditions, restructuring production relations in the countryside, and equipping the agro-industrial complex with technical and social facilities were discussed. The question of the need for the party to break off relations with those who are members but who are taking part in anti-socialist, separatist, and nationalist organizations and who are undermining the CPSU from within was trenchantly posed. Comrade Ligachev answered journalist questions.

Baklanov Defends CPSU Discipline, Doctrine

PM2803161790 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Interview with Oleg Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by V. Ostrovskiy: "To Be a Political Leader!"—date and place not stated]

[Text] [Ostrovskiy] The draft CPSU Platform for the 28th Party Congress speaks of reinterpreting the principle of democratic centralism. Oleg Dmitriyevich, will this reinterpretation not prevent the strengthening of discipline in the party ranks?

[Baklanov] Reinterpreting does not mean rejecting this basic organizational principle at all. It must be preserved, or else the party may turn into a discussion club—which some people would like it to become. I believe that the draft platform contains the fundamental thesis of taking into account the opinions of the minority and its right to defend its views. This is a step toward the democratization of the CPSU. In the past, there was no such stance in the party's activity, but instead there was crude, hierarchical discipline.

If we are talking about the power of the party masses as an obligatory condition in the profound democratization of the party, then this process will be expressed primarily in increasing the role and extending the rights of primary party organizations, which are the basis of the party. I am not going to repeat the positions expounded in the draft platform on this subject, but I would like to focus on the right of primary party organizations to act in accordance with rules and procedures which, incidentally, they would establish themselves, so as to have the opportunity to influence the work and decisions of higher party organs, conferences, and congresses.

At the same time, we proceed on the basis of the idea that a primary party organization should, as it were, supply the elective party organs not just with ideas but with people, based on the political and human qualities of communists and their competence. In a word, the party does not intend to relax discipline in its ranks.

This is all the more important in the multiparty society for which we are aiming. As the experience of foreign parties shows, questions of discipline acquire special significance in a party's struggle for influence over the masses. In our conditions, it is also important because we are faced with the task of consolidating society while pursuing its revolutionary renewal.

In this connection, I would like to note that, if a party member fails to fulfill the party's decisions and does so deliberately, then I believe that we should not wait until he leaves the party of his own accord.

[Ostrovskiy] Will the CPSU go back to active ideological work among the masses?

[Baklanov] I believe that this is the CPSU's main task. The shortcomings that occurred in this sphere—and I do not rule out the world communist and workers' movement in this context—took place as a result of underrating ideological work among communists themselves and among the people. At times this work was no more than dogmatism and formalism, and living creative thought was lost. People were discouraged from thinking independently. As a result, many people have now turned out to be unprepared for burning theoretical discussions and they have lost the ability to argue intelligibly in support of the party's communist positions.

I will take the liberty of making a comparison. Jesus Christ's tragedy and pathos lay in not being understood by his contemporaries. However, people live according to his ideas to this day. Something similar is now happening in the communist movement. A significant proportion of the consumer society has rejected its ideas, and many people are predicting the collapse of this movement and are in a hurry to bury it. In actual fact, I believe, this is is a profound error and a misconception of the process. It is no secret that capitalism borrowed from communism much that is useful and good. This benefited the whole of mankind. This must be appreciated. The wonderful idea of constructing a communist society has somehow or other conquered the minds of millions and millions of people. I believe in that.

[Ostrovskiy] At the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a number of speakers talked about the need to reexamine the role of political organs in the Army and in the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and the troops under its authority. What was envisaged here: their self-elimination, or a transformation of their functions and structures?

[Baklanov] I wouldn't simplify the question like that. First, we must bear in mind that we have a history of political organs that have fully proved their value—including during the period of World War II. They fulfill a very important educational function. This side of their activity absolutely must be preserved. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that those who serve in the army, in the MVD internal troops, or in the militia must not lose their political complexion. Neither the Army nor the MVD is separated in our society from the political and social life of our country. And I believe that servicemen should have the right to membership and activity in their party organizations. And this, incidentally, is the constitutional right of every Soviet citizen.

The more so as we do not intend to renounce the territorial-production principle of party building, and this means that the military collectives keep their party organizations. The same applies to the MVD and its troops.

At the same time, certain forms of the party organs' work in the troops can be changed, but I would not completely negate their positive role in the building of the Armed Forces and the enforcement of law and order.

[Ostrovskiy] Oleg Dmitrevich, are you not troubled by a situation whereby the draft new CPSU Statutes and the draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress make practically no mention of its position on class or its position on a communist society as the ultimate aim of our revolution?

[Baklanov] That is exactly what is troubling me. I believe that by no means everything has been included in the

process of working on these drafts. We perceive already from letters sent to the CPSU Central Committee, and from articles in the press, that people are sensitive to this omission in the above-mentioned documents. Their complaints in this sphere are fully justified. These omissions in the documents must be eliminated and they must be enriched in nationwide discussion. I hope that, through their ideological basis, they will serve the work of consolidating our society. I believe that the party will approach its 28th congress with documents already enriched with the collective reasoning of all the people and all CPSU members.

Everything that somehow gravitates toward social democracy within the CPSU will obviously be rejected. In general I am not opposed to this trend of thought, but the communist party which has made and will continue to make a significant contribution to world civilization, is capable of proving—independently, and without any tinges of other ideological trends—its indispensability and loyalty to its doctrine and to itself.

The CPSU has another feature. We communists are a voluntary union of like-minded people, who form a party which primarily expresses the interests of the working classes and all working people. Renouncing political monopolism does not by any means signify renouncing the ideology of the working class and the working people of our country. These positions involve values common to all mankind and at the same time, relate to class in their interests and in the analysis of the new realities, creatively developing Marxism-Leninism. We are not renouncing our doctrine, in the same way as we are not rejecting all social thought and historical experience.

Pugo Discusses Party Discipline, Economic Reform

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[Interview with B.K. Pugo, candidate of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Party Control Committee, conducted by P. Antropov and N. Tarasenko: "Controlling Means Assisting"]

[Text] [Antropov, Tarasenko] Boris Karlovich, the opinion that the "economic reform" and "party control" concepts are incompatible may be heard frequently today. The economy, it is alleged, should be handled by the government and the soviets and that party control has enough problems as it is. But, on the other hand, complaints are being heard increasingly, in our weekly included, about the slackening of performance discipline. Calls are being heard also for a strengthening of the party demands on managers. How do you view these two diametrically opposite wishes addressed to party control?

[Pugo] As a clash of two views of the role of party control. One senses in the first assertion, in my view, a certain premature anticipation and a detachment from the actual problems which the economic reform is encountering and which are impeding it time and again. Hopes for the automatism of the market mechanism clearly show through here. It will, it is alleged, take the place of all inspectors. For this reason control in the sphere of the management of economic processes is a superfluous, if not harmful, thing. In principle this is correct, but given the existence of a controlled market mechanism.

On the other hand, some people are, as before, attempting to shift onto the shoulders of the party authorities the solution of economic problems and make them a kind of fixer. A tried-and-tested method of many executives: If you cannot solve a problem, write to the Central Committee, to the Party Control Committee—they will help. You know, people, albeit fewer, are still writing. Yet it has repeatedly been said unambivalently that economic matters should today be decided by the economic and state authorities.

But let us once again analyze the situation which is taking shape in the economy and in the country. You could not call it straightforward. We have entered a complex transitional period. We do not have a market in its classical understanding, and its formation will take a considerable time. Elements of the administrative-command system and new forms and methods of management live side by side in the economy currently. And, of course, the decline in performance discipline is seriously hampering the economic reform.

Many communist executives are in no hurry to introduce financial autonomy, leasing and self-management at their enterprises. Some are resting content with what has been achieved. Others cannot overcome the habit of tried-and-tested methods of management. Someone needs to correct them and demand more vigorous action. But who will do this if not the party authorities, if not party control?

[Antropov, Tarasenko] The objective conditions are such, it transpires, that in the transitional period a tightening of party control of the fulfillment of party and government decisions on an extension of economic reform is not only desirable but extremely necessary....

[Pugo] Yes. In the present situation party control must operate even more energetically and respond even more keenly to slowness, sluggishness and complacency. We are duty bound to ensure that the words of the communist executives, regardless of their office, not be at variance with their deeds. It is our duty to defend the reform against all kinds of voluntarist distortions and deformations and to promote the introduction of new, progressive forms of management. The need for this is great. I personally have repeatedly seen this for myself, during recent visits to outfits of Kalinin and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, for example.

Let us take the introduction of leasing, for example. The law has been enacted, and there are party decisions on the development of leasing relationships. But things are moving slowly. In one place executives fear extra bother they can do without. In another, the ministries and

departments are curbing people's initiative. It is here that party control should have its say.

Nor can we disregard the forces which would like to apply the brakes to perestroyka, emasculate its real content and limit the effect of the laws on which the economic reform is based. It is sufficient to recall, for example, the attempts to preserve in the guise of the state commission, the system, rejected by practice, of the detailed regulation of product-manufacture quotas and to impose prohibitions and restrictions on the family contract and cooperative and individual activity.

And have bureaucratism and red tape and self-seeking and group egotism disappeared?! To hope that these defects will pass of their own accord is at least naive. They are not as innocuous as might appear from a distance. Do you remember to what the formal approach of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Fish Industry to the issuing of licenses for the sale of fish overseas led? To serious problems in supplies to the union market. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA wrote about this, incidentally. We were forced at a meeting of the Party Control Committee to remind the sector's communist executives in earnest that the interests of the department cannot be put above those of the people.

Party control does not have the right to remain aloof from a solution of the problems which are putting the economy in a fever and undermining people's faith in perestroyka. The millions of rubles which the party inspectors save the state annually certainly should not be disregarded either.

The long term is different matter. When market mechanisms are operating at full strength and the new economic relationships have strengthened, the situation in the economy will have changed also. Then there will be a change in the role of party control too.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] The Supreme Soviet has approved the concept of the further progress of the economic reform. It has been approved in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo also. What role in its realization is to be performed by party control?

[Pugo] I believe that the most important thing for party control today is verification of the communists' actual fulfillment of decisions which have been adopted. We are directed thus by the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress also.

The economic reform is affecting the interests of millions of people, and they believe in it and expect an improvement in their life. It is important to overcome as resolutely as possible what is preventing the engagement of people's interests for a stimulation of the entire diverse economic and social life of society.

It is well known that attempts were made to conduct economic reforms earlier also. But they were of a particular, superficial nature, I would say. Attempts were made to replace one system of indicators, for example, with another. But nothing came of this. The main reason for the failures of the preceding economic reforms, in my view, was the fact that they were conceived and implemented in isolation from democratization, from the interests and actions of millions of people.

Yet the principal character in any reform—political or economic—is man. A very great deal depends on his attitude toward the innovations which the reforms introduce to practice. On how he utilizes the opportunities afforded by perestroyka. Take, for example, the well-known RAF Minibus Plant, whose outfit was one of the first to switch to leasing, the "Novomoskovskoye" Agro-Industrial Association and the "Mikrokhirurgiya glaza" Interbranch S&T Works. Why is the economic reform reflected so auspiciously in the results of their work? Because in these outfits the tune is called by people with a proprietory bent and a heightened sense of what is new.

Thus it transpires that for the success of the reform it is not enough to recommend new forms and methods of management for introduction. It is no less important to restructure people's attitude toward them, toward the economy itself. This is why party control, combating indifference, social dependency and conservatism, is not only contributing to a strengthening of the moral health of society but must also increase the influence of the human factor on the development of the economy.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] Political methods of influencing the economy exclude from practice, as is known, direct instructions from the party committees to the state and economic authorities and public organizations. This demand will evidently make adjustments to the methods of the work of party control also?

[Pugo] Quite correct. Both in the Party Control Committee and locally a persistent search is under way for new approaches to control work. Mechanisms, in V.I. Lenin's words, of "strict party control," that is, control of the activity of the communists working in all spheres of the national economy, are gradually being debugged. It is via control that the party implements its political line and actual decisions, and it has a right to know how its members are fulfilling the assignment. Not only to know but also to make a party evaluation of their actions.

The question not only of the content but also the forms of party control is being posed anew today. As you know, the practice of acting the custodian of individual sectors of the economy existed for a long time. The Party Control Committee monitored the work of ministries and departments and sometimes individual enterprises also. Special groups operated in the committee to this end.

We have now abandoned the sectoral principle in control work. Six groups have been formed on the territorial principle which monitor compliance with the statutory provisions in the party organizations of this region or the other. A group for inspecting the party discipline of

communists in the central state authorities is operating actively together with them.

The party's control authorities are today capable of investigating practically all violations of state, production and performance discipline and laws and morals. But we do not intend substituting nor are we substituting for people's control and the procuracy and the ministries and trade unions. They have their approach to an evaluation of the actions of those guilty of shortcomings, we have ours.

In examining problems party control is interested primarily in how far the communists, executives particularly, are aware of their responsibility for the fate of perestroyka, what their attitude is toward their work and problems which arise, how they make use of political methods of work under the conditions of economic reform and how they are implementing party policy.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] In other words, any problem is viewed in the Party Control Committee through the prism of the personal responsibility of this communist or the other for his assignment?

[Pugo] If you look at the decisions of the Party Control Committee, you will see for yourselves that our demands are always personal, whatever problem is being examined. This was how we approached also the heart of the matter, when we discussed the work of the communist executives of permanent bodies of the USSR Council of Ministers and ministries and departments with respect to provisioning the population with basic necessities. Not our business, it might have seemed. But from what standpoints to view it? If you go into the actual causes of the manifestation of the shortage, much has its roots in the past and is to be found in the imperfection of economic relations. We took this into consideration.

But the committee also analyzed how the communists treat the solution of these problems. And several instances of an inability or reluctance to work in the new manner and of an incorrect attitude toward people's needs and requirements were uncovered. It was necessary to strictly remind a number of executives about their personal responsibility for ensuring the provisioning of the population with basic necessities.

It is probably appropriate to mention here that the Party Control Committee has recently increased its attention to the urgent problems which are troubling people. The work of trade and consumer service has been inspected in Gorkiy Oblast. The work of the republic's communist executives on improving the life of party and labor veterans has been studied in the Karelian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Communists' actions pertaining to satisfaction of the requirements and proposals of soldier- internationalists in Kostroma Oblast have been analyzed.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] What conclusions can be drawn from the inspections?

[Pugo] The trouble with many central, and also local, authorities is that the very concept of personal responsibility has frequently been eroded in them. It is often difficult even to make out who specifically is to blame for this shortcoming or the other. At every step Ivan points to Petr, and he, to Ivan. It is time to break this vicious circle. It is necessary to clearly determine in each ministry and each state body who specifically is responsible for this area of work or the other.

Reading this interview, it is possible that some people will say in their hearts: Are you not exaggerating the power of party control? You have carried out an inspection, listened to the managers and punished them. What now, will everything be different? No, we do not believe so. But there have to be changes for the better.

People believe this. Letters to the Party Control Committee testify to this. One always senses in them what the people support and what worries them. Concern for the state of discipline has been heard increasingly often of late in these sincere appeals to party control. We are anxiously being reminded that it has weakened both in the state authorities and on the shopfloor. We see this and will be more decisive in strengthening discipline among the communists. I allude to conscious discipline buttressed by a sense of party duty.

Some people believe that at the time of inspections the Party Control Committee endeavors to select "factlets for exposure". This is not true. The purpose of the inspections is entirely different—to uncover and investigate the factors hampering perestroyka. Nor are we performing this work in isolation or secretly but in conjunction with the party organizations and committees. You will agree that it is not that important who has uncovered an oversight. Achieving changes for the better is far more important. And it is by no means necessary at times to mete out punishment for this. It is far better to assist the communists in comradely fashion to find the more correct way to remove shortcomings and to opportunely support a good initiative.

So party control is needed today not only to monitor the state of affairs but also to help people tackle problems more quickly.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] However, our readers are, to be honest, far from always satisfied by the decisions of the Party Control Committee. They ask: Why are some communist executives mixed up in murky business let off with a mild fright? Why are more decisive measures not adopted?

[Pugo] We in the committee receive such complaints also. We try to take the criticism into consideration. You will most likely have noticed that our decisions have recently become stricter and more exacting. This was perceived particularly by the executives who were involved in the murky business of the ANT concern.

For the flagrant violation of state discipline in the sale of military equipment and products in short supply the

Party Control Committee expelled from the party V.K. Dovgan, general director of the "Vzlet" Science-Production Association; Yu.A. Pekshev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission; V.S. Grinev, first deputy head of this commission's consolidated economic department; and V.V. Babayev, senior official of the USSR Council of Ministers machinery. Strict party proceedings have been instituted against many other communists also.

Much has already been written about this sensational story concerning an attempt to sell tanks abroad. But it is not inappropriate today even to emphasize that the irresponsible actions of a number of executives struck a serious blow at perestroyka. We encountered the political myopia of certain people who had been entrusted with the manufacture of means of defense. They forget about unswerving observance of state discipline and put departmental and group interests above the country's interests. I hope that this lesson will force other leaders to think a little and recognize that there is no excuse for irresponsibility.

I hope you will agree that the Party Control Committee, and it has only 80 senior officials now, would not, were it 10 times bigger even, be in a position to uncover all shortcomings and oversights. The local, particularly primary, party organizations should be reacting to them primarily. Otherwise we will never rid ourselves of finger-pointing at the whole party. It cannot be forgotten that lax management, a disregard for the principles of social justice on the part of the communists and communist conceit undermine the party's authority more than the most trenchant criticism.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] Yes, there is enough criticism of the party today. But this is what is remarkable: As soon as it is a question of a house which has been handed over with jobs left undone, of supply interruptions and of the harmful discharges of this plant or the other, the party committees are to blame for everything. Is this fair?

[Pugo] It has become the case in our country that people have grown accustomed to the party being responsible for everything. They will in time come to better understand where it is the state and economic authorities which are to blame and where the incomplete work of the party committees and that there has been a separation of functions. I believe that under today's conditions the party authorities do not have the right to avoid many specific issues. But this does not, of course, mean that they must involve themselves in each and everything. We need to see the fundamental difference between political methods of leadership and strict demands on the particular assignment and a party committee's attempts to conceal its desire to reserve for itself economic and managerial functions.

But this also happens. We saw this for ourselves, for example, when we analyzed how the party committees of the Mordovian ASSR were mastering political methods of leadership. An inspection showed that three out of four questions raised in the obkom [oblast party committee] bureau had an economic focus. But a passion for traffic-control functions is far from innocuous. In becoming bogged down in trifling economic problems it is possible to lose sight of the main thing—influence on the masses.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] Earlier the CPSU Rules endowed the primary party organizations with the right of supervision of management activity. Is such a provision necessary in the new rules?

[Pugo] A difficult question. I will express merely a purely personal viewpoint inasmuch as questions of an alteration of the rules are the exclusive prerogative of the highest party authority—the CPSU congress. It would seem to me that under current conditions, particularly since the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, when the party abandoned the monopoly of political power, reservation for the party organization of the right to monitor the activity of management would be an anachronism to a certain extent.

The party organization's obligation to keep an eye on the extent to which management's actions take account of the interests of the working man is another matter. It would be wrong to remain aloof from these concerns. The communists have always worked in the labor collectives, and it is they who have most perseveringly and consistently defended the interests of the working people. There are absolutely no grounds for forgetting this tradition today.

[Antropov, Tarasenko] What role in the extension of the economic reform at this stage should, in your opinion, be performed by the primary party organizations?

[Pugo] To put it briefly, the decisive role. It is the primary party organizations which are the basic component of the party. It is the primary party organizations which, if they wish to be the vanguard, must have a decisive impact on the life of the work force. This is particularly important now, when their independence is growing, self-management is strengthening, a market mechanism is being created and elements of competition are emerging. The primary party organizations should be the instigators of all that is new and progressive and persuade people of the need for an acceleration of economic reform.

At the same time I wish to emphasize that concern for economic recovery is today a most important concern of the whole party. The proposals of certain figures concerning the party's complete renunciation of participation in the solution of economic problems would seem to me either ignorance of real life or simply a dishonest method. After all, even in the "liberal" West each in the least way serious party has a detailed economic program and proposes this solution or the other of the problems of production growth, employment, inflation, formation of the budget....

The party should decide fundamental, strategic or, as they say, macroeconomic questions. At the same time, however, it should in no way interfere in economic affairs and the operational management of production. This is the managers' business. It is thus that the CPSU Central Committee proposes today approaching questions of economic development. Everyone who is familiar with the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress can see this for himself.

Medvedev on Need for Ideological Renewal

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[Article by Roy Medvedev: "What Is the Way Out of the Crisis? The Key Is in Ideology"]

[Text] **Everyone today recognizes the importance of the ideological basis of the revolutionary perestroyka that is taking place in the country. Everyone also recognizes that the biggest changes in practical reality, in the economy, and in the political situation both in the USSR and in neighboring countries are occurring much faster than the changes in the social sciences and in ideology.**

This in turn gives rise to a lot of centers of dangerous tension in society, inasmuch as earlier the ideology of scientific socialism played, and continues to play today, the role of the foundation of that social system which exists in our country, and where CPSU party organizations continue to remain the main "load-bearing structures" of the social building. Without these load-bearing structures and foundation, our common house cannot exist either today or tomorrow. But one cannot help but note that both the foundation of this house and its "load-bearing structures" are beginning to weaken.

Up until now, however, what has been preventing the development of not only a proper but a consistent policy in the key areas of public and state life? What compels us at times to shy from one political line to another, and not so much to improve as to worsen the situation in the country? In what way must we lessen this contradiction between reality and its reflection in the public conscience? One of the most important resolutions of this problem consists of a speedier renewal of our ideology, which has noticeably failed to keep pace with life. The draft of the new platform of the party Central Committee is a major step but only the first step, or one of the first steps, in this direction. We must move forward in this regard much faster. This is being hindered by a profoundly erroneous correlation between the social sciences, ideology, and policy that became embedded in the past.

Any really scientific ideology must correspond to the practical reality in the country and in the world and rely on those findings that issue from the study of this reality by numerous present-day social sciences, and if we have in mind the world outlook significance of ideology, then on the findings of other sciences, and, of course, philosophy. In turn, correctly formulated ideological doctrines in any case will make it possible to ease substantially the development of correct principles for leading society and of fundamentals for the domestic and foreign policy of the party and the state.

Moreover, policy must be understood here in the broad sense of the word—as a combination of the struggle and cooperation of various classes, strata, social currents, and groups inside the USSR, and the struggle and cooperation of different states on the basis of their interests and aspirations, taking into account traditions and history that differ from our social system. It is people and groups who have mastered the art of political leadership to the greatest degree who should constitute the nucleus of the political leadership in our society and state. Of course, their path to power should pass through democratic elections as much as possible.

However, it is not difficult to prove and to show that in the last 60 years a sensible correlation between reality, science, ideology, and policy was actually turned upside down. The political struggle in its most important aspects was reduced by Stalin to an extremely cruel and bloody struggle for personal power. The interests of this struggle were also to be served by a deformation of socialist ideology, which, although it was given the designation "Marxism-Leninism," was practically reduced to an arbitrary falsification of the history of the party.

Only one role was left for the social scientists under these conditions—to comment on the revelations of Stalin and certain "leaders" in his closest circle. The sciences in fact became the servants of a Soviet religion that was being created in the country, and deviations from the pitiful role assigned them were suppressed no less cruelly than the deviations of natural sciences from the role of maid servant of theology during the time of Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei.

Not much changed here under Stalin's successors. In the final analysis, it was this growing contradiction and divergence between practical reality and the real interests of society and their reflection, deformed beyond recognition, in the conscience of the Soviet people and the leaders that led our country and society into the present difficult economic, political, and national crisis.

To overcome this crisis, it is necessary not only to fill the empty shelves in our stores, but also to return to the Soviet people the faith that they are losing more and more in the wisdom of their work, in the ideals of socialism, in those higher ideals of justice of a new society, and in those moral and ideological values that induced the Soviet people to work selflessly during times that in many respects were much more difficult than those we are going through today. For this, we must return ideology, politics, and the social sciences to their natural role and place, to straighten out their deformations, and also to conduct the difficult and expensive

work in correcting the disproportions and deformations that have accumulated over many decades in the economy, and in production, social, and national relations. Moreover, in a number of cases we must actually recreate certain social sciences, returning to them the authority and role that they lost as regulators of a scientifically-based ideology and policy, and social life and practice.

Of course, it is not possible to create a genuinely scientific ideology of humane and democratic socialism too quickly, one of whose most important elements is the currently developing "new thinking." Nor is it possible to create a politically effective new system of leadership of the society quickly—this process has already been going on for several years. But a correct perception of these tasks will hasten the conduct of necessary changes, without which Soviet society cannot function and develop normally.

Ryzhkov Addresses Cultural Figures

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[Excerpts] [Announcer] Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov held a meeting yesterday [23 March] with cultural figures and people's deputies. The meeting was opened by Chingiz Aytmatov, chairman of a commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Many problems were raised by the people's deputies, including the sorry state of children's cinema which was talked about by Deputy Bykov, and problems of protecting and restoring historical monuments which was talked about by Deputy Solovyev. [Video shows Ryzhkov greeting some of the deputies, clips of some of the participants addressing the meeting, Ryzhkov seated at top table with Aytmatov and others. Camera then closes in on Ryzhkov and stays with him for rest of program, with occasional shots of other individuals] [passage omitted]

[Ryzhkov] First of all, it is a source of satisfaction for me to have this meeting with you today, although I share the view of those who spoke here and said that it was a brave undertaking for me to take direct charge of culture. First of all, to be honest, if we look back nine months, it was you who forced me to do that. You forced me. At the Supreme Soviet sesion the question was raised quite sharply that due attention was not being paid to cultural issues, that to all intents and purposes the government, that is the Council of Ministers, bracketed culture along with the availability of panty-hose or footballs. I am not mistaken, am I? [murmurs of assent from the room] Exactly, I thought I had the quote right.

So we got together then and took... [change thought] it may be that at the beginning this was done under a certain amount of pressure but we realized we had to separate culture from the other social problems existing in the country. And that decision was made. So that was how it started, as they say, but afterwaards, to be honest, I even began to feel some satisfaction that this was for me an object lesson, to come face to face with the whole question of culture as one of the layers of the country's public life. Gradually I began to grow accustomed to the role I now play in the government, and to some extent I might say I find a certain satisfaction in the fact that if some steps forward are being taken then they are to the benefit of our common cause.

Now on to today's meeting. I would divide it into two parts. First, it is with great satisfaction, but also with great alarm and perhaps even with great sadness, that I perceive what can, perhaps, be called an ideological threat in what the comrades here have been saying. I am referring to the musings on culture, on what stage we have reached, what are our failings. The second part relates to what one might call the purely economic or material side of our culture.

On the first part, I feel I do not need to air my opinions, because you know it all much better than I. It is your profession, and I can see that we have gathered here some of the most talented people in one field or another, so I do not need to bore you with my attitudes to culture or how I see the development of culture in our state. There is just one thing I can say. And in this I to some extent—or rather, wholly—support some of the things that have been said here today. You know, we live in very complicated times, extraordinarily complicated times, especially in the past few years when we have moved the theoretical foundations of perestroyka to practical matters and you see that, along side the very great number of postive things that have entered our lives—democratization, glasnost, and so on—there have at the same time begun to appear very great centrifugal forces. We, therefore, have to find directions for our public life which would really develop centripetal forces, rather than those centrifugal ones. Unfortunately, I have to say this frankly, the centrifugal forces are very powerful in our state today. Whether we are willing to recognize this or not, one would have to be blind not to see it. If we do not stop these centrifugal forces the state cannot become stronger, more powerful nor gain in prestige.

These forces are developing in many areas: in the economy, in culture, too, I feel, and especially in relations between the nationalities where at times we end up with altogether extreme situations of one kind or another and cannot stop ourselves.

We therefore have to find—and when I say 'we' I am referring to the government commissions, or rather the committees, of the Supreme Soviet, and to government bodies—we have to find truly wise solutions for the field of culture. It has been said rightly here that in recent times we have indeed been making a great deal of use of loud words such as strong, a strong center, strong republics, and so on. But why do we not say a wise center, a well balanced center? Because all of this comes down to contradictions, these words used for effect at times really

amount to contradictions. We talk about strong republics, and about a strong center, which means a collision between two forces. Whereas I think we should be finding solutions which would lead to the consolidation of our society. In this respect, I believe that a proper approach to cultural questions could indeed help consolidate our society by, on the one hand developing ethnic cultures and ethnic self-awareness; ethnic development. At the same time we have to find what is common, that which will bring us together and unite us. As I see it, culture, among other social phenomena, is the field which can and should unite us. I am not saying...[changes thought] I agree here with the comrade that societies without culture have no right to progress. That is wholly obvious. If we fail to create such a foundation for our society then we shall get nowhere.

Let us take the economy. PRAVDA today has a good report on the front page, saying, quite rightly, I believe, that many of the good decisions we have taken in recent years in the economic field have fallen on stony ground, on unprepared ground. Man has been unready, society has been unready, and that includes in the cultural sense, among others. So this task is, I think, a very big one, and we need to find a cultural combination which, let us say, makes for unification and, of course we have to always show concern for what is taking place as far as nationalities are concerned.

The second part—and it seems to me that this was the bigger one, which was evident today, and this is natural because the government deals to a greater extent with socioeconomic questions, be they internal or to do with foreign economic matters—is, of course the question concerning the material base, the material situation, the economic aspect of culture. I believe that this discussion, notwithstanding the acuteness of the problems raised today, is a very useful thing. First of all, many of the points raised were things I was aware of but, they did not, for example, reach me in greater detail, because I am constantly being deluged with information. Some of the things said today I believe need to be examined in great detail, again and definite decisions must, as it were, be arrived at and made.

So, do we need to strengthen the material base for culture and, as it were, enhance the economic level of the whole of our cultural life? I do not believe there is anybody in the government who would say that this is not necessary. All of our trouble stems from the fact—and you see now, especially in the Supreme Soviet where there are 22 commissions and committees—that volleys of problems are bursting out today, volleys. You see, they are not bursting out in some consistent fashion so that today we could solve one problem, tomorrow another one, and so on. The whole situation in the country today, the awakening of social life and the politization of society have been caused also by a very high degree of negligence. Many issues have not been solved for many, many years and as a result suddenly everything must be dealt with today. This is the greatest misfortune. Volleys of problems are bursting out. Taking into account the fact that the economy works inefficiently today, and I have even to say that its pace has been slowing down lately, its dynamism has been decreasing, it turns out that we cannot in practice ensure the implementation of this or that problem. We have made calculations regarding the main problems that today are knocking at our door in the economy and social life. Take the law on pensions. A solution is needed. The old law is 35 years old. The maximum pension is R120. At the time Khrushchev introduced it, the average salary was R78. Today the average salary is R220-230, but the same R120 remain. Is a solution needed? Yes, it is! In the final analysis, a society which does not care about its elderly people, does not care about its members who have given everything to the state and us and we leave them to the mercy of fate, such society, on the whole....

[Unidentified voice in the background interjects] It is amoral.

[Ryzhkov continues] It is difficult even to describe it. It is callous. We have squeezed everything we could out of a man and then we have deserted him. This is cruelty. I have been saying everywhere for two years: Cuts should be made wherever possible but the elderly must be given their due. This is our duty. The tsars used to do it. You know, there used to be special departments for charity, in the time of tsars. In other words, whether or not society is progresive could always be seen from how it treats thgose people who have given everything to it. So this is the top problem. I think it should be solved. Perhaps other problems could be postponed today; one should say: Today the state has no possibility of solving, say, some other problems but this law and its implementation should be solved. A law on working leave is urgently needed, and so on.

Therefore, of course, a state must be strong to be able to solve these urgent social issues, a state must have something in its hands. All the time we are in a contradictory situation: On one hand, we all say that enterprises should be given everything and the republics even more. At the same time we say that a state program should be adopted, for example, for pensions or a state program for culture which would be a state program. But for that the state should have finances, too. When Comrade Pavlov starts a fist-fight with somebody, you should understand that all this is being done for us, not for Pavlov. But common sense is necesary, too. We understand that balance and wisdom are required in everything. Too much pressure may lead to enterprises working without any efficiency at all. They will simply fold their arms, and the state will not become richer from that. At the same time, such conditions can be created when one gives nothing to the state, as it were, while filling one's own pockets. Recently we have succeeded in that. Today I have heard enough about cooperatives which organize concerts, etc. What is this if not illegally filling one's pockets? Therefore, we have to find correct correlations.

I am always against tightening financial screws at factories to such a degree as to make them lose heart because I have myself gone through all that business, as the saying goes, and I know.

When you see that you can work, you work willingly and you produce more than when you have no future. The only thing is—I address you as deputies—that sometimes during discussions there is lack of understanding for the government: them over there who do it all. Well, I think that life will be the judge. I mean one day you will finally understand that they, that is, we, are you, no more no less. But an opening should always be left. We must not adopt laws which later do not allow us to shift the issue either left or right. For example, if we think that a union law can put in order all the problems of our life—for example, those of economic life—this is an illusion. It is impossible in a country.... [changes thought] Just a while ago you argued between yourselves here whether or not this applies to a public organization. But is it possible to write everything down in an all-union law in such a way that it should make clear provisions for everyone, down to the smallest enterprise or workshop? Such laws do not exist but there are fundamentals and general provisions, and beyond them the government should obviously be given a possibility to establish benefits or certain interpretation in some areas and this will make it possible for us to solve some specific issues. For example, that center that Rolan [Bykov] has. I signed the document on it, and I think I have done the right thing because, finally, we must preserve cinema for children, otherwise commercial trends will smother it and I do not know how we will educate the childen, in what faith.

Therefore, I think we have done it right. If the law comes out now containing rigid regulations, what will happen? We will smother it [children cinema] and that will be that, right after what we have done. But if it says that the Council of Ministers has the right to introduce certain changes, give some advantages taking account of its specifics, of course, I will sign it right away. I will sign it again and will say: You should act in line with what was signed at the time. This was just an example.

I would like to say the following. Today a reproach was made, in the neat manner characteristic of workers of culture: Still, the government has rolled back, so to speak, to the Komsomol and trade unions. I accept this as criticism aimed at myself. Yes, indeed, this is so.

But I have a question for you. I see many familiar faces here. I saw those surnames in the first six months of last year in the pages of the press. How you all chiselled away at me for the cooperatives! You made mincemeat out of me from 29 December—true, for two days before the New Year you did not manage to assemble—and from 2 January last year until the end of the first six months, until the session: After all, that was most fierce criticism—by what right did Ryzhkov not allow cooperatives, independent cooperatives, concert and video cooperatives, etc.? I, after all, justified myself many times and said: Listen, I am not doing this for money; I am doing it for the sake of the good of our people, for the sake of youth, for the sake of young people, and I am doing it for the sake of my grandchildren, when it comes down to the bottom line. Why, are you getting at me? Am I doing this for kopecks? We will debauch the people! You understand what we are doing.

For six months there was ruthless criticism of the government: You are doing everything wrong. And it was not for other lines where abortions are prohibited, or where items of jewellery or drugs are banned. The criticism was precisely for culture, precisely in this area. Therefore, in the past you very much helped, so to speak, helped in this cause. You helped. Now, now you have woken up and are beginning to ctiticize. Yes, indeed I believed the Komsomol people. I consider it a mistake, and I still consider it a mistake, and, generally, to be frank, Komsomol members would need to go themselves and say: Dear comrades, remove those privileges which Comrade Ryzhkov assigned to us. And the same for the trade unions—Comrade Mishin is sitting here, a former Komsomol official. And I in his place would get up and say: Comrades, we are renouncing this, and we will act as the entire union acts. But nevertheless, those two organizations which today have brought under their fine-sounding names cooperatives that are corrupting the youth, after all we have hinted: Let us cancel this, go on! No! I think that maybe today's conversation will have an effect, nonetheless.

I want to say in conclusion how hard and difficult it is for me to hear of all these problems which are showering down. But, frankly, maybe it is easier for me today than every day when I listen to other spheres. After all, there are many interesting and promising things. I several times wanted to dwell on one issue, but somehow it passed. You know, the material base has of course, indeed become very backward in our country. But it is our good fortune that our school has nonetheless remained, and I think that this is the main thing—we have a school of art, a school of ballet and music, and so on. These are great achievements for us. But we must not erode them. If we erode them, so to speak, then a material base will not be of any help to us. Therefore, I want to express once more, in conclusion, my satisfaction with our meeting.

Constitutional Oversight Chief Interviewed

PM2803152090 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 27 Mar 90 p 5

[Interview with Constitutional Oversight Committee Chairman Sergey Alekseyev by Sergio Sergi; date, place not given]

[Text] Moscow—[Sergi] Chairman S. Alekseyev, you bear a major responsibility: to monitor Gorbachev's work....

[Alekseyev] Yes, it is a huge responsibility and, above all, I will have to avoid being captivated by the lure of his

personality and, when necessary, act on the basis of the Constitution. We can suspend the president's acts, and if they violate human rights we can do so from the outset. We can and must intervene in the case of every slightest violation, whether Gorbachev likes it or not.

[Sergi] What is the significance of the election of the president of the republic in the USSR today?

[Alekseyev] It is very significant. We have taken account of the experience of world political culture—of France, the United States, Italy. Everything has been taken into account, because the most developed and modern political structures envisage not only the separation of the three authorities, but also some degree of integration between them. This is so that government can be united, strong, and efficient. The introduction of the presidency, however, is connected with the amendments of Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution, which establish a multiparty system in our society. And a multiparty system entails the existence of this efficient and strong single authority. However, the creation of a presidency is a major step forward in the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system, because it starts the real process of transferring power from the party bodies to the state bodies.

[Sergi] How do you define the present stage in the country's history?

[Alekseyev] I believe that this is a key moment—a turning point. The next stage will be the formulation and approval of the new Constitution in which all the current process will reach their conclusion.

[Sergi] What does the USSR still need in order to become a real rule-of-law state?

[Alekseyev] I believe it is necessary to develop all these processes, to carry them through to their conclusion, and to approve a number of laws affecting all fields of our life. I repeat: We are proceeding from the Constitution and will deal subsequently with civil and penal legislation and so forth.

[Sergi] Somebody pointed out at the congress that it would have been correct to eliminate the word "soviet," since the USSR is a presidential republic.

[Alekseyev] I do not believe there are any contradictions between the two forms of power. In my opinion, it is necessary to move away from the original formula of "all power to the soviets." This, to prevent the impression that the collegial bodies decide absolutely everything. As far as the principle of soviet power is concerned, I believe that the name of the state should remain as it is, because it characterizes the main aspect—which I consider very important—of power concentrated among the workers and the direct link between the organs of sovereignty and the people. This is very important in achieving the socialist ideal. We have not shifted to ordinary bourgeois parliamentarianism but have retained the key aspects of the socialist ideal.

[Sergi] What differences do you see between the Western European parliaments and the Soviet parliament?

[Alekseyev] The differences are disappearing. The main one is that in the Western parliaments several parties are represented and the assembly is divided into groups. This does not yet exist in our country. It will happen in the future. This is why we are asked: Why did you vote for a single candidate yesterday? Not only because Gorbachev is a leader recognized by everyone both in our country and abroad, but also because there are no ready formed structures that could provide alternatives. If anyone else had put forward candidacies, it would have been a mere sham.

[Sergi] Do you not consider it excessive to couple the posts of president and party general secretary? When can their separation take place?

[Alekseyev] It depends on the changes within the party. If the party becomes less identified with government there will be no problem in separating the posts. We are moving toward that goal.

[Sergi] You argue the need for a nonconfessional state. Does this idea not conflict with the coupling of the two posts?

[Alekseyev] For the present, yes. But Gorbachev has already replied that, as president, he will represent the interests of the entire nation, not of the party. I believe this is the most important thing.

[Sergi] Which principle is most lacking in the Constitution?

[Alekseyev] First, the indestructible human rights must be proclaimed. This must be the central point....

[Sergi] Would you rewrite the Constitution proceeding from this?

[Alekseyev] Yes. The introduction or first article must broach this very topic.

[Sergi] How have human rights been interpreted in the USSR?

[Alekseyev] Sometimes even as a classification alien to us. Of course the legal term "rights of the individual" existed.... Human rights must stand above all other political factors.

[Sergi] Was the institution of the presidency really necessary?

[Alekseyev] I believe that for the time being we do not yet appreciate he importance of this event. People say: Here is the president, the centralizer. The fact is that the idea of the state as dictatorship still looms over us. State equals dictatorship....

[Sergi] This impression is nurtured also by the way Gorbachev was elected....

[Alekseyev] I have already said that if there had been two candidacies the second would have been a facade, a kind of game, and the other candidate would have been in a subordinate position.

[Sergi] What will happen in five years' time when the next presidential election is held?

[Alekseyev] In five years' time there will be other political groups, parties, with differences even within the socialist orientation. This is a natural process. At present the transitional period of the presidency is under way. I do not regard having a single candidate as a tragedy at all: There was no other solution. Could you name me another leader of Gorbachev's caliber?

Frolov, PRAVDA Team Meet With Muscovites

PM2603154790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[O. Lunin report: "In an Open, Comradely Manner"]

[Text] A meeting between members of the PRAVDA Editorial Board and the ideological aktiv of Moscow and its oblast has been held at the Sociopolitical Center of Moscow CPSU City Committee and Oblast Committee.

Perestroyka in the country, the party's renewal, the profound changes in society, every day's heated events—all this now affects everyone and elicits burning interest. People want to know the truth in order to judge everything consciously and to formulate their own position and line of conduct. This is not easy, given the present "polyphony" of newspapers and journals. But journalists also now have a more acute need then ever to meet with their readers and to sense their concerns and sentiments not only from the editors' mailbag.

For PRAVDA this is a long-standing, vital necessity, I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the newspaper's chief editor, emphasized on opening the meeting. Mindful of the subscription results for this year, the collective of PRAVDA journalists has analyzed its work exactingly and is seeking to realize readers' criticisms, to bring the newspaper's contents as close as possible to the person and his needs, and to "deformalize" the newspaper, as was stated at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting at the PRAVDA editorial office.

To judge from a certain growth in the number of subscribers since the beginning of the year and from the editors' mailbag, which has increased in recent months, the changes on the newspaper are attracting readers. There is great interest, for example, in the "Discussion Page" devoted to the topic "The Party and Perestroyka. Toward the 28th CPSU Congress." The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the congress is actively being discussed.

...The PRAVDA journalists were sent more than 500 notes from the auditorium. Both the notes themselves and the replies to them were direct and frank, like the whole atmosphere of the meeting. Here are some of the questions which A. Ilin, editor of the party life department, answered. Is PRAVDA prepared to publish alternative versions of the CPSU Platform and Statutes? What accounts for the newspaper's passivity in the struggle for the purity of the party's ranks?

V. Poshatayev, PRAVDA editor for the ideological department, was sent notes concerning the situation in Lithuania and other problems of interethnic relations. Questions from those present connected with PRAVDA's coverage of events in East Europe, relations with the Republic of Cuba, and the development prospects for CEMA and the Warsaw Pact were the subject of a statement by B. Averchenko, PRAVDA editor for the socialist countries department. PRAVDA political observer V. Ovchinnikov spoke about the development of relations with Japan and about some urgent problems of international relations.

V. Gubarev, PRAVDA editor for the science department, answered questions on the elimination of the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, on ways to bury radioactive waste, and also on the sensational reprint of an article from the Italian newspaper LA REPUBBLICA.

Here is another of the notes: "PRAVDA has repeatedly come out in defense of the Starodubtsev brothers. Its articles have made people feel pain for these zealots of agriculture. What has been the result of these articles, and what are their consequences for those guilty of victimization?" D. Valovoy, the newspaper's deputy chief editor, gave a detailed reply to these questions. There was also a "personal" question for him: "What is the government's reaction to your article 'Payment for Extravagance'?" He also spoke of PRAVDA's position on questions of enhancing the role and prestige of engineers. Ye. Gaydar, PRAVDA editor for the economic policy department, spoke on a number of problems connected with regional economic accountability and the reform of price formation.

Please speak about the fate of the journal RODINA, comment on the rumors of a possible increase in the prices of subscription publications, what is the newspaper's stand on perestroyka in the Army?—these are some of the questions which First Deputy Chief Editor L. Spiridonov answered.

Also participating in the meeting were A. Karpychev, deputy chief editor; A. Chernyak, responsible secretary; T. Kolesnichenko, the newspaper's political observer; and V. Lyubitskiy, editor of the letters and public opinion study department.

But the largest number of notes was addressed directly to I.T. Frolov. How does the PRAVDA editorial office intend on the eve of the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth to protect his name from attacks; does it not seem to you that there are almost no young people on PRAVDA's Editorial Board; why are orders no longer portrayed on the newspaper's masthead; can the newspaper become the organ of the whole party, and not just

of the CPSU Central Committee; does the editorial office plan to catch up with ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in terms of the number of subscribers, etc? The chief editor also answered "personal" questions: What are you tackling as a Central Committee secretary, and how do you manage to combine two such complex posts? Do you take an interest in being PRAVDA chief editor, or do you do it out of a sense of duty?

The discussion at the meeting was frank and amicable, and very varied questions were put, including "angry" ones. But, on the whole, the PRAVDA journalists' direct "familiarization" with their readership undoubtedly benefited everyone. Approximately 1,300 people were present in the hall, and it was, of course, impossible to reply to all the notes. The questions have been put. Readers will find the answers to them in the newspaper's pages, including from those people who were replying to them at the meeting with the ideological aktiv.

PRAVDA Roundtable on Democratic Platform

90US0619A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Report on PRAVDA roundtable discussion of Discussion Leaflet No 11 held on 22 February in the I RAVDA offices: "Alternatives: Dialogue or Opposition?"]

[Text] **It says in the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress that in addition to remarks and suggestions the party is prepared to consider alternative drafts as well. Today we are publishing one of these documents. At the same time we are offering for the readers' attention the materials of the roundtable discussion held in the PRAVDA editorial offices on 22 February. Participating in this discussion were the authors of this platform and also associates of the newspaper and social scientists.**

Let Us See Where We Stand

A. ILIN, member of the editorial board, PRAVDA editor for the party life section. In beginning our roundtable discussion for today I should like to invite the discussion participants to do a kind of comparative analysis of two documents: the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress and the "Democratic Platform." To reveal, as it were, the zones of agreement, the common approaches—I think this is one of our most important tasks. Let us also discuss the divergences that exist so as to clarify their causes and, perhaps, find a way out of the confrontation. It seems to me that both documents proceed basically from the same position—democratization of the party. One cannot say that the platform of the conference of party clubs is democratic and the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee adopted by the February plenum, conversely, is undemocratic. It would be wrong to pose the question that way.

Many of our readers are getting the impression that the major difference is not so much in theoretical assessments as in organizational delineation. This, in the opinion of many who wrote letters to PRAVDA, is justification for speaking of the danger of a split in the CPSU.

In this connection our readers are also raising the following question. Certain comrades, including some who support the Democratic Platform, are in favor of various kinds of statements on television and radio of ideas and views that are incompatible with the points of the CPSU program and regulations. People are confused about why these comrades remain in the party and moreover, one understands from a number of their statements that their goal is to win a majority at the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress and form the corresponding central committee. Then, they say, they raise the question of asking those party members who do not agree with them to leave and close the door behind them. As far as I know, for example, the "communist section" of the Moscow party club has already been excluded from that organization. Recently we have had occasion to read and hear statements by certain "democrats" to the effect that they will not leave the party—to put it simply—for two reasons. First: If we leave the CPSU and form our own separate party on a democratic platform, who will get rid of the conservatives who still remain in the party? In one of the party club newspapers I read a note in which the author directly states this. The second reason: We, they say, cannot leave the CPSU, so to speak, empty-handed. That is, they are speaking about possibly dividing up party property.

I deliberately focused on these questions because, whether we like it or not, people are having doubts about them. They have a right to ask us: What lies behind all this? Why can we not work within the framework of the natural process initiated by the party for its renewal, restructuring, and democratization, expansion of glasnost, and so forth?

V. LYSENKO, member of the coordination council of the Democratic Platform. I should like to begin with fundamental issues of the similarity and dissimilarity of the drafts of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the Democratic Platform in the CPSU.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the very preparation, discussion, and adoption of these documents have differed significantly. While the draft of the Democratic Platform was sent a month ahead of time to the local areas, and the delegates who came to the conference in Moscow were able to familiarize themselves with it beforehand and obtain, so to speak, a mandate of confidence from their party organizations and party clubs for voting "for" or "against," the participants in the plenum received the Central Committee draft literally two days ago. It was generally impossible to make a really serious, thoughtful analysis during that time. The second aspect. The Democratic Platform was discussed for two days at section meetings. Each person had the opportunity to

speak specifically about individual points of this document. And of the hundreds of participants in the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which lasted for three days, 58 people spoke.

I should also like to note that the Democratic Platform took several months to prepare and not only members of the Moscow party club but also eminent social scientists participated in this process. This document was discussed several times in scientific institutions and as a result it is fairly well aimed and consistent. At the same time, in the opinion of our coordination council, the document drawn up by the Central Committee is contradictory and inconsistent. It is as though the draft Platform of the Central Committee follows on the heels of events.

S. KOLESNIKOV, candidate of historical sciences. It is not a matter of who made the point first, but still scientific conscientiousness demands a clarification of the issue. Let us take such a key idea in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and also in the Democratic Platform as the idea of human democratic socialism. In the first place the work on this thesis goes deep into the past. In the second place, if we look at the years of perestroyka we can see how consistently, step by step, this idea has developed, been fleshed out, and has been realized in various forms in party documents. I shall mention the January 1987 Plenum, the report at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, and the February 1988 Plenum of the Central Committee, where an attempt was made to earmark the "parameters" of the new image of socialism. One cannot bypass the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference and, finally, the documents of this conference itself. To begin the accounting for the political reform from the spring elections of 1989 is frivolous to say the least because it was the 19th Party Conference that developed this program which later began to be realized in practice. One could also mention the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine last autumn and his speech at the all-union student forum. Finally, there is the article, "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Restructuring," which was published in PRAVDA.

All this is the fruit of a large amount of work on developing the very idea of humane democratic socialism so that the appearance of the Central Committee Platform is the result of lengthy theoretical work by the party which cannot be measured in terms of one year or even two or three years. Therefore, one cannot say that the party met a month before the plenum, composed the platform, and quickly adopted it. This is not true. Its ideas have been worked on over a long period and brought up for discussion in one form or another. Or let us take the definition of the functions of the party and its role in the society. Both in party documents and in articles in PRAVDA and the magazine KOMMUNIST in recent years the idea of separating the functions of the party and state has been raised repeatedly. In lead articles, editorials, and in roundtable discussions. So whenever we talk about any kind of priority we must take this into account.

V. LYSENKO. There are common aspects in the two documents and, in our opinion, this makes it possible and necessary to have a dialogue between the Central Committee and, shall we say, representatives of the Democratic Platform and other trends in favor of democratization within the party. In the first place, this is the idea of democratic socialism. In the second place, it is a rejection by the CPSU of its monopoly on power and a recognition of the inevitability of the appearance of a multiparty system. Although I must note that in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee it is not recognized that a multiparty system already exists. Unfortunately, up to this point not one of the existing democratic organizations on the scale of either the country or even individual republics, with the exception of the Baltic republics, has actually been registered. In the third place, we are in favor of abolishing Article 6 of the Constitution.

Another important aspect is the recognition of the need to fight to retain the position of the ruling party within the framework of the democratic process, this right being won in elections. Finally, both documents share a number of proposed norms and mechanisms for the party. These include, for instance, abolition of candidate tenure, the conducting of party referendums, granting the local organizations the right to accept people into the party, and so forth.

Now briefly about the principal differences. The main one, in our opinion, is that the CPSU Central Committee Platform is based on the concept of the vanguard party. It is emphasized repeatedly in this document that the party remains the leading force, that it is a natural force that today is capable of consolidating the entire society, that only the leading role of the party can ensure successful completion of perestroyka. We do not agree with this opinion. We think that if we want perestroyka to be successfully brought to its logical conclusion it is necessary to change over to the parliamentary type of parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be on an equal basis with all the other political parties, having the same rights and acting within the framework of the Constitution and the law on political parties. This is the only way we will be able to reclaim the confidence of the country's population. And to declare that we are the vanguard, that we are the leading party—this, I think, means to discredit the CPSU and can lead to a loss of confidence in our party.

Now about the other differences. The draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform does not recognize that the party is in a state of crisis although the crisis was mentioned in practically all of the speeches at the plenum from both the left and right wings. If we do not admit that the party is in a crisis the medicine we use to treat it will be quite different.

Further, in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform the party functions are formulated in the old way. It is pointed out that the party implements the personnel policy, it concentrates its efforts on the development of a theory and program of action, and so forth and so on. This is approximately the same as it was before. An article in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA contained the idea that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform lies at the basis of the activity of all Soviet people. It seems to me that this very approach is unsuitable today. Indeed the party can offer one way out of the crisis situation, but there must be other ways and the population should decide on one or another concrete program.

The draft of the Central Committee Platform gives a broader interpretation of the party's ideological foundations, including more than just Marxism-Leninism. But at the same time the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform does not say a word about the crisis in communist ideology, although the very word "communism" has disappeared from the platform. A questionnaire conducted last June by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee and the Moscow Higher Party School showed that only 2.3 percent of our country's non-party members and 4.8 percent of CPSU members link the future of mankind to communism. Therefore, not to recognize the crisis in communist ideology today means to hide one's head in the sand again.

Finally, there are a number of serious differences regarding the organizational principles of party construction. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform retains the principle of democratic centralism, calling to renew it. At the same time the experience of all parties, without exception, that have operated on the basis of this principle has shown that they are all parties of a totalitarian type. Therefore, we think that this must be replaced by general democratic principles. Otherwise we shall never make the party truly democratic.

We absolutely disagree with that which is still the territorial production principle. This is another one of the foundations of a totalitarian type of party, when its structuring is imposed exclusively according to the hierarchical, vertical model.

Another thing. In the CPSU Central Committee it is constantly emphasized that unity and consolidation comprise one of the main goals of the CPSU. I think this again is unity for the sake of unity. We have been guided by this formula for many decades. Today it is obvious that quite diverse forces have been united in the party as they have throughout society. So to say that our main task is to make sure that they all remain in one party and work harmoniously, in my view, is illusion and self-deception.

Is There a Danger of a Split?

V. SHOSTAKOVSKIY, member of the coordination council of the Democratic Platform. Many people are discussing the danger of a split. It allegedly originates with the representatives of the Democratic Platform. But are the conservative forces not really the source of a split in the party? Or is it the actions of the apparatus? Can we really not see that a number of concrete actions and political decisions have already led to a mass exodus of people from the party. So we must look very soberly at this situation. There is a danger of a split, but it seems to me that the centrist path, the centrist policy, the policy of endless compromises of party leadership are leading to this and not the formation of any platforms or groups within the party.

The statement of the question of withdrawal from the CPSU is not clear to me. Neither in the documents of the party clubs nor at the conference nor in the Democratic Platform has anyone directly stated that someone should withdraw. But the question was raised at the plenum of the Moscow gorkom [city party committee]. Why should those who at this time, during perestroyka, are guilty of impeding the processes of party renewal, those who are to blame for the very large stagnant areas within the party—why should they not withdraw from the party. These are probably the ones who should withdraw. And according to the will of the party masses they should withdraw. In general this process is taking place.

It seems to me that there is a very serious danger of once again starting to speak in eloquent phrases and declarations and not getting a real and profound process of renewal underway.

V. SOGRIN, doctor of historical sciences. I think that the Democratic Platform is completely engaged in the search for the renewal of socialism that is now being conducted in the CPSU. Its main principles coincide or are harmonious with the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. The differences that have just been mentioned, in my opinion, are not so essential. For instance, differences about the ideological sources of socialism. They are all mentioned in M.S. Gorbachev's article published in PRAVDA. They include the experience in social democracy, general human values, the experience of Western Marxism. I do not see any fundamental differences here.

Still there are points in the Democratic Platform with which I should like to disagree. These include, for instance, the point about the existence in the party of three trends which are defined as follows: conservative Stalinist, moderate reformer, and radical reformer. In my view the CPSU has two main trends: reformer, which includes all of the Democratic Platform and which is steadily gathering force, and conservative, which is waging a stubborn battle for influence but is losing its positions.

But recently there has been one more trend which I would define as liquidating. We must not close our eyes to it. Among the liquidators one can include those who, although they are in the Communist Party, think that it has exhausted its possibilities of progressively influencing the society and should leave the historical arena.

The liquidators decisively and fully reject the legacy of Marx and Lenin, I emphasize, not only the outdated principles but all of Marxism, declaring it to be responsible for the establishment of Stalinist barrack-style communism in the country. The liquidators feed on the idea of a big leap, the immediate destruction of all existing political structures, and the development of the society according to the aversion principle with the help of shock therapy.

But, while openly declaring their political opposition to the CPSU, the liquidators will still not leave its ranks; they prefer to use the tactic of "gnawing away" at it from within. They clearly want to bring as many communists as possible over to their side, to win broad support at the 28th party congress, and to cause a split, forming a new party which shares the platform of the liquidators.

In this connection certain points of the Democratic Platform pertaining to the principle of party construction cannot but arouse my concern. I think there are many differences between it and the and the CPSU Central Committee platform. I would like to speak about the freedom of the factions in the party, the more so since the factions—and I quote the Democratic Platform—"can become the basis for the appearance of several political parties which offer various models of socialism." Here we are speaking not about ideological pluralism and not about freedom of expression of the minority opinion but about the formation of factions with their own internal organization, which is actually a multiparty system within the CPSU.

I do not think there is a single political party in the world that can allow itself that luxury. This would mean its death in a political struggle. Nonetheless I feel this slogan is dangerous for the CPSU now that it has rejected Article 6 of the Constitution and the Communist Party has proclaimed that it will use exclusively political means and free democratic competition in the struggle for power with other political trends. In connection with the new CPSU political strategy, which I do not think is taken into account in the Democratic Platform, I have a question about its point to the effect that party representatives in parliament should be quite free of the party program in the expression of their will. I am sure that this requirement seems strange to many political parties in the most developed democracies.

It seems to me that now it is important for representatives of the Democratic Platform to determine their relations with the central party trend—the reformists. I think it should be strengthened. I am speaking about rallying around the reformist, central (and not centrist) trend in the CPSU.

For one must not forget about the tendency toward the growth of political extremes and the appearance of left- and right-wing extremism which, in my view, presents a real threat both to democracy and to perestroyka. These political extremes, in spite of all the differences among them, come together on the platform of anticommunism. Look how the left- and right-wing radicals, the Democratic Union on the one hand and Pamyat on the other, are absolutely unanimous in their overthrow of Marx and Lenin. With what bitterness the extreme right and the extreme left come down upon the leaders of the reformist trend, including Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I would appeal to the Democratic Platform to assess the danger of this situation and cement the unity of precisely the reformist trend in the party.

A. ILIN. I would like to lend my support to V. Sorgin's opinion about the autonomy of party factions in parliament. No, there is probably no country in the world where a party represented in parliament has factions that are absolutely free of party discipline and so forth. I recall my conversation in the Swiss parliament with the social democrat Martin Bundy. We asked him: How free are the deputies in the selection of their positions and views? He answered: In principle, of course, I am free not to support the decisions adopted by my party. But this means that it will not support me. And to conduct parliamentary activity under the conditions of a multiparty system, without really feeling the support of the party you represent here, offers little promise, to say the least.

There is no doubt that there should be some kind of freedom within the framework of the party system and party discipline but it is hardly possible to speak with full autonomy. Otherwise it will turn out that the communists elected to the Supreme Soviet or the Russian or union congresses of people's deputies will actually leave the party. We have a contradiction here: On the one hand the party fights for power with the help of elections and creates its own faction, and on the other this faction, being fully autonomous, essentially severs its connection to the party. **Centralism and Democracy**

S. KOLESNIKOV. When I read the materials from the Moscow Gorkom Plenum I was not so much surprised and struck by the statement of one of the participants who said approximately this: Offer two platforms—the Democratic Platform and the platform of the Central Committee—and everyone will immediately raise their hands in favor of the first because its advantages are so obvious. This question is debatable to say the least. Our discussion in particular should help to clarify the essence of this matter. First of all about these as alternative platforms. I think that essentially they are not alternatives. Both platforms speak of the change in the tendency of the development of the party, the rejection of the "party-state" model, and the removal of the party from the party-state hierarchy as the basis of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system. There is also discussion of changing the work methods, particularly of parliamentary forms. The only sense in which these are alternatives is that these documents do not coincide in volume—no, not in terms of the number of pages but in terms of the volume of content. The Central Committee Platform gives a program of action for all areas, it is based on well-thought-out philosophical principles of the new thinking, and it encompasses socioeconomic problems

and questions of cultural and ethnic relations. In a word, everything about which the party should be concerned today and which cannot but be bothering the society. There is practically none of this in the Democratic Platform. Therefore, one can compare the two documents only in terms of one of the sections—that which pertains directly to the party.

There is another shortcoming of the Democratic Platform that is essential in my view. It seems to me that a number of our concepts have become hieroglyphic. For instance, democratic centralism. It is clear that this term has been practically discredited in the mass consciousness today. Possibly there is no need to include this point at all in the party regulations. But a certain strange thing is happening: Something which is actually not democratic centralism is being bitterly rejected. For instance, the Democratic Platform gives a list of the vices of this principle: it does not provide, it does not give the right, it prohibits, it dictates, it does not allow.... But what kind of centralism does not allow things? Democratic, in Lenin's sense, "in the democratic sense?" Or some other, bureaucratic kind which was established as the "iron-fisted" guiding principle of party construction at the beginning of the thirties, that model of the party from which we are departing today. What is supposed to replace this principle? Various variants: "democratic unity," "democratic consolidation," "common democratic principles." But what is this if not a pseudonym, a designation of the same elementary principle of construction of any organization which at one time was given the name "democratic centralism" but was distorted and deformed to such an extent that nothing of democracy was left in this principle. A riddle? No, perhaps this is again the phenomenon of "mirror" thinking which is inherent in the mass consciousness today and, unfortunately, to some extent in the scientific consciousness as well. Just as the ancient Slavs avoided calling a bear a bear and invented various hieroglyphs since they were afraid to pronounce this word aloud.

In this connection—about the horizontal structures which have already been discussed. What is keeping us from creating them? The right to group according to interests, according to platforms.... We can and should include this in the regulations. But is this really a basis for confrontation? To speak for the priority of horizontal structures and against vertical structures is, in my opinion, a unidimensional approach. If vertical unidimensionality is not good, then horizontal, surface unidimensionality is not very productive either. We must take a more three-dimensional look at relations within the party and the structure of the party. We must not bind ourselves to any unidimensional, superficial approach.

The approach to factions, in my opinion, is not sufficiently thought through either. Many comrades apparently do not understand that the appearance of a multiparty system means to a certain extent a tightening of organizational discipline within the party, and factions mean intolerance of different kinds of thinking. The experience of the West shows this fairly clearly, including the experience in social democracy.

It would be worthwhile to read more attentively the resolution of the 10th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], "On Party Unity," before demanding its "abolition." For its sense is joint work by all communists on correcting the mistakes of the party, expansion of democracy, independent activity, debate, and at the same time rejection of the narrowness of factions.

And my last remark. When the Moscow party club and other associations of communists conducting interesting research in the area of democratization of the party appeared it seemed to me that all this overlapped with many renewalist, reformist tendencies in the CPSU. But then it seemed to me that this intellectual movement was uniting with certain populist attitudes. And populism began to overwhelm the not very large islands of intellectualism in these reformist associations. Today we see a fairly strange symbiosis of sometimes extremist phraseology and normal, quite intelligent judgments that have found their way, for example, into the Leningrad platform. This is an unnatural symbiosis. Its consequence is frequently rigid, rally-like action. And today when time is so compressed the civilized intellect is at a premium.

V. SHOSTAKOVSKIY. I will begin with the last subject. The growing together of intellectual groups and hotbeds of "extremism...." I do not think that this pertains to the left block or the left flank. I wish to remind you of the growing together of populism and conservative forces following the example of the first rally in Leningrad.

REJOINDER Of course, extremes come together!

[Shostakovskiy] Now about democratic centralism. I am still inclined to proceed from its real content registered in normative form in the regulations that are currently in effect. I do not really understand what you have in mind when you speak about Lenin's understanding of democratic centralism. If you take our party's first regulations, this principle had no normative development there. This development occurred during Stalin's times, in 1934 at the 17th Party Congress. But let us recall how it was prepared for. Let us recall the 14th party congress. It was pervaded with a fight against minority rights. Krupskaya's attempt, relying on Lenin's ideas, to somehow protect the rights of the minority and return to the practice that had existed in the early stages of the development of Russian social democracy and in the Bolshevist wing, was flatly rejected by the majority of the congress. This created a certain atmosphere which told of the lack of a democratic potential. You understand that not only was it not to be found in the norms—it was not to be found in the psychology of party relations either.

In the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee, in my opinion, there was no honest scientific analysis of the condition of the party. Many of our problems stem from this. We are speaking here about some reformist

tendency and the natural processes of renewal. Allow me to express my doubts that we are going through a natural process of renewal and that a reformist tendency has developed. Let us recall a number of productive ideas of the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 19th All-Union Conference regarding the party. How much of these ideas has entered the practice of party life? Essentially nothing has happened. Even the resolution of the 19th CPSU Conference concerning glasnost—an interesting and productive document—has been regularly violated by the party itself and its leadership. Now we know little about what takes place and how at the upper levels of the party.

Is a natural process of renewal possible? A natural process is possible in a living organism. In an organism that is living and functioning. Does the party have a living organism? I do not know of any other political organization in the world which is structured in such a way that it is present in practically every labor collective and in every unit of the society. Let us compare this with the level of influence on social processes, on public opinion, on the formation of the political situation. Or the integrating function which was mentioned earlier—why is it not being carried out?

A. ILIN. In my view, we are oversimplifying things here and denying the party's integrating role. For instance, during the Great Patriotic War it was fairly clear. As it is when other large problems are being solved. Yes, there was a dictatorship and there were repressions. And mistakes. But the party's influence on the economy and the development of social processes cannot be denied.

V. SHOSTAKOVSKIY. Yes, it can. Because this was not political influence. It was the influence of command and power pressure. War is a somewhat different phenomenon; it is an extreme condition of the society and the party.

REJOINDER. And are we not in an extreme situation now?

[Shostakovskiy] I agree with that. But in many cases did the extreme condition not come from the party as the architect of this society?

The rigid social construction, the bearer of which is the party, was realized by the method of the same power pressure. Now it has collapsed because it was being held up by supports whose groundlessness is now quite obvious. It seems to me that we must not return to this.

When preparing the Central Committee Platform, unfortunately, they did not take advantage of the developments and analysis of the party's condition that were done at Moscow University and in our party school and fairly thoroughly at the all-union conference of party clubs and party organizations. As a result, the strategic direction toward the establishment of the power of the party masses in the party is not backed up by a system of ideas or mechanisms for the realization of this direction. In general I assume that without studying the object it is difficult to look for potential for renewal and path of access to a renewalist, constructive regime.

Moreover, we must determine where we want to go. We understand democratization of the party in various ways. I now recall one conference after the March elections last year at which a well-known party worker stated: I am in favor of democratization of the party. To do this we must gather up the military regulations, take everything that is written about discipline, and creatively transpose it to suit our needs....

REJOINDER. Well, there are plenty of fools everywhere....

[Shostakovskiy] This is not simply stupidity, it is a position, a vision of democracy, an understanding of discipline. We shall not advance significantly with this kind of approach. Is there a reformist tendency in the party? At this point I cannot say that we have a consolidated active reformist tendency with a sufficiently clear goal.

The Way Out of the Crisis: Where Is It?

V. POSHATAYEV, member of the editorial board, PRAVDA editor for the ideological section. One gets the feeling that the organizational basis is taking the upper hand both in the draft of the Democratic Platform and in the discussion today. There are indeed many questionable and debatable issues here which can and should be discussed. Now I am bothered by something else. In the Democratic Platform, which is offered here as an alternative document, it says clearly at the very beginning that we are in a crisis of communist ideology. But, to be honest, there are no arguments to support this statement. A thesis has been proclaimed which could, of course, find support among many people who are not experienced or trained on the theoretical plane. The contradictory nature of the document is clear throughout, and here especially. I found approximately eight points which the platform notes are in need of radical revision. These include the dogmatic idea of the historical mission of the working class, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the inevitability and necessity of socialist revolutions, and so forth. But all of these issues have been widely discussed recently. They were also raised in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and investigated in the article by M.S. Gorbachev in PRAVDA and in subsequent discussion. But the authors of this platform are acting as though they are the initial discoverers. They are speaking of things which indeed alarm people. But then there arises the question of the position from which they wish to resolve these issues. From the position of some other, noncommunist ideology? Do they still adhere to the viewpoint that within the framework of communist ideology it is possible to rectify the distortions that have occurred, about which we have spoken, and to solve the problems that are bothering all of society? This must be discussed openly for otherwise

these points will cause a lack of confidence and, naturally, objections to complaints about alternatives. I categorically dismiss the thesis about the crisis of communist ideology.

REJOINDER. The issue is not stated so globally even by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his latest book, but still there is a crisis of a certain ideological model associated with the Stalinist deformations.

[Poshatayev] The fact is that it is possible to speak about a crisis in communist ideology and specific points that are in need of further development. I see no opposition here. Perhaps I have not penetrated into the essence of the subtext? But I have analyzed the text of the Democratic Platform.

V. SHOSTAKOVSKIY. I think in the first place that we have not acted like Marxists. After a certain stage what is called communist ideology is something other than a group of norms. We must figure out basically how much of the ideology is still alive, what can work productively, and what can be increased and made to bear fruit—here I agree with the entry in the Central Committee Platform and Gorbachev's article—taking all the experience into account. But this must be done and we are not dealing with it very consistently or productively. We are defending certain so-called ideological values or—I do not know any other way to put it—values which in many cases act as ideological knots. Let us recall the experience of Hungary where economic reforms were underway for more than 20 years. Yet they did not produce the desired results. Why? Because as soon as things got to the point of radical changes the ideological factor went into effect. Unemployment—how can this be, and closing down enterprises—how can this be; is this in keeping with socialism? And these reforms were immediately suffocated.

I think that this represents one of the most serious dangers for us now as well. Ideologemes [ideologemy] are still alive in the mass consciousness. Just look at how the problem of private property is being perceived. Nobody wants to think seriously about what it is they are talking about. Many reject it from the outset, they see something terrible in it as in the values of social democracy, for example, or in the experience of reforms.

YE. GAYDAR, doctor of economic sciences. One can quite clearly see the continuity of the Democratic Platform with respect to much of that which has been included in our ideological baggage along with perestroyka and that which is called the line of the reformist wing in the party. This is an integrated document and it is very well written. On the whole I am prepared to put my signature to almost everything that has been said here. And to be honest, of course, one can find different readings between the Central Committee Platform and the Democratic Platform as has been done here. But if one does look at them this way the first to be discovered will be the differences that ensue from the different positions with respect to power. There are five years of experience in perestroyka behind the Central Committee Platform. There is also experience in very serious and successful reforms because in any event today we are living in quite a different society and in a different party. It also includes an immense burden of mistakes which make forward movement more complicated.

In this connection let me discuss my attitude toward the crisis thesis. If you read the statements of any opposition party they always abound in expressions to the effect that this country is inexorably moving toward a crisis. This is a natural position for a party that is in opposition to the one in charge. In this case I would be more likely to agree with the Democratic Platform—there is a crisis in the party without any doubt. How to get out of this crisis is another matter. And here indeed, in my opinion, is a question of principle—it is the question of the attitude of this renewalist wing risen up from below in the CPSU toward the reformist center in party leadership.

The unification of reformist movements from above and below could play a positive role in the renewal of the society.

I should like to draw attention to the fact that the Democratic Platform does not say a word about the economy. Perhaps the reason why it is so easy for me to agree with it is that it does not affect my professional interests. But from the standpoint of the economy one must take into account the actual facts. For it is easy to pull down the entire economy—we have proved this brilliantly, and with fairly simple means. But to put it back together and restructure it is a very difficult task. Moreover, it is a task that in the situation that has been created can be carried out only on the basis of a fairly broad political consensus, essentially a large block of forces in favor of renewing the civilization.

Given the deteriorating economic situation it is necessary to have consolidation within the party, not with conservatives who will undoubtedly pull us backward, but consolidation of all those forces that are objectively in favor of reform.

A. CHERNYAK, member of the editorial board, official PRAVDA secretary. I agree that in principle the Leningrad platform raises many important issues with which one cannot but agree. But we should avoid using antagonistic expressions that are more appropriate for rallies and pinning on labels. The Democratic Platform declares what is bad in our party today. And there is nowhere for us to get away from this. It has indeed discovered those sore spots, 90 percent of which are known to us today. But what does it suggest, where is the way out of this situation, how do we get rid of the sore spots? Here, unfortunately, we have not received anything like an answer. Well all right, we will transform the CPSU into a parliamentary party operating in a multiparty system. What will this do? How will it operate? What is this—a panacea? Will all of our problems be

solved? No. The transformation of the party itself is also a very complicated issue, and it can in no way be opened here.

V. KELLE, doctor of philosophical sciences. Those who have spoken here have already noted that in terms of their ideological positions and in terms of their goals the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the Democratic Platform are very close and coincide in a number of cases. I think that a real alternative was revealed in the questions about factions and problems of democratic centralism. How do the authors of the program under discussion envision the existence of a unified party without any centralization? Then the idea of a parliamentary party. Parliamentary parties in the United States of America and in England, for example, are constructed in entirely different ways. Therefore the point about the parliamentary type of party produces nothing; it is very indefinite. This is a weak spot in the Democratic Platform.

This platform has to do with the fact that the party is in a condition of crisis. But there is also another side to the matter: If the party is claiming that it will remain a political force, there must be some kind of justification for this, something positive in the party itself. What evokes criticism of the party? Three circumstances: the burden of the past—the command-administrative system; second, the still remaining monopolies on power which, unless they are controlled, generate corruption and so forth; and third, the mistakes made during the course of perestroyka itself. While previously in the press our problems were linked to our legacy from the past, now we can see that many mistakes have been made during perestroyka. But these were mistakes made under the most difficult conditions of the revolutionary breakdown of the old. It is impossible to foresee everything. I cannot agree with certain assertions that nothing is being done here. We have moved a very long way into the future. Even though the economy has failed and there are many social problems we have still made some progress. We have escaped that condition of timelessness in which we lived for 20 years. The fact that the party has taken the historical initiative is to its credit. It could and did become the real source of the changes that are already taking place.

It seems to me that the CPSU Central Committee Platform is correct in saying: In the past we have also had considerable achievements, our country became a great power, and this must not be forgotten either. The great historic cause is the transformation of the party which over the course of 70 years stood at the head of things and which raised the issue of not only getting rid of the command-bureaucratic system but which is also giving up some of its own power. This is unprecedented in history.

Of course, we must take into account that all this is related to an immense philosophical about-face and there is an immense amount of theoretical work to do. Both the Central Committee platform and the Democratic Platform are oriented toward this. And here, it seems to me, is where the platforms come together.

As concerns the party's vanguard role, if the party bases its activity on a certain ideology and is guided by certain ideas, naturally, it will realize these ideas in life. Any party is the vanguard of certain social forces.

A. ILIN. We are saying here—correctly, in my view—that the two platforms have much in common. Unfortunately, there is little that is constructive in either one of them. Goals are proclaimed but when it comes to the means of achieving them they are mainly just declarations.

I should like to focus attention on this only with respect to the Democratic Platform. It seems to me that its authors are in the grip of certain vulgarized notions of trends in the party. Some of them, in my opinion, are deliberately misrepresented while others are intentionally embellished. For example, it speaks not simply of the conservative trend but of the conservative-Stalinist trend. But a conservative is certainly not necessarily a Stalinist. And another consideration. If this trend is linked to the names of eminent people who have left their stamp and who are inclined to participate in rallies, that is one thing. But can one associate it with the names of people who have lived their lives honestly, who have not spared themselves, who have worked self-sacrificingly, who have created that by which we live and do not want their lives to be dismissed with the scathing label of conservatives? When we vulgarize or misrepresent any trend we begin to fight with mythical enemies. Or, conversely, we call for people to follow mythical "leaders" who have demonstrated their devotion to perestroyka with nothing more than loud words.

Let me focus attention on the issue of the multiparty system. This is not a theoretical issue. It is a question of power. From my viewpoint the authors of the Democratic Platform are somewhat hasty in resolving the power issue. Let us be realistic. Whether our party is good or bad it exists and it has a certain amount of experience; it has not only conservatives but also living structures and cadres. Among them are people who are unworthy, who have morally discredited themselves. There are people who are not capable of performing the functions entrusted to them. But in reality the party is still the force which is protecting our society from further collapse. If one is to speak of tendencies I am undoubtedly in favor of having the party turn its power over to the soviets, but this must be done with an awareness of its political responsibility. The party bears responsibility for our difficult past and it bears responsibility for both the present and the future. If today the party were to relinquish its power and leave the state-hierarchical structures, who specifically would take over the power? The people? We are quite well aware that there is not a single country in the world where the people have the power directly. The power of the people is exercised through certain government structures.

Our party is taking responsibility, and so are the representatives of the Democratic Platform, for the political development of the society. And this means that we must realistically take into account the level of our society's preparation or a different power structure, whether or not we have legal structures, and whether the appropriate laws have been adopted.

The last thing. In all of our disputes the main thing, in my opinion, is whether we proceed from the interests of the party, whether we want it to become the real vanguard force, perhaps without proclaiming itself to be the vanguard, or are we working for negation? It seems to me—and this has already been discussed—that one can still feel more emphasis on the negation than on the principle of construction. Without positive ideas, without a striving for creative constructive actions we will not achieve success.

FROM THE EDITORS

Having undertaken the broadest discussion during the course of preparing for our 28th congress, our party is extremely interested in accumulating as much as possible both of practical experience and of theoretical developments of social scientists and of reflections of communists and non-party members concerning the fate of the CPSU, its role and position in the society, and ways of radically restructuring party work. The draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th congress is now being widely discussed in the party and throughout the society. Communists are defining their positions and their attitudes toward the ideas and points presented in this program document, and they are making their remarks and suggestions. Some of them have already been published in PRAVDA. We shall continue in the future to print the materials from the discussion of the pre-congress party documents.

Attention should also be given to what is called the alternative programs of action which originate in the party organizations, party clubs, and other associations of communists. Many of these proposals which come in to the editorial office have been printed in our newspaper's "Discussion Leaflets."

Today's publication of the text of the Democratic Platform and the discussions in the PRAVDA editorial offices are a continuation of this same basic policy of the newspaper. We try to present on our pages the entire spectrum of opinions, ideas, and approaches to party renewal. Obviously, we did not manage to exhaust this subject in the roundtable discussion—the dialogue will be continued, and will include reader participation. But certain conclusions must be drawn right now. First of all one should note the groundlessness of attempts—and, as we know, they are being made—at a competitive juxtaposition of the position of those who support the Democratic Platform and the main points of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform. This approach does not do anyone any good. Although, while these documents have points in common, there are also principal differences between them. The draft adopted at the February Plenum of the Central Committee reflects both the development of social thought and the political experience accumulated by the party during the course of perestroyka. The Democratic Platform also reflects many ideas which have been discussed in the party during these years. It would be wrong and actually impossible for it to be any other way. At the same time, with respect to a number of items this platform is schematic and excessively ideologized. For a party document is not simply a scientific treatise or a journalistic composition.

One cannot agree with the authors of the Democratic Platform when it comes to their views on party factions either. History has already proved that this path leads to a dead end. Its lessons convincingly show: Factions are by no means a synonym for democratic plurality of opinions and, as a rule, they are accompanied by confrontation, a rigid irreconcilability in the struggle for leadership, and an inability to compromise. The same thing is shown by the still brief history of the association of communists which produced the Democratic Platform.

Without downplaying these or other differences which the readers might judge for themselves, let us say that they do not close off the path to honest and direct dialogue on behalf of the radical interests of the party. The result could be a synthesis of all that is reasonable and constructive in the unified document, enriched by collective intelligence and experience—the CPSU Platform which will be adopted by the 28th party congress.

Democratic Platform Member on CPSU Program

90UN1212C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 11, 17-23 Mar 90 p 5

[Interview with B. Lysenko, candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR, by unnamed ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent: ""Not Confrontation, Dialogue!""; date and place not specified]

[Text] The editors have received many questions following publication in the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY of material on the association of communists "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" (Nos 3 and 7 for 1990). Our correspondent asked V. Lysenko, member of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" Coordinating Council and candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], to respond to some of them.

[Correspondent] What is the attitude of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" toward the results of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum and the draft Central Committee platform adopted at it?

[Lysenko] We regard the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum as a certain step forward in the

democratization of the party. A half-baked, contradictory, and largely forced step, however, which does not correspond to current public expectations.

The inevitability of political pluralism is recognized in principle. A revision of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution is proposed. At the same time the plenum failed to acknowledge the multiparty system which actually exists in the country (to which, for example, the refusal to register the All-Union "Memorial" Society and many others testifies). There is a virtual absence in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee of specific democratic mechanisms for the realization of this principle and provision or the other, which makes possible their complete devaluation in the actual practice of party life.

[Correspondent] What do you think, is the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" an alternative to the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee or not? To what do you aspire—dialogue or confrontation with the Central Committee?

[Lysenko] Despite a number of points in common, the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" is, as a whole, an alternative document to the draft platform of the Central Committee. It is based on the concept of a parliamentary type of party, that is, a party equal with all other parties, obtaining a mandate to administer the country exclusively at general parliamentary elections and for a limited term and ready to cede power to another political force if the people advocate this.

We do not believe here, however, that the two documents are separated by an iron wall. We support a dialogue of the democratic forces in the party and a search for a compromise version of the reform of the CPSU which could unite the reform forces in the party. In this connection we propose the creation on a broad democratic basis of an organizational committee for the preparation and realization of the 28th CPSU Congress, which would include leaders of the CPSU who enjoy the communists' trust: USSR people's deputies who are members of the CPSU; representatives of all communist parties of the union republics and local and primary party organizations; representatives of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," representatives of the strike committees and the communists who are leaders of democratic organizations and movements.

[Correspondent] You are a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy for Moscow's Leningrad Territorial District 28. Will affiliation to the CPSU influence the results of the elections?

[Lysenko] Compared with last year's elections the electorate's attitude toward candidates for deputy who are members of the CPSU has deteriorated. At many of the election meetings which I have attended the question asked first is: "Are you a communist or not?" Following an answer in the affirmative, a rumbling starts in the room. Now, true, CPSU members are often asked: "Are you a supporter of the 'Democratic Platform in the CPSU'?"—and, in the event of an affirmative answer, they are supported.

Referendum on CPSU Congress Members Urged

90UN1212B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 11, 17-23 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by K. Erglis, member of the CPSU since 1946: "Public Referendum Needed"]

[Text] The draft document "Procedure for the Election of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress" was published on 27 February. It is of great significance inasmuch as "the results of the congress will depend primarily on the composition of the delegates." I consider it necessary in this connection to make certain observations and suggestions.

The current CPSU Rules determine clearly in sections 24, 48, and 44 the three-stage procedure for the election of delegates to the congress: In the primary organizations delegates are elected to a rayon (city) conference, these delegates then elect delegates to an oblast (kray) conference (republic congress), who, in turn, elect delegates to the CPSU congress.

The draft that has been published is in fourfold breach of the CPSU Rules. As distinct from the rules, it is proposed that: a) "the election procedure... be determined by plenums of oblast and kray party organizations and the union republic communist parties..." b) party electoral districts be introduced c) direct elections (there are no "district" and "direct election" concepts in the rules) be introduced; d) "...as distinct from the procedure stipulated by the CPSU Rules currently in effect, candidates who have garnered the largest number of votes in relation to other candidates should be deemed delegates elected to the 28th CPSU Congress...."

The ambivalence and imprecision of the proposed "procedure" could in all likelihood cause difficulties in the work of the congress' credentials commission and lead to arbitrary decisions in recognition of the competence of the deputies. The multiple violation of the rules would set a dangerous precedent for the future. A party which has proclaimed the creation of a state based on the rule of law does not have the right to itself flagrantly violate its own law—the rules. Where is the solution if only the congress may alter the rules, but the vast majority of CPSU members have found it necessary to conduct direct multiple-choice elections of delegates to the congress by party district?

Mankind has hit on the idea of referendums in order by general ballot, with the participation of each person with a vote and in the most democratic manner, to conclusively decide questions of the establishment of a new law or a change in individual provisions of it, freeing the legislative authority from the solution of a specific problem. The referendum mechanism was described in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 8 for 1990.

The "CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress" proposes "the holding in special circumstances of referendums." I believe that the current situation is just such a special circumstance. It transpires that only a partywide referendum may legitimately determine the procedure for the election of delegates specifically to the 28th congress. Inasmuch as the well-organized party apparatus is at all levels capable of operating without delay, the final result of the referendum could be obtained within two weeks from the day of publication in PRAVDA of the text of the ballot paper. I could suggest the form of the ballot paper.

Komsomol Central Committee Examines Issues

PM2603113590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "10th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum: Day Two"]

[Text] The 10th All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Plenum continued its work 23 March 1990.

Taking into account the discussion which took place, the plenum instructed the Komsomol Central Committee Commission for the Elaboration of the Komsomol Statutes to finalize the submitted draft statutes and possible 21st Komsomol Congress resolutions concerning the statutes, and decided that the documents in question should be published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and submitted for consideration by the 21st Komsomol Congress.

The plenum took note of the report by V. Chepurin, chief of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Organizational Department, on organizational backup for the preparation and holding of the 21st Komsomol Congress.

A joint sitting of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission took note of a report by N. Klykov, chairman of the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission.

It was noted that it is inexpedient to create an unwieldy parallel monitoring structure within the Komsomol, with its own organs and apparatus. A decision was made to publish in the press the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission's proposals to the 21st congress on the concept of restructuring monitoring within the Komsomol.

The plenum suggested the following agenda for the 21st Komsomol Congress:
1. Report by the Komsomol Central Committee.
2. Report by the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission.
3. On the Komsomol Program.
4. On the Komsomol Statutes.
5. Report by the group of USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol.
6. On the Komsomol's central organs.

The Komsomol Central Committee plenum agreed with the amendments to the suggested representation of Komsomol organizations on the new composition of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and instructed union republic Komsomol central committees and Komsomol oblast committees to perform the necessary work on the nomination and promotion of additional candidates to the new All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. The plenum took note of a report by the Organizational Committee for Coordinating the Activity of Komsomol Organizations and Preparing for an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol Congress on the fulfillment of the Ninth All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Plenum resolution "On Convening a Congress of RSFSR Komsomol Organizations," and decided to publish this report in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

The Komsomol Central Committee plenum examined draft resolutions "On Student Youth" and "The Komsomol and the Young Pioneers Organization," and recommended that they should be submitted for consideration by the 21st Komsomol Congress.

The plenum took note of the conclusions and proposals and the appeal by participants in an enlarged plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces to the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the 21st Komsomol Congress, and suggested that they be discussed at the congress debating centers and that a draft resolution on these matters be submitted to the congress.

The plenum supported the proposals by the Komsomol Central Committee Finance and Economic Commission on amendments to the Komsomol Central Committee budget for 1990.

The Komsomol Central Committee plenum instructed the council of representatives from delegations to the 21st Komsomol Congress to examine a draft resolution "On the Mass Media and the Komsomol's Publishing Work" and to submit it to the 21st Komsomol Congress.

The plenum adopted a resolution "On the Situation Prevailing in the Aral Sea Region."

The Komsomol Central Committee plenum also examined a number of other questions.

Role of Press Discussed at Moscow Conference

PM2803140590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Debate on the Role of the Press"]

[Text] Given the increasing politicization of society what should the mass media be like? How will relations be established between them in the future? The scientific and practical conference entitled "Party-Mindedness and Pluralism of Opinion in the Mass Media," which

opened in Moscow yesterday at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, is devoted to clearing up these issues.

Its participants—journalists, scientists, and party officials—pointed out that the Soviet press is now becoming an arena for political struggle. Press publications are now divided according to their ideological and national views. Many newspapers and journals do not only hold alternative but also opportunist, antisocialist positions today. Will this diversity result in chaos or lead to truth; in what cases is political dialogue possible between the mass media and where is there a need for political struggle—those assembled at the coneference are trying to answer these questions.

Agricultural

Mid-March Weather, Crop Conditions Reported

904B0180A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by Kh. Tebuyev, agrometeorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Over a large part of the territory of the Baltics, Belorussia, the Central Chernozem, the south of Povolzhye, the northwest of the Central region, and the northeast of the Ukraine the winter crops resumed their growth (20-30 days ahead of the average times over many years). On the rest of the territory of the Ukraine, Moldavia, and the northern Caucasus winter grain crops continued to grow, early spring crops are being planted, buds have started to swell on the cherry, plum, and apricot trees, and in the southern part of the territory, on the apple trees as well. Because of the warm, dry weather the supplies of productive moisture in the southern half of Moldavia and the southwest of the Ukraine have decreased and amount to 15-25 millimeters in the plowed layer of soil and 50-110 millimeters or 60-80 percent of the norm at a depth of 1 meter. In the majority of the rest of the regions where growth has started the supplies of moisture are good. In the southwest of the Central Chernozem region, the lower Povolzhye, the extreme north of Lithuania, and in places in Estonia and the west of Belorussia the upper layer of the soil has reached a soft pliable condition. Conditions have been created for preparing the soil and planting early spring crops (20-30 days ahead of the average time periods over many years).

Cool weather prevailed in the Transcaucasian republics. There was freezing everywhere. A considerable amount of precipitation (20-40 millimeters) was observed in the western and central regions of Georgia and the southeast of Azerbaijan. Conditions were unfavorable for doing field work here because of the rain. Winter grain crops have been growing for a large part of the 10-day period.

In the agricultural regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan (except for the southern regions) the weather has continued to be warmer than usual. The average air temperature over the 10-day period was 3-8 degrees higher than the many-year average while in the south of Kazakhstan it was lower than average. As of 20 March there was a snow cover everywhere except for in the southern regions of Kazakhstan. In Western Siberia the winter grain crops were dormant and the conditions for wintering were satisfactory.

In the republics of Central Asia after the warm weather in the second half of the 10-day period there was a sharp drop in temperature, and in a number of regions there was heavy precipitation and wind. In the eastern regions of the territory the conditions for conducting field work were unfavorable because of the rain which turned to snow in certain regions. The winter grain crops were growing over a large part of the 10-day period, the buds on the fruit trees continued to swell, and in the south of Turkmenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (except for the northern regions) the apricots, peaches, and almonds started to blossom. The conditions for blossoming were good in the first half of the 10-day period but during the second half they deteriorated considerably because of the precipitation that fell in the form of rain (snow in places) and the lower temperatures.

Scientific

1957 Ural Accident Radioactivity Problem Viewed

LD2803175490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 28 March carries a 10-minute interview by Andrey Nikifirov of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Penyagin, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Ecology Committee. Nikifirov says that Penyagin has recently returned from the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] where he was on a fact-finding tour connected with the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station [AES] accident. Is Penyagin satisfied with government replies, Nikifirov asks. He is depressed about them, he says. Penyagin did not suspect such level of incompetence and inadequate and mendacious information. Penyagin adds that deputies, likewise, failed adequately to prepare their questions. He adds that questions must be short. Replies must be to the point. We must learn all this. We must learn not to give deliberately false information, Penyagin says. He goes on to say: "Well, let us put it this way. Comrade Belousov, talking of our region, Chelyabinsk Oblast, today said that after the 1957 explosion everything had been disinfected there, everything had been put right and everything is altogether fine."

Nikiforov: "Let me make things more precise for the sake of our radio listeners. We are talking of the explosion at a radioactive production waste storage depot."

Penyagin: "Yes. Due to this explosion at the time...[changes thought] or, to be more precise, this explosion affected 270,000 people. This is the enormous extent of this disaster as far as our Ural area is concerned. Industrial reactors are currently operating in this region. Currently 450 million cubic meters of radioactive water have accumulated.

"More complex situations also exist there. I have in mind one of the lakes in which solid nitrate and uranium salts which can simply, can simply explode, are deposited. Today the minister, or to be more correct, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, talking of this situation asserts that everything there is just fine. How can one say that? I just thought I will have to put a question as a deputy as a matter of priority. Either he is not on top of the situation, or he is unable to say the truth or else something else, one does not understand what, is at stake here. At any rate, it seems to me, such ministers cannot effectively carry out their work."

Nikiforov: "Aleksandr Nikolayevich, you are naturally well on top of the situation inasmuch as you are a people's deputy from that region, but here you named figures—to what extent, as it were, are they official?"

Penyagin: "Yes, the point is that as soon as our ecology committee got down to work, here I have in mind, well, you can say a year ago, we held the first open parliamentary hearings on the explosion in the town of Kyshtym in 1957. This has been done. Moreover a vigorous debate is currently underway there on the problem of whether or not to build an atomic station precisely on these lakes of radioactive water. That is why I have been dealing with this problem constantly and in earnest—I can not but know what is going on there. I visited the town. I visited the defense enterprise which operates there. And I cannot imagine that comrade Belousov is unaware of these things—he is duty bound to know. But if he is of the view that he can be economical with information for us and that false information can be given then I think, simply, that evidently he underestimates us and that he underestimates the ecological situation that has taken shape in this given case in the South Ural area. One must not talk with deputies in this manner. All deputies must know the truth—only in this case will we learn to adopt correct decisions. Otherwise we will systematically allow errors to occur in decisionmaking and this is all the more the case with regard to political errors."

Nikiforov: "Aleksandr Nikolayevich, what do you think, all that you have been talking about, all these consequences, are these the results of that explosion in 1957—or could it be the case that these are, as it were, some kind of new processes linked with—well, we are aware that your region has, as it were, very intensive production facilities, such as very large metallurgical production facilities and so forth?"

Penyagin: "No, it is simply that, yes, it is, first and foremost, reactors that are operating there at a defense enterprise and the cooling of the reactors is done precisely through these lakes. Well, to reply to the question—this is how such a great quantity of radioactive water built up there. And also another thing—all this depends on the technology of production facilities sited there now. Cheyabinsk 65."

Military

Yazov, Lizichev Address Army Writers Meeting

PM2803115790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

["Our correspondent" report: "Meeting With Writers"]

[Text] A meeting with writers whose work and lives are associated with the Armed Forces, and who recently formed their own Officers' Assembly of Writers, was held 24 March in the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and minister of defense, addressed the meeting. In his brief speech, he described the complex situation in which the Armed Forces are operating at present. He dwelt on the role played by fiction and the mass media in the spiritual life of soldiers and officers.

Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, told those assembled about the implementation of proposals made by writers at their previous meeting.

Alarm and concern with the state of affairs in society, the groundless attacks on the Armed Forces, and the mass media's inadequate activeness in defending the interests of servicemen, were voiced in speeches by writers A. Prokhanov, N. Doroshenko, F. Chuyev, S. Lykoshin, I. Kurchavov, K. Rash, Yu. Vinogradov, A. Fomenko, and Major General V. Filatov.

Those assembled were unanimous about the need for a truthful depiction of processes occurring in the Army and of its role and position in the life of society and the people.

Yazov Speaks at French Military Academy

PM2903103690 Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Mar 90 p 4

[Jacques Isnard report: "General Yazov's Disarming Smile"]

[Excerpt] General Dmitriy Yazov has an answer to everything. He answers with a disarming smile. In accordance with the "new military thinking," the Soviet defense minister, who is celebrating his third year in office under Mikhail Gorbachev, used that smile on Tuesday 27 March when addressing students from military academies at the Paris Military Academy. Gen Yazov is on an official visit to France until the end of

this week. As Jean-Pierre Chevenement, his French counterpart, did in Moscow last year, the Soviet defense minister spoke for an hour with the young officers who will form the top military hierarchy in the coming years.

It was a balanced performance: A 30-minute address—at times the general read from a written text, and at others he spoke off the cuff—followed by 30 minutes of answering questions during which a taste for argument vied with a good-natured frankness.

Ten Billion Rubles in Chernobyl

In reply to one questioner who expressed concern about the Soviets' ability to destroy their equipment in accordance with a timetable imposed by the disarmament talks with the West, the minister said that he finds it "difficult at present" to answer this question: "Melting down 20,000 tanks is not easy and costs a great deal." However, "money does not grow on trees." In reply to somebody else who wanted to know whether "the revival of Islam is a threat to the USSR," the general said: "I am not a Muslim and I have to feel my way on the subject of Islam, just like you. I do not think that Islam leads to war, if the Muslim states are included in the disarmament process. Allah does not necessarily call for confrontation." But, after all, the Soviet minister admitted, the French have more experience of hostilities with the Arab countries."

In reply to a third questioner who mentioned the possibility of the Soviet Army withdrawing from East German territory, Dmitriy Yazov reaffirmed that the question will be settled in negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France on the one hand, and the two German states on the other. "But we do not rule out bilateral negotiations. We have no intention of establishing ourselves in the GDR, any more than on any other foreign territory."

During his prepared speech, the Soviet minister had also discussed German unification. "We have never denied the Germans' right to live in unity. Unification concerns the Germans but must not lead to a military and strategic imbalance on the continent or be harmful to neighboring countries." And, after stressing the need for a peace treaty "to define Germany's status in the European structures," Gen Yazov said that "France's position coincides with ours on many points," aside from the fact that the USSR still thinks it is "absolutely out of the question and unacceptable for Germany to remain a NATO member."

The Soviet minister recalled at length that, by choosing the path of "reasonable sufficiency" and a "defensive doctrine," his country pledged to any state "never to be the first to open hostilities and never to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike."

He listed the unilateral disarmament decisions made for 1989 and 1990 by the USSR and reaffirmed that his country was prepared to abandon its status as a nuclear power "if others do likewise." The Soviet Union knows what it is talking about: "We have already spent 10 million rubles decontaminating the Chernobyl region and in 1990 we will stop production of very pure uranium for military purposes, just as we have already closed two reactors manufacturing plutonium for military use in 1987." [passage omitted]

Stolen Navy Small Arms Used in Crime

PM2803152390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report: "And Again We Search for Weapons..."]

[Text] Baltic Fleet—"As a result of persistent work by the Baltic Fleet military prosecutor's Operational Investigation Group, in cooperation with KGB and internal affairs administration staffers in the cities of Mogilev, Astrakhan, and Novgorod, a number of serious crimes have been detected—the theft of weapons and ammunition, and murder, and six AK-74 assault rifles with ammunition have been recovered...."

The intensive labor of many people lies behind these lines from the official document. But it all began from the customary slackness and criminal negligence in the execution of duty on the minesweeper commanded by Captain Lieutenant I. Shandakov (now dismissed from his post and recommended for transfer to the reserve). Over a long period of time neither the ship's captain, nor Lieutenant N. Likhodeyev, commander of Command Department 2-3 (dismissed from his post and recommended for transfer to the reserve), checked that small arms and ammunition were present on the ship. This enabled former ship's armorer I. Grabovetskiy, in a conspiracy with another two sailors, to commit the theft of weapons and ammunition on their transfer to the reserve. The absence of the assault rifles was discovered at the end of last year by Seaman R. Orchukba, who reported it to Lt. N. Likhodeyev. But Likhodeyev informed the ship's captain about the theft only on 6 February this year. It additionally transpired that a Makarov pistol, over 700 assault rifle rounds, signal flares, and battle-noise simulators are also missing.

The operational investigation group for solving this dangerous crime was headed by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Goncharenko, deputy fleet military prosecutor and chief of the Investigation Department.

Riga, Mogilev, Astrakhan, and Novgorod are but a few of the cities visited by the military prosecutor's staff in the course of a month. Five assault rifles were discovered in the possession of, and recovered from, inhabitants of Latvia; the sixth was found in the Transcaucasus. During the investigation a murder was also detected—committed using the stolen pistol. Sappers discovered the pistol and bullets for it by a highway in the region of Grobina village (Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]). In a joint operation with staffers of the Latvian SSR Organized Crime Department, a particularly dangerous recidivist criminal was arrested.

The investigation of the case of three former Baltic Fleet servicemen and over ten civilians is currently being concluded.

Baltic Republics

Defense Ministry Outlines Policy on Deserters

LD2903133990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Here is news on the fate of the Lithuanian deserters. Based on the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic on the invalidity of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service of 12 November 1966 on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic, serviceman Lukosevicius is under the jurisdiction of the Commission for Affairs of Military Service of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic.

A telegram containing this information arrived addressed to the commander of a military unit. The whereabouts of yet another serviceman who left his unit without authorization has become known. According to the situation on 29 March, there are more than 250 servicemen in the republic who have committed this illegal act.

The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces has set up a special commission to expose persons who have deserted and return them to their units. Responding to a TASS correspondent's question regarding the commission's work, Lieutenant-General Markovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, said: Our officers have visited the families of 97 servicemen. In 40 cases the parents assured us unconditionally that their children, who had given in to provocation, will continue their service, will complete it and, with a sense of having fulfilled their duty, will return home. Moreover, some of them demanded guarantees from us that the offenders will not be prosecuted. In 42 families the situation is such: Fathers and mothers said bitterly that they sincerely want to help us but are themselves unaware of where their sons are. The parents of 15 deserters were unresponsive to all persuasive attempts and appeals for prudence and parental wisdom.

I cannot fail to mention something else. Having familiarized myself fully and thoroughly with the living and domestic conditions of the close relatives of servicemen, we reached the conclusion that certain young men should be given the opportunity to terminate their service in the Armed Forces. Of course, such a decision in each specific case will be arranged in accordance with the law.

Lieutenant-General Markovskiy added that 51 servicemen who left their unit without authorization have already been sent back. It has just been reported to me that several other servicemen have arrived at the Vilkaviskis, Ukmerge, and Anyksciai military registration and enlistment offices. They have all declared their willingness to continue serving in the Soviet Army. To a certain extent, these figures reflect the arrangement of political forces and the state of social awareness of the republic's inhabitants. We have grounds to believe that many people in Lithuania are beginning to understand that the 12 March decision of the Supreme Soviet and other law-making acts do not exempt servicemen, including citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], from criminal liability for deserting their units without authorization.

A TASS correspondent was informed of the following at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: The leadership of the USSR Defense Ministry has decided not to prosecute servicemen of Lithuanian nationality who deserted their military units without authorization and who have voluntarily stated, at military registration and enlistment offices of the republic, their willingness to continue their service. At the same time, it is stressed that persons who persistently continue to violate the Law on Universal Military Service will be sought and detained, and criminal penalties will be applied to them in accordance with existing legislation.

Bucharest Radio Reports on Lithuanian Issues

AU2803111290 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 0400 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] In a telegram sent to President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Lithuanian leaders proposed the opening of negotiations on a neutral territory and, at the same time, they protested against Soviet military operations in Lithuania.

The assault troops sent to Vilnius are there to carry out the orders of Soviet Union's Government and president to increase the protection of major state assets on Lithuanian territory, said General Varennikov, the commander of the ground forces. According to the Soviet Television statement, the airborne troops are making daily helicopter flights over Lithuanian borders because of the increasingly greater indication that the Armed Forces of the Sajudis Organization are installing new boundary marks in [name indistinct]—reads the statement of the commander of the Soviet Union's Assault Troops.

In Lithuania, certain measure have been taken regarding the entrance and exit of foreign citizens, who were advised to leave the republic's territory and temporarily refrain from entering it. These measures also refer to diplomats, commercial representatives, and journalists accredited to the Soviet Union.

Also in Vilnius, it was announced that assurance was received that Lithuanian deserters from the Soviet Army, who were captured, were not injured and will not be punished. They will only have to complete their military service.

Yesterday afternoon, a few thousand demonstrators, who oppose the unilateral proclamation of Lithuania's independence, demonstrated peacefully in the neighborhood of the Vilnius parliament.

After the first meeting of the Presidential Council, held in Moscow yesterday, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the major subject discussed was the revitalization of economic reforms and the land reforms, without approaching the issues of the Federation.

AFP notes that the president of the Soviet Union has not mentioned Lithuania.

During a news conference held in Lagos, Eduard Shevardnadze said that the Lithuanian events are cause for concern in Moscow, however no force is being used. No additional troops have been deployed in Lithuania, since the strongest weapon is preferred—dialogue. The Soviet foreign minister also mentioned that today, the draft of the new Constitution of the country is being worked out, which will establish the political mechanism regarding the exit of a republic from the composition of the Union.

The Soviet Minister of Defense Dimitriy Yazov said yesterday in Paris that everything will be resolved peacefully in Lithuania.

Genadiy Gerasimov, the head of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry said in Moscow that the Soviet Union views the resolution of the U.S. Senate regarding Lithuania as an interference in domestic affairs of the Soviet state, an act that is at variance with the norms and principles of international law.

Lithuanian Border Closed to Tourists, Journalists

LD2903105290 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1030 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] The Soviet leadership has now closed the Lithuanian borders to foreigners. A decree signed by President Mikhail Gorbachev says the borders of the republic will remain closed to foreigners for the time being. The border closure applies to tourists and journalists. No changes in travel to the other Soviet republics, including Estonia and Latvia, have been implemented, the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm states.

Official Assesses Impact of Visa Restrictions

LD2903104890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0835 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Interview with Povilas Dauparas, head of the Information Department of the Supreme Council of the Republic, conducted by radio news presenter J. Valancuite "during an adjournment of today's Supreme Council session"—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Valancuite] Has the amount of information available diminished following the USSR president's decree restricting the number of entrance visas to Lithuania?

[Dauparas] You know, I would say we have not noticed it at all. Especially of late, the stream of journalists is rather large. For example, we have almost 300 journalists at the moment.

[Valancuite] Do you think this is because they are disobeying the regulations, or is it because of their resourcefulness?

[Dauparas] Well, it is difficult to tell. I would think that the measures intended to impede the arrival of journalists have not yet been applied. [passage omitted]

Vilnius Radio Carries 29 Mar Council Session

Basic Law Debated

LD2903095490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 29 March begins its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Copuncil session in Vilnius.

A brief discussion is held on the immediate agenda of the session and then a statement is read on behalf of the scientific council of Vilnius University. The statement expresses indignation and protests the Soviet Armed Forces occupation of premises which the University is currently renting from the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

At 0706 GMT Deputy Lapainskas takes the floor and reports on the amendment to be made to the basic law of the republic.

At 0723 GMT debates ensue on the composition of the Supreme Council Presidium.

At 0755 GMT Deputy Kruopas makes a report on the amendments to the basic law on local self-government bodies.

At 0805 GMT debates on the issue follow. When debates on each paragraph conclude, a vote is taken in all the above amended paragraphs.

At 0825 GMT the results of the election of local authorities is announced: 7,088 deputies have been elected out out of 9,331—almost 76 percent. Repeat voting will be held in 844 constituencies and in other constituencies repeat elections will be held. It is announced that a more detailed account of the results of elections will be published in the press.

At 0830 GMT the session adjourns until 0900 GMT.

Landsbergis Addresses 29 Mar Council Session

LD2903125890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1038 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Address by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, to the Council; on 29 March in Vilnius—live]

[Text] I would like to inform you that I have to make a rather significant number of oral and written statements urging support for our position and our struggle, and to recognize the government of Lithuania. Last night I was urged again to write a letter addressed to the entire U.S.

Congress, senators and congressmen, because an action on a very large scale is taking place there which involves the entire country. I was told that it is not only American Lithuanians who support us. Ordinary Americans of various nationalities, people speaking various languages, give their support too. This action is a large-scale action. Senators and representatives who are elected by people are very favorable to us. If a joint resolution in favor of Lithuania is adopted, then the State Department, with its cautiousness, should not keep the President from making a real and final act of recognition.

I have written a short text which I would like to read to you. I wrote on behalf of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council on official letterhead paper. This is the text:

We, who adopted a platform to restore the republic of Lithuania and to renew its statehood and return Lithuania to Europe and to the family of free nations, were elected by the will of the Lithuanian people. Now we have carried out what we pledged.

However, Lithuania's freedom is in great peril now. Therefore, I would like to make a very clear statement: Support for Lithuania is support for freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe. This support will no doubt help Mr. Gorbachev as well. It will prevent him from committing a gross mistake.

The recognition of the government of the reinstated republic of Lithuania which we are seeking is an important step toward strengthening peace in the world. We are waiting for this, in good heart and with no guns in our hands. We are waiting for your help in this hard struggle against militarism and aggression, in the fight for peace and justice. Signed with trust and hope.

Russian Deputy Addresses 29 Mar Supreme Council

LD2903123190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0958 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Address by Aleksandrovich Bogomolov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic deputy, to Lithuanian Supreme Council session on 29 March in Vilnius; Bogomolov speaks in Russian—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker of the Chamber, dear deputies of the independent Lithuanian Repubic: As a representative, as a people's deputy of the Russian Federation, I greet you here from this rostrum. [applause] Esteemed deputies, the aspiration of peoples for peace, independence, self-determination, and freedom is invincible. The fact that Lithuania today has declared its independence is evidence that not only Lithuania wants to do this. All the peoples inhabiting our Soviet Union want it—Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Moldavians, and Russians. And we deputies of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet want our relations, the relations of the Russian Federation and the relations of the Lithunian Republic, to be built on mutually advantageous, good-neighborly relations. [applause] We have both been oppressed for 72 years by the system which today has brought our peoples to the brink of poverty, to the brink of social, ecological, and political catastrophe.

Today, the failure of that system is coming, and those of its leaders, those of its apologists, who are still in power today are ready to commit all sorts of grave sins, using military force, which, unfortunately they still have in their hands today, stopping at nothing in the name of their own selfish aims to stay in power. But the process going on today toward democratization, self- determination, and the independence of peoples is irreversible. There will be no return to the past. [applause] We deputies of Leningrad, deputies of the Russian Federation, deputies of the Leningrad Soviet, adopted an appeal concerning the events in Lithuania at our working conference on 24 March, and its says:

From Central Radio and TV reports and the press, which are whipping up anti-Lithuanian feelings, the impression is being formed that the policy of the Union government is capable of dragging the country into a new tragedy like what happened in Tbilisi and Baku. It is appropriate to also recall the Hungarian events of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, the Soviet-Finnish and Soviet-Afghan wars. In our view, the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Council is first and foremost a consequence of the delay in signing a new Union treaty and the ineffectual measures to overcome the growing socioeconomic crisis in our country. The only way out of this crisis situation can be negotiations. Therefore we deputies of the Leningrad City Soviet and people's deputies of the Russian Federation from Leningrad express our concern about the situation which has come about and we appeal to the USSR president and USSR Supreme Soviet to refrain from the use of force and threats of force, and to create, as soon as possible, conditions for negotiations with the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

This appeal was read out and greeted with great applause. But since there was not enough time to adopt the appeal, it was not adopted. Later, at a conference of the Leningrad Soviet people's deputies organizational committee, in connection with the events which took place on the night of 26-27 March, that appeal was changed and a telegram was sent to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The telegram reads:

Today, 27 March, we heard the news of the use of military force in Vilnius. We are convinced of the impermissibility of violence in solving the question of Lithuania's sovereignty and that of other republics. We insist that this problem is solved only through negotiations. We demand the immediate exclusion of the use of military force and the immediate start of direct negotiations with plenipotentiary representatives of the legally-elected leadership of the republic. Deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and Leningrad City.

Altogether there are 55 signatures, including 20 deputies of the Russian Federation from Leningrad. [applause]

In conclusion, dear deputies, I want to wish you happiness, joy, independence for your republics, successes in the economic life of your country, and successes in the social life of your peoples inhabiting Lithuania. [applause]

Lithuanian Defense Units Formed Despite Decree

LD2903095690 Moscow TASS in English 0921 GMT 29 Mar 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Vilnius, March 29 TASS—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet today was told of progress in work to elaborate a bill on political parties, which will define the terms for their activity in the republic. The bill says that political parties can be registered at the Justice Ministry, if they have a membership of 500 or more.

The Supreme Soviet called upon deserters from the Soviet Army to hide out in churches, closed medical institutions and other isolated places. According to official figures, about 250 Lithuanian soldiers have voluntary left their places of service. The Army command is taking measures to bring them back to their units. Local law enforcement bodies, however, do not help the Army command to detain them, and sometimes even obstruct its efforts.

Although President Mikhail Gorbachev banned the formation of units to defend Lithuanian territory, the recruitment of volunteers for them is continuing. This is happening, in part, in the city council of the Sajudis Nationalist Organisation in Klaipeda and also at its Kaunas headquarters.

Eighty Lithuanian deserters have so far joined units "to defend Lithuanian territory," a spokesman for Sajudis said. All in all, more than 5,000 people have expressed their desire to serve in these units.

Miscellaneous weapons, including machine-guns, automatics and pistols, continue to be sold on city markets. Machine-guns cost 1,500 rubles and pistols—800 rubles on a cooperative market in a Kaunas suburb and on the city market in Kedainiai.

Noteworthy in the light of the development in Lithuania is the provocative activity by nationalist organisations in other union republics. Latvian Popular Front leader Dajnis Ivans called for recruiting and dispatching Latvian "volunteers" from among militiamen to Lithuania.

Valery Semivolos, chairman of the so-called All-Ukrainian Labour Federation, arrived in Lithuania, stating that "the Ukraine, too, will pursue the path of Lithuania."

Vladislav Shved, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Pro-Union Lithuanian Communist Party and chairman of the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania, told TASS that "forces are being mobilized, primarily on the part of Sajudis, which wants to compel all to comply with its laws."

Shved believes that Sajudis' policy is "characterized by two-faced morality." Sajudis, he said, which only six months ago viewed censorship as a manifestation of Stalinism, now regards the banning of television programmes unsuitable to it as democratic.

Developments in the republic continue to be in the focus of attention of many foreign news organisations. Two hundred and fifty three foreign correspondents and about 30 television crews are now in Lithuania.

Pro-Union Member Urges Direct Presidential Rule

LD2903142490 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT 29 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Budrys]

[Text] Vilnius, March 29 TASS—A pro-Union Communist Party official in Lithuania has indicated that direct presidential rule might be necessary to settle the crisis in this Baltic republic.

Lithuania is in a state of "constitutional crisis", said Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the republican Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Citizens' Committee.

In an interview with TASS, Shved said that the situation in the Baltic republic was becoming ungovernable. Under these conditions, the pro-Union party and a considerable number of citizens "are concerned about the lawmaking activity of the Lithuanian parliament", he said. "This activity is directed at placing the republic in opposition to the entire Soviet Union and deepening confrontation," Shved added.

"The newly appointed ministers are called upon to reject the Soviet Constitution and refuse to fulfill the Soviet president's decrees." The pro-Union Communist Party believes that "all outstanding issues in the republic should be resolved within the USSR framework, but with maximum independence of the republic and its freedom from departmental diktat and centralism," Shved said.

The Lithuanian Communist Party "does not rule out the republic's possible secession from the USSR, but maintains that such actions should be conducted in keeping with the law of the Union". Such issues cannot be resolved unilaterally, he stressed.

To add to the problems, many non-Lithuanian residents of the republic are not certain about their future, Shved said. There are grounds for such fears because the nationalist Sajudis organisation has already changed its previous slogans, which has given rise to rumours.

The recent documents by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Shved remarked, "lead one to think of the

possible establishment of dictatorship in the republic." He criticised the bill on anti-state slogans, saying that it is "directed against dissenters, against those who uphold the idea of a socialist Lithuania within a renewed Federation." The pro-Union Communist Party feels this, he said. It was compelled to publish its newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA outside the republic and its representatives are barred from speaking on radio and television.

According to Shved, "the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet should realise that the problem of the republic's secession from the USSR cannot be resolved unilaterally. Attempts to achieve this are leading into a blind alley."

If no changes occur in the Lithuanian parliament's activity, Shved pointed out in conclusion, "the only way to settle the crisis would be to introduce presidential rule on Lithuanian territory".

Deputy Medvedev Discusses Prospects for Lithuania

PM2903103190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 4

[S. Kredov report on interviews with USSR People's Deputy N.N. Medvedev in Moscow on 16 and 26 March: "USSR People's Deputy Nikolay Medvedev: 'I Am Worried About Lithuania, My Little Motherland'"]

[Text] **Nikolay Nikolayevich Medvedev is one of the six USSR Supreme Soviet members from Lithuania who are continuing to work in the all-Union parliament, albeit as "observers." Today he expresses his view of events in the republic.**

But first of all, a few words to describe my interlocutor's personality and beliefs.

He is a member of the Lithuanian and the USSR Supreme Soviets. Prior to becoming a professional politician, he worked as a sector chief in a Kaunas scientific research institute.

N. Medvedev is an indigenous resident of the republic (his ancestors, ethnic Russians, have lived in Lithuania since the 18th century). He is a member of the Orthodox Church. In addition to Russian, he is fluent in Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian. He was, however, brought up primarily according to Russian cultural traditions.

It is an indicative fact that Nikolay Nikolayevich became a USSR people's deputy from a district inhabited primarily by Lithuanians. This is how he explained his popularity among voters: "I am very, very 'green.' I sincerely and honestly love the land which raised me."

He is one of the founders of "Sajudis" in Kaunas. He assumed for a long time that this movement would distance itself from politics and would concentrate on studying questions of morals and culture. But that was not to be... The following statement is typical of N. Medvedev: "I have a clearly formulated set of values. The most important element is man, man's moral commandments. Then the family. The nation as a family of families. The state as the common home of 'families' (nations). Economics. Politics... Each subsequent value is subordinate to its predecessor. It would be absurd if politics were to be elevated above economics. If we elevate the interests of a nation, a race, or a religion above man's interests, the result is the birth of fascism regardless of its hue, be it brown, green, or white. All attempts to alter the sequence of these concepts in history have ended up in misfortune."

The following interview resulted from two conversations with a 10-day break between them. The conversation began after one of the sittings of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies...

[Kredov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, why are you now in Moscow? After all, many of your countryman deputies have stayed at home, feeling that they are more needed there.

[Medvedev] It was important for me to sense the Congress' mood. Furthermore, I am trying to establish business contacts in Moscow which could be useful in creating a future East European common market.

[Kredov] You were formerly known as one of the most consistent fighters for expansion of Lithuania's economic sovereignty...

[Medvedev] Not for expansion—for full sovereignty. This is how I perceive it: We want to be masters of our own land and reliable business partners. No more and no less.

[Kredov] And so, your republic's government has taken resolute steps. Are you satisfied?

[Medvedev] I believe that events in Lithuania have somewhat complicated the situation in the republic and in the country alike. Many decisions were made in Vilnius without their economic consequences being fully taken into account.

[Kredov] I will not comment on this remark of yours: "somewhat complicated." I realize that you have to carefully weigh every word and avoid extreme statements... What do you think, is Lithuania in a position to compensate for the losses resulting from a break (if it does actually occur) in existing economic ties by an influx of world capital in the republic or the "charity" of other countries?

[Medvedev] I think that we are not yet in a position to count on major investments of world capital, and this goes some way toward explaining my pessimism. After all, no state can be saved through charity today. Charity actually corrupts [razvrashchayet]. Sympathy won't feed you, either. It is primarily necessary to rely on one's own energy, industriousness, and brains.

[Kredov] What else worries you now, when you look on events from Moscow while your heart is probably back in your native republic?

[Medvedev] It is alarming that there are politicians who hear only their own voices without foreseeing the results of their actions. My heart aches from people's lack of understanding for one another. This tragic lack of understanding can be felt here and there alike. People in Lithuania, for example, believe that democratization is progressing too slowly in Russia. My fellow countrymen are very temperamental and emotional, they lack the Estonian pragmatism. On the other hand, I can see for myself that people in Moscow fail to comprehend the specific features of the Lithuanian national character.

[Kredov] Let us try to bridge this gap with your help. Tell me, are the Lithuanians not getting "carried away," as it were, by their national ambitions? Is it true that even only two years ago—as is frequently claimed—there were no differences between the republic's indigenous population and the newcomers?

[Medvedev] Not true. There have always been differences. In the sense that people in our country have always been hostile toward anyone adopting a scornful attitude toward local traditions. As for that which now goes by the name of "anticommunism," it was indeed not openly manifested before. Even though every Lithuanian was nurtured almost from birth on the belief that his motherland was the victim of occupation by the neighboring superpower in 1940. You can treat this any way you like, but it did happen. Considerable efforts were required to explain that repressions in Lithuania were committed not by the Russians but by the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs], by Stalin's Central Committee.

There is no nationalism in the Lithuanians' blood, and I categorically assert this. There is, however, great and ardent love for their culture, religion, and language, there is a sense of their motherland's fragility and uniqueness. To tell a Lithuanian that this land does not belong to him is a mortal insult. And Lithuanians no longer want outsiders to experiment in their land. A tiny state cannot afford a civil war or class struggle. It will be consumed by such a conflagration.

[Kredov] How did the insulting expression "migrant" originate?

[Medvedev] This is something to which I am always firmly opposed. Whenever a woman or a child is verbally abused in my presence for not knowing the local language, I stand up for them without fail. Believe me, I have also made my personal contribution to ensuring that this term is now used only by the most backward people. There are no "migrants." There are, however, "rolling stones," casual arrivals who are unfamiliar with any cultural tradition. Foul-mouthed people are immediately classed as "persona non grata" in our republic.

A large number of buildings in Kaunas were erected from plans by the architect Vladimir Dubenetskiy; he is highly respected there. The Counts Zubov family lived in Lithuania, and that is part of the region's history... No, Lithuanians cannot be accused of reactionary nationalism. A newcomer may not know their language but, provided he shows respect for local customs, he is accepted as one of them.

[Kredov] Put your hand on your heart and answer this question: Do you personally experience any difficulties in relations with fellow-countrymen? (My interlocutor paused to think.)

[Medvedev] Difficulties emerge when some Lithuanians in their minds identify the Russian nation with Stalin's NKVD. Then I feel bitter.

[Kredov] Can you envisage a turn of events when you might have to leave the "little motherland" and resume residence in Russia?

[Medvedev] I have asked myself this question... This is how I would reply: I will remain in Lithuania for as long as my words and deeds suit my compatriots.

[Kredov] People's deputies from your republic have virtually withdrawn from the union parliament's work. Do you approve of this decision?

[Medvedev] Inwardly I disagree. But since there is a consensus, I obey it. I am prepared to work on USSR Supreme Soviet commissions but, out of solidarity with my compatriots, I take no part in voting.

Nonetheless, I believe that Lithuanian deputies have quite properly upheld their voters' interests at union level and have helped the development of democratic process in the USSR as a whole. It is incumbent on us to continue our work until Lithuania's status is determined de facto. There is a Lithuanian saying: Do not fear a well-fed neighbor, fear the hungry one. It would have been worth working hard to ensure that our neighbor is well-fed and prosperous. But alas...

[Kredov] There are some deputies from the Baltic republics who are especially energetic in upholding the interests of Russian-speaking minorities in their regions. Kogan, Alksnis, Yarovoy... These are the most familiar names. How do you appraise these deputies' activity?

[Medvedev] There is no doubt that they are sincere people. But I am not all that sure that their activeness is always beneficial to the minority in question. Unfortunately, when speaking about Lithuania, they have not been heard saying: The Lithuanians must be helped to defend their native land, it is the only one they have.

[Kredov] Shall we try and forecast the future development of events in your republic and in the Baltic region in general?

[Medvedev] Similar processes are under way also in Estonia and Latvia, but they are progressing more

slowly. They have a somewhat different demographic and political situation. There is also the effect of subjective factors. Estonia, for example, has many former residents of Pskov and Novgorod. And they are tough characters!

...The majority of Lithuania's population is now trying to build its own political system. Neither capitalist nor socialist—the name will be determined later. The Lithuanians are somewhat hindered by their emotional nature, the tendency to get carried away, the desire to attain sovereignty regardless of present realities. I believe that social tension will grow. The working class can be expected to resist the economic policy of the republic's present leadership. But there will be no conflicts on ethnic grounds, I am sure of this. [end Medvedev]

I met N. Medvedev again 26 March.

[Kredov] Ten days have passed since our last conversation, Nikolay Nikolayevich. I know you got back from Lithuania yesterday. What is the situation in the republic now?

[Medvedev] The center's decrees and resolutions have had the opposite effect to that which they were clearly intended to produce. They are perceived by the population as threats...

[Kredov] Suppose you were an adviser to the USSR president. What plan of action would you suggest to him?

[Medvedev] I would advise M.S. Gorbachev to make a television address to the citizens of Lithuania. In my view, the discussion should be conducted in an economic vein, with facts and figures to hand. That way it is easier to find common ground. In addition, a dialogue between the union and the republican parliaments should begin immediately.

...These days I feel powerless to stop a tragic process. Hopes of starting dialogue between union and republican organs are dwindling. Out of all the Lithuanian deputies, only Buracas and I remain in Moscow...

Vilnius Radio Carries 28 Mar Council Session

Military Service Law Debated

LD2803085190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 28 March begins its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. The session is chaired by Deputy Kazimieras Motiek with deputy chairman Aleksandras Abisalas.

At 0703 GMT Deputy Motieka reads the proposals for today's agenda.

At 0707 Deputy Gediminas Serksnys reports on the draft proposal to change some articles in the basic law relating to the composition and duties of the Supreme Council Presidium. It is decided to include this item on the agenda.

At 0722 the deputies decide to work in commissions and hold a plenary session in the afternoon.

At 0723 Landsbergis makes a brief statement on the need to introduce a new law on military service.

At 0725 deputies discuss whether this proposal should be examined in a corresponding commission. One deputy states that the call-up is taking place at present in Lithuania and many young people are responding to the call and joining the army.

At 0730 Deputy Saulius Razma makes a statement on the intrusion at the Higher Party School in Vilnius. This is followed by a statement by Deputy Kazimiera Uoka on trade union activity at this time.

At 0738 GMT the deputies depart to work in the commissions. The next plenary meeting is to take place at 1200 GMT.

Presidium Debated

LD2903085790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 28 March resumes its live relay of the session.

At 1203 GMT there is a statement on amendments to the basic law. The commission for the restoration of statehood proposes that the Supreme Council Presidium consist of 11 persons, who have to be elected by the Supreme Council.

At 1212 GMT proposals on the functions of the council speaker are made. His duty is to chair the council sessions.

At 1221 GMT various procedural questions are raised.

At 1227 GMT Deputy Romas Gudaitis proposes that the presidium consist of only nine persons, and that no amendments be made to the basic law concerning the speaker.

At 1231 GMT there are other proposals concerning these problems. Some deputies express the opinion that various amendments to the provisional basic law should be introduced as often as necessary until the constitution is finally adopted.

At 1314 GMT Deputy Sadreika proposes that today only the problem of the speaker should be resolved, leaving amendments to the basic law to be resolved later.

At 1320 GMT the composition of the presidium comprising the chairman, his deputies, and chairmen of the commission, is adopted by a majority. This is to be regarded not as an amendment to the basic law. The deputies then vote for the presidium consisting of 11

persons. These votes were taken in order that the editorial commission knows what to include in the draft amendment.

At 1325 GMT in a vote on whether the institution of the speaker should be established, 89 deputies vote in favor. The session adjourns.

At 1400 GMT the session resumes. Deputy Egidijus Jarosiunas makes a report on the draft law on political parties which is yet to be discussed. He describes in detail the draft law, saying that it is very similar to that adopted by the Lithuanian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) Supreme Soviet session some time ago. Only several articles in the law have been edited or amended, especially the one that bans political parties of foreign countries operating on the territory of Lithuania.

At 1420 GMT Deputy Paulauskas makes a report on the election of the chairman of the permanent parliamentary commission for the restoration of statehood of the republic of Lithuania.

At 1430 GMT the future agenda of the work of the Supreme Council is discussed. The draft agenda for the 29 March session is adopted as follows:

1. Amendments to the basic law of the republic.
2. Article 62 of the law on local self-governing bodies.
3. Law on political parties.
4. Debates, and the continuing formation of the government.

At 1458 GMT, by a majority of votes, the session decides to transfer the debates on the law on political parties to the session on 3 April.

At 1500 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis reports on the current situation, concentrating on reaction abroad rather than on events at home, because the Soviet Armed Forces have made no more attempts to occupy other public buildings.

At 1530 GMT Deputy K. Uoka says in Lithuanian that he has been asked to read the following statement from the commandant of staff of the helicopter regiment which carries out flights over Kaunas and Siauliai. He reads the statement in Russian as follows:

"I, L.A. Zhestnov, am leaving the CPSU for the following reasons. I do not agree with the policy which is being pursued in relation to the Lithuanian Republic. The Lithuanian Republic should be given the right to decide its own fate without limitations, just like any other republic. Second, being a serviceman, I have been relieved of duties and am being sent to Siberia, precisely because of my views on the problem of Lithuania and other matters. There is nowhere to seek protection. Therefore, maybe the press or the public will help.
"[Signed] L.A. Zhestnov, (?settlement) Yuzhnyy Bagrationovskiy Rayon, Kaliningrad Oblast."

This is greeted by applause.

This is followed by announcements on work in commissions.

Landsbergis Addresses 28 Mar Council Session

LD2803231790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The session of Lithuania's Supreme Council continued its work today. The most important item on today's agenda was the first reading of the bill on political parties. The bill stipulates that parties and political organizations of other states cannot be founded and cannot function in Lithuania. The parties' statutes and programs must not contradict the republic's Constitution. Following debates, a deputies' commission was set up to work out the draft law.

The usual report on the political situation was made by Chairman of the Supreme Council Vytautas Landsbergis at the close of the afternoon sitting. Having in mind the information about the contacts between the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and the USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out that the U.S. Department of State had categorically denied any secret deal between the (?Soviets) and the United States. It is known, however, that James Baker sent a telegram and Shevardnadze's reply is expected. Vytautas Landsbergis also drew attention to the explanations given by the press secretary of Vice President Quayle to the effect that the vice president does not approve in the least of the Soviet Army's actions in Vilnius over the past few days and nights.

Vytautas Landsbergis regretted that not only the Soviet propaganda and foreign mass media but prominent figures of some foreign states as well referred to the Lithuanian youths who had quit compulsory military service in the Soviet Army as deserters. Proceeding from international law, this notion cannot be applied to citizens of independent but still occupied Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis remarked. In this connection he called for a resolution of the Supreme Council to the effect that the (?forced oath) given earlier to the army of a foreign state does not commit anybody as of the day when the independent Lithuanian republic was restored. It seems, however, that the youths who have left the Army will continue to be rounded up. In addition, conscription to the Army will be resumed, (?which is) also illegal. This activity of the Army, with nearly no contacts between the parties, poses a certain threat, Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out.

Fraught with danger is also the order of the president of another state for the population of Lithuania to hand over hunting rifles. For the time being the weapons are not being taken by force, but if this happened it would be a dangerous provocation. Still, even under such circumstances, the citizens of Lithuania ought to preserve calm. All the actions of the occupationists must be given publicity and countered with protests. It is also necessary to act when foreign diplomats and journalists are being driven out from Lithuania, said Vytautas Landsbergis.

He qualified this as an act against the principle of openness, while for us openness is the main weapon to safeguard us against all dangers.

The chairman mentioned that he had met today Russian ministers of parliament, people's deputies of the Soviet Union, and deputies to the local soviets of some cities, who came to Vilnius of their own initiative. Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out that during the meeting the referendum issue had been touched upon, since the Russian parliamentarians are of the opinion that the decisions of the Supreme Council ought to be confirmed by referendum. The people had in fact voted for Lithuania's independence while electing their representatives. The referendum therefore would be illogical and politically (?queer). And if a referendum were held it should first of all find out whether Lithuania wanted to join the Soviet Union, or maybe it wanted a union with Poland and Sweden, which once was the case in history for a brief period of time, or perhaps a federation with the Baltic states. In any case the initial point is an independent Lithuanian state, Vytautas Landsbergis emphasized.

The deputies enquired whether Moscow's response to yesterday's note of the Presidium of Lithuania's Supreme Council and government to the Soviet Union's President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Government was already known. [passage omitteda] There is no response from Moscow, Vytautas Landsbergis said.

At a news conference held in the evening, he pointed out that Lithuania was showing initiative to mediate a telephone conversation between Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene and Mikhail Gorbachev, and, as Vytautas Landsbergis put it, Mikhail Gorbachev had not refused in principle.

Lithuanian Deputies Discuss Presidium Formation

LD2803180690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Mar—Today deputies at a plenary session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet discussed amendments to the temporary main law of the republic concerning the formation of a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium. It is proposed that in the composition of the Presidium there will be a chairman, deputies, the secretary of the Supreme Soviet, and other members of the Presidium who will be elected directly by the deputies—11 people altogether. Constitutional amendments have been handed over to the drafting committee for additional finishing work.

Information was heard about the work on the draft law on political parties which will define conditions for the activities of parties in the republic. The draft says that political parties can be registered at the Ministry of Justice, if they number 500 persons or more. The draft law also says that in the republic the activities of political parties and other organizations of foreign states are forbidden. It is envisaged that political parties cannot receive financial support from other states.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, delivered a review of the political situation in Lithuania and around it.

The session will continue its work tomorrow.

Lithuanian Leaders Hold News Conference

LD2803202890 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius March 28 TASS—"Calm in Lithuania is our biggest news today," Deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Algimantas Cekuolis said, opening a news conference here this evening.

Addressing journalists, Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, said that Deputies of Lithuanian Parliament Bronislavas Kuzmickas and Egidijus Bickauskas met in Moscow with U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, who is on a visit in the USSR. Landsbergis said that Kennedy had given consent to be a mediator in establishing contacts between Moscow in Lithuania.

Landsbergis, as well as Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas, who participated in the news conference noted that the political situation in Lithuania is stable and that tension in the republic started to ease from today.

"We act calmly and are resolved to bring our cause to completion," Ozolas said. Landsbergis declared again that "Lithuania is seeking contacts and urges the Soviet Union to open negotiations with Lithuania, to refrain from using force and to look for a constructive and peaceful way out."

Deputy Prime Minister Reviews Current Situation

AU2803174290 Paris AFP in English 1709 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Lithuanian leaders were tight-lipped about their meetings with Soviet Army commanders. A committee set up to coordinate talks between the Lithuanian government and the Soviet Army met on Tuesday, but the outcome of their discussions remained shrouded in mystery Wednesday.

Lithuania's Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas told AFP on Wednesday that "army representatives went to Moscow (after the meeting) where they held another meeting after which the presidential council was informed." He said Lithuanian ministers of parliament had received "information according to which (Tuesday's anti-independence) demonstrators were going to try to take the (parliament) building with the Army's help." "But we knew at three p.m. that the organisers of the demonstration had been ordered not to attack."

He said Mecis Laurinkus, a Lithuanian minister of parliament responsible for the dispute with Moscow over the deserters, had met a Soviet officer named General Vetetkin in a Vilnius barracks. The general told him that the young deserters, seized in raids on hospitals where they had sought refuge, had not been harmed. According to Mr. Ozalas, they would have to complete their military service but would not be punished.

Fewer Soviet troops were on the streets here Wednesday, with only three unarmed soldiers standing guard at the entrance of the central committee building. On Tuesday there had been 15 soldiers in combat gear, guns at the ready. [passage omitted]

Delegation Leader Views Polish-Lithuanian Talks

LD2803132490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1005 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Interview with the Citizens Parliamentary Floor Group President Bronislaw Geremek after the return of their delegation from Vilnius, by unidentified interviewer on 28 March; place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] This morning the delegation of the Citizens Parliamentary Floor Group [OKP] with its president, Bronislaw Geremek returned from Vilnius.

[Question] Professor, do you think, following your one-day visit to Lithuania, that there is a chance that democratic Lithuania will find the language of dialogue with the leadership of the Soviet Union?

[Geremek] We talked about our experiences. It is difficult to advise another country, another nation, another government, on what it has to do. Our experience is that martial law does not solve political problems, and we said that publicly and loudly. [word indistinct] everyone should have been able to hear. We said that one had to talk. In the statement issued by the Lithuanian parliament it is said that Lithuania was ready at any moment to take up dialogue with the Soviet side, on neutral ground. That proposal by the Lithuanian government is an expression of good will. Apart from that it is also a country, quite simply, living in great tension. There are groups of people who are afraid of independence and of the changes that are taking place at the moment in Lithuania, since they are destabilizing. And there are groups of determined people—but determined in such a way that emotions sometimes prevail over common sense. However, the government of the Lithuanian Republic is showing calm, patience, and common sense. Negotiations are possible at any moment. The question that I would ask myself, and have no answer to, is who instigated the deployment of assault landing forces to enter the hospitals, to the places where young Lithuanians were hiding? Who was the author of the decision to use force? Who wants those kinds of decisions? Those kind of decisions are directed not only against the interests of Lithuanians, but also against the policy of Gorbachev. It was not only against Lithuanians but also against a certain policy that [word indistinct] is practiced in western and central Europe.

[Question] There is a guarantee by OKP deputies that there should be the kind of inviolability of the Polish-Lithuanian border that exists with the Odra-Nysa border.

[Geremek] We could not give a guarantee, as we parliamentarians have few tanks and divisions. We express the policy, that is, the policy of the Polish state, that the borders are inviolable. We said that because there are very important matters that are being fanned up in Lithuania. The recent Soviet declarations are marking up; [as heard] the eastern Polish-Lithuanian border is being made the subject of doubts, and opinions of that kind are being spread in Lithuanian. Poles and the Polish minority in Lithuania, and Poles in Poland are questioning that border. That is very (?extreme) propaganda, dangerous for the future of Polish-Lithuanian cooperation. Our neighbor is Lithuania; if (?we are talking) of good relations only the unequivocal permanence of the borders creates such conditions.

Bakatin Speaks on Lithuania to Diplomatic Heads

LD2803194190 Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 28 mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—Vadim Bakatin, Soviet interior minister and member of the Presidential Council, assessed today actions by the Lithuanian authorities aimed at seceding from the Soviet Union as a "road unacceptable for any civilised state in relations with other civilised states".

Speaking to the heads of diplomatic missions accredited to the USSR at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Centre, the minister stressed that "nobody deprives the constitutional right of any republic to secede from the Soviet Union".

"But the chosen method and haste provoke doubts," he added. Bakatin expressed opinion that "the Lithuanian Government and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet should evidently do some thinking: Is there any need for continuing the confrontation?"

Dealing with other issues of the domestic situation, the minister singled out some factors which, in his opinion, have a direct destablising influence on society.

They are social tension caused by the unbalanced nature of the market and the economic slump, ethnic conflicts which already killed 293 people: more than during the entire last year.

These factors also include mounting political struggle and frantic pressure on the authorities in most diverse forms: From demonstrations and rallies to the growth of crime.

He noted that, although growth rates of crime dropped, total figures continue to rise.

Police Reportedly Vow To Back Lithuanian People

AU2803144090 Paris AFP in English 1353 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, Lithuania, March 28 (AFP)—The Lithuanian police will back the people of the Baltic republic that declared independence on March 11 against the Red Army if need be, a senior police officer said here Wednesday. "If the Army moves against the people, yes, I'll fight for the people," the deputy police chief in the central Lenin district of Vilnius, Algirdas Palacka, told Agence France-Presse.

Outgoing Lithuanian Interior Minister Marijonas Misiukonis, restored Saturday to his post in the new government, has placed the 13,000 members of the police, mostly local men, under the direct authority of the Lithuanian government. Mr. Misiukonis, minister before the March 11 decision, has sworn to uphold Lithuanian law in the republic.

Mr. Palacka said Wednesday that he had served in the Red Army for several years, but added that police rules were "to defend the interests of the people." "We learned at police college to have the law respected and our law is Lithuanian law," he said. Choosing to answer questions in Lithuanian rather than in Russian, Mr. Palacka said people's attitude to the police had improved because "they realize that the police is the only force than can protect them in cases of danger, notably in instances of brutal attack on individuals."

Police are more and more in evidence on the streets of the Lithuanian capital, foreign journalists noted Wednesday. An AFP correspondent Tuesday saw a police patrol stop three Soviet troops who had parked near the trade building on Getiminas Avenue, formerly Lenin Avenue, ask for their papers, and finally lead them away under the eyes of an approving crowd.

Soviet paratroopers had overnight Monday occupied four buildings of the Lithuanian Communist Party in what was seen as the latest turn of the war of nerves between the Vilnius government and Moscow.

A Lithuanian radio journalist Wednesday told AFP that "it is true that our attitude to the police has changed radically. First because the status of the force has changed and secondly because we think it is the only force that can protect us."

The radio building has been under discreet protection for 48 hours and broadcasts have been extended to run 24 hours a day. If the broadcasts stopped, journalist Vitas Usas said, the people would know the radio station had been taken.

"We know the police are not going to defend us by themselves—the Red Army is too strong for them—but they will intervene in isolated incidents, such as attacks on Lithuanian citizens," Mr. Usas added. One Lithuanian policeman tried to intervene when Soviet soldiers rounded up Lithuanian deserters overnight in a psychiatric hospital where they had taken shelter Monday. According to police Captain Jonas Dervinis, the policeman was still in hospital suffering from head injuries. "It's not our job to fight the troops," Capt. Dervinis said. "We should work together to protect the people in the event of incidents. That's also the Army's job." "But the situation changed when the Army came into the republic," he added, in a reference to the arrival last week of troop reinforcements sent in by Moscow. He said the Soviet forces normally based in Lithuania had "never occupied a building, nor beaten up policemen."

Foreign Ministry Aide Discusses Secession Law

PM2803160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Juridical Sciences Yuriy Aleksandrovich Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights Administration by special correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy; date of interview not stated: "Road to Independence; Lithuanian Situation in Mirror of International Law"; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Vilnius-Moscow—Frankly, it is not easy for an inhabitant of Lithuania to understand the events taking place in the republic. The republic's parliament says one thing, the USSR president says another, and the decisions unanimously adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet are just as unanimously rejected by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The paratroopers who have appeared in the republic's cities and villages suggest that it is no accident that troop exercises are taking place precisely in a period of insubordination of the Lithuanian government's disobedience to the center. And if it is difficult for the Lithuanian inhabitants to understand it all, what can we say of those who sympathize with them (or who are angry at the withdrawal from the Union) in the country and abroad?

In this situation it seems to me that the only criterion for assessment is the law, the gauging of events by the universally accepted norms of international law. And, having armed myself with the questions and arguments which Lithuania is voicing at meetings and in parliamentary debates about its independence, I requested a meeting and talk with Doctor of Juridical Sciences Yuriy Aleksandrovich Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights Administration.

[Kapelyushnyy] It is two weeks since the parliament declared the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] the Lithuanian Republic, a state independent of the USSR, which is emphasized at every step, in every public statement by the representatives of power. But for some reason the recognition of an independent Lithuania by the governments of other states is slow in coming...

[Reshetov] Obviously because Lithuania must first leave the USSR.

[Kapelyushnyy] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, "Lithuania does not need to leave the USSR for the simple reason that it never joined it!" I quote this argument which has been repeated many times by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which was cited at the USSR Supreme Soviet by a representative of the Lithuanian delegation, and which, finally, has become the conviction of a substantial part of the Lithuanian population. They say that since there was no marriage there will be no divorce...

[Reshetov] There was a marriage. And evidence of this is provided by the many "wedding gifts," including territorial gifts. That is why any specialist in international law will easily prove the unsoundness of such statements. He will prove it while guided not by emotions but by the spirit and letter of the law. Even if the marriage (we shall adhere to the terminology of family law) had not been legally registered then the years spent together make it compulsory that the property be divided. That is the legal norm. And whether or not Mendelssohn's Wedding March was played when the marriage was contracted has no part in the matter. In our case, as the whole world knows, Lithuania's entry into the USSR was legally registered.

[Kapelyushnyy] Let us grant this point. But it has seemed to Lithuania that living in a single family is a bad thing, it wants to live in its own home and has decided to take advantage of the right to self-determination enshrined in the USSR Constitution. What is to happen? How do people in general act in the civilized world in state divorces? Does world practice know of such examples or is the Lithuanian situation unprecedented?

[Reshetov] There have been such cases, but there are not many examples. In the international community state divorces are a rarity. Moreover, the absolute majority of the most democratic powers do not provide for such a procedure in their Constitutions. For instance, there can be no divorces Italian-style, Spanish-style, French-style, or American-style. In Spain separatist trends are the prerogative not of family law but of criminal law. Article 2 of the French Constitution proclaims the indivisibility of the French Republic. It must be said that the European Convention on Human Rights in 1951 introduced new grounds for restricting, for instance, the activity of organizations in order to observe the territorial integrity of states. So that divorce European-style is also problematic.

[Kapelyushnyy] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, but surely the will of the people is above the law. Let us suppose that today the inhabitants of Russian America, that is Alaska, remember that 100 years ago they were part of Russia and that they were sold without their consent and announce that they want to go back. That is their right.

[Reshetov] I believe no one in the United States would view this problem seriously just as they do not view seriously questions of the Indians' self-determination, although they too would like to acquire complete right over their historical territories. Perhaps the only country where the question of complete self-determination can be raised on a legal basis is our country, the Soviet Union.

But on receiving the right to self-determination you must also give the right to self-determination. In a multinational state this should be the legislative and moral norm. And, incidentally, I am sincerely saddened that one of the first statements of the Lithuanian government was about Lithuania's indivisibility...

[Kapelyushnyy] That means that Lithuania had the right to raise the question of withdrawing from the USSR and took advantage of it. Consequently...

[Reshetov] Consequently we must determine the procedure for the further development of the process of self-determination. The first and extraordinarily important point is whether the decision to withdraw from the USSR is legal. After all, raising the question is one thing. Adopting a decision, recording it legally, and giving it legal force on the basis of the will of the majority of the population is another. Here too we will have to begin from a long way off...

The institution of succession to rights exists in international law. These are consolidated norms which regulate the transfer of laws and commitments of one state to another. The sphere of operation of this principle of international law is very wide. It regulates questions of states' rights and commitments stemming from previously concluded treaties, all basic economic and financial questions, and questions of ownership, especially state ownership, and state debts and succession to the rights to state archives.

[Kapelyushnyy] That is, you mean that the Lithuanian archives in which documents of the people's half-century history are concentrated, including very dramatic pages, are not Lithuania's property? I am simply forced to elaborate on this, because great significance is attached to this in the republic. In recent months there has been a permanent picket outside the KGB building, because the suspicion has arisen that they will take away archive documents. The question has been discussed in the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, a law has been adopted.... Are there international conventions on this question and all the questions cited by you?

[Reshetov] The Vienna Convention on State Succession in respect of treaties was drawn up and adopted in 1978. It states that any treaty in force at the moment of state succession in respect of the entire territory of the precursor state remains in force in respect of heir states and successor states. That is, in the event of the secession of any union formation from the USSR, it bears the commitments assumed by the Soviet Union. As regards problems of the transfer of economic, financial, property, and many other rights, all these norms function in international law as common law. This makes them no

less binding than those contained in the international convention. I am afraid that the text is overloaded with legal terminology, but here style is sacrificed to accuracy. But, to switch to everyday language, the normative and legislative acts that exist in a country at the moment of a republic's self-determination, even if it dislikes them, have to be observed and carried out. And since you specifically raised the question of archives, an archive is common property because it contains not only Lithuanian but also Soviet history.

[Kapelyushnyy] Immersion in legal niceties has not yet cleared up the situation with regard to recognition of the Lithuanian Republic. It seems that the opposite has even happened—it has complicated it. Am I to take it that you are saying that Lithuania will be conditionally independent until all questions of state succession have been settled? And what about the proclaimed act of Lithuania's independence?

[Reshetov] In my view the newly elected Lithuanian parliament was in a hurry to proclaim the act. It should have been the culmination of very hard work on self-determination, rather than preceding it. In order to bake a loaf of bread, you have first to plow the grainfield, sow it, grow the crop, harvest it, and only then celebrate harvest festival... The concept advanced by the British academic Lauterpacht, one of the fathers of international law, is built on the premise that recognition of a new state is generally impossible until all questions of succession have been settled. It cannot be said that this is a universal theory, but it is shared by many people, and this must be taken into account. But the expression of the will of the majority of the population must be an axiom of self-determination and a necessary and obligatory precondition of a republic's secession from the USSR. As far as I know, there has been neither a referendum nor a plebiscite in Lithuania. And the parliament, even though elected in a most democratic manner, does not have the right to decide this.

[Kapelyushnyy] I will venture to elaborate: The opinion is being expressed that, since the candidate deputies from "Sajudis" and the candidates of other parties supported by it did not conceal the fact that they uphold the idea of independence and secession from the USSR, by voting for them the people thereby voted for self-determination. So is there any point in wasting time and money on a referendum when its result is clear?

[Reshetov] You have asked me how these questions are decided in the civilized world, and I answer you. Under international law the people express their will in terms of deciding a territory's fate by means of a plebiscite. There is little legal difference between the procedure for holding plebiscites and that for referenda. But the concept of a referendum is broader, and it is also used to decide other questions. Plebiscites are traditionally used to decide problems of territorial ownership.

Mindful of the fact that the union has a multiethnic makeup and that many territories are the historical motherland of several (and even many) peoples, it would be democratic and just to raise the question that on the secession either of Lithuania or of any other union republic from the USSR a plebiscite (or referendum) must be held on the krays, oblasts, and even rayons. It is necessary to obtain the full opinion of the people living in these administrative units.

There should be no limitations on participation in a plebiscite, all citizens have an equal right to participate in them. Nationality, residence qualification, linguistic knowledge, and so on—all these things have no significance under international law. In general I must say that the introduction of a residence qualification in the Baltic republics is a most flagrant violation of human rights and of the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. I am a member of the international committee on this question and I would like to say that in the entire world there are just a few states which have not abolished the residence qualification. Now Lithuania and Estonia have joined them...

[Kapelyushnyy] That is interesting, where do they still have this qualification?

[Reshetov] Well, the Kingdom of Tonga, for example. But there the qualification limit is six months... It is always distressing to watch when advocates of democracy use models of democracy which are not the best. Why not study Sweden? Even foreigners are allowed to take part in local elections there...

But say a plebiscite has been conducted. The majority of the people favored self-determination. Questions of legal succession are being resolved. And even in this case, just as in family law, the judge must ask both the plaintiff and the defendant—have you thought everything through to the end? Have you weighed everything up? Is it not more sensible to find a compromise solution instead of splitting up? The separatist feelings which have seized the country are causing not only grief and bewilderment among thinking people in the country but also astonishment throughout the world. The tendency toward integration and unification is a sign of a progressive world process. This is particularly evident in the East European countries.

[Kapelyushnyy] Knowing the feelings of the Lithuanian politicians I envisage that your arguments, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, will not be accepted. For example, in the stubborn refusal to admit the need for a referendum (we have no law on a plebiscite) I see a certain apprehension on the part of the republic's leadership that the people may not support the idea of secession from the USSR. In any event, not all the people will support it—that is clear. And the idea of determining the people's will region by region will cause especially fierce opposition. The Vilnius region and Klaypeda region may vote against leaving the Union. The idea of creating an autonomous territory has been circulating in Polish areas of Wilenszczyzna [traditional Polish name for area

around Wilno, now Vilnius] area for over a year now. What does international law say on this issue? And, finally, what will happen to those Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians who do not want to live outside the country?

[Reshetov] My view is that in demanding freedom for itself, Lithuania must grant an equal right to the ethnic minorities on its territory and respect their opinion. Otherwise it is impossible to create a democratic society. But in any event it must be borne in mind that we have lived together for centuries, we shall need to live alongside each other and to help each other, as good neighbors should. Our joint history means that we must regard our relations as special.

[Kapelyushnyy] It is not very clear to me, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, what the term special relations means?

[Reshetov] Even if there is a split, citizens of non-Lithuanian nationality will be left in Lithuania who will yearn for their original homeland. Under international law, the country of origin has the right take an interest in the fate of its countrymen and help them to maintain their national culture. After World War I a number of European states were partitioned, agreements on the rights of minorities were adopted, and special monitoring organs were set up. Today, too, we see in international practice how one side or another shows an interest in the diaspora of its citizens. Hungary is concerned about the fate of Hungarians in Romania and the Soviet Union, Poland for the Poles in the USSR and so forth...

[Kapelyushnyy] I would say that among the positive examples we see no special concern from Russia for its countrymen—either in the Union or abroad. And as for the anxieties of the non-Lithuanian population in Lithuania, it is the Russians who are concerned most of all. I return to your question once more: How will their civil and property rights be protected if they want to leave?

[Reshetov] There are many examples of the migration of a section of citizens from country to country. As a rule, they receive compensation for the property that they cannot take with them, they are compensated for harm caused by enforced migration, and questions to do with housing, the provision of jobs, and so forth are resolved under bilateral agreements. Clearly, everyone has noticed that in supporting the Lithuanian people's desire for self-determination, the world's most prominent politicians are urging for the problem to be resolved by means of talks. It must be understood that these words are addressed not only to the USSR Government but also to those Lithuanian politicians who have opted for the path of ultimatums. When appealing to international public opinion, the Lithuanian side simply has to observe the norms existing in international law.

Western Comments Concerning Lithuania Cited

PM2803154390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "Lithuania: Maximum Restraint Needed"]

[Text] Recent events in Lithuania continue to attract the close interest of broad political circles in the world. Notes of alarm are creeping into reports from abroad. This is reflected most characteristically in the statements which have been made in the past few hours by eminent political leaders of various countries and representatives of international organizations.

The EEC countries' statement contains an appeal for "maximum restraint in Lithuania and peaceful, open, fair dialogue."

A number of countries, including the United States, have somewhat muted their criticism of the USSR over the steps which are being taken to observe legality and law and order on the republic's territory. Thus, the REUTER report from Washington points out: "On Tuesday the White House reduced the pitch of its criticism of the Soviet authorities' actions in Lithuania... White House spokesman M. Fitzwater told correspondents that the U.S. Administration does not want to heat up the situation." He also expressed regret that the commentaries he had given the day before on the arrests of deserters in Lithuania had been interpreted in the press in an undesirable way. Concluding his routine news conference, M. Fitzwater said: "We do not want to undertake any actions which could worsen the situation in Lithuania."

In turn, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez warned his political allies abroad against interfering in Lithuanian events. "The West must display extreme caution, refraining from any attempts whatsoever to interfere in these matters, so as not to impede the search for a radical solution to this problem," he stressed during a talk with representatives of the media.

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, who is in Spain on a brief visit, also voiced an opinion on this question on behalf of the EC countries at a joint news conference. He said: "Considering the new circumstances, the appearance of additional problems can be assessed as inevitable... Manifestations of a spirit of independence in the Baltic republics are a more than legitimate phenomenon, but the European Community should reckon that the attainment of the goals set by the Baltic peoples will be achieved on the basis of consensus... Advancement toward it should be consistent."

The Finnish foreign minister too has stressed that the desire of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for self-determination is in full accordance with the spirit of the documents signed in Helsinki in 1975, but here he pointed out that the achievement of independence by these republics should be on the path of the peaceful settlement of problems with the USSR leadership.

TASS Describes Situation in Vilnius

LD2803174290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1628 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Report by TASS special correspondent Aleksandris Budris]

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Mar—Today passed quietly in the capital of Lithuania, just like last night. There were no reports of any incidents. People in the streets are hurrying about their business, and many are carrying portable radios: Local radio is broadcasting a live report from the continuing session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Huge queues are forming in front of newspaper kiosks. The newspapers are being snatched up within a matter of minutes.

Today the square in front of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee building was deserted; a group of people holding a lively discussion had gathered until late on Tuesday evening. On Tuesday, this building in the center of Vilnius was taken over by the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee for the platform of the CPSU as belonging to the CPSU. Soldiers of the Soviet Army are standing guard over it.

In a telephone interview with a TASS correspondent, Vladislav Shved, secretary of the temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and chairman of the Committee of USSR Citizens, called the external calm deceptive.

Everyone understands, he stressed, that there is "an accumulation of forces, first and foremost on the part of Sajudis, which wants to force everyone to carry out its laws."

In the opinion of Shved, the policy being pursued by "Sajudis" "is characterized by a double code of morals." In connection with the holding of a protest rally yesterday against some of the decisions by the new authorities of Lithuania, claims were made to the Committee of USSR Citizens that it had violated the decree on demonstrations and meetings. Last year, Shved recalled, this decree was not to the advantage of "Sajudis" and it was torpedoed by it.

Uppermost in the speeches of those taking part in the rally, which brought together approximately 20,000 people, were demands to restrain from adopting antidemocratic laws, as well as for holding a referendum on the issue of self-determination for the Lithuanian people.

Six months ago, noted Vladislav Shved, "Sajudis," which regarded censorship as a manifestation of Stalinism, now considers it democratic to cease the broadcasting of television programs when they are not to its liking. As we see, he stressed, two democracies exist—one for "Sajudis" and another for the CPSU.

Pro-Union Party Chief on Control of Buildings

LD2803151390 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By Special Correspondent Stanislav Navrutskiy]

[Text] Vilnius March 28 TASS—The Lithuanian government's note to the Soviet Government in connection with the bringing of a paratroop regiment to Vilnius and the occupation of a number of party institutions by the Army was the principal subject of discussion at a regular meeting of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on Tuesday.

The parliament did not even consider candidacies for some vacancies in the new Cabinet of Ministers. Only half of the Cabinet of Ministers has been endorsed so far.

Publications in the republic no longer accuse the Union media of a desire to destabilise the situation or of reports about growing tension in Lithuania. Reports along these lines have lately become commonplace for the republican press as well.

Tension particularly built up after the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) Central Committee building in downtown Vilnius, along with some other buildings, was brought under the control of the pro-Union LCP Central Committee.

"We establish control only over buildings belonging to the party. This decision was taken only after there emerged a real threat of these buildings being occupied by other organisations," Vladislav Sved, secretary of the pro-Union LCP Central Committee, told journalists on Tuesday.

He recalled that the premises of the Vilnius City Committee of the party had been taken under the control of workers' teams only after, in disregard of the opinion of the city organisation of the pro-Union LCP, some of them were turned over to cooperatives and public organisations, including the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania.

"Of course, turning to the Soviet Army—and it was precisely with its aid that we brought most of the buildings under our control—was not the best way to protect party property. But we had to resort to it because neither the Procurator's Office nor the courts of the republic want to help us now."

According to Sved, more than 96 million rubles had been allocated from the CPSU budget for the construction of party buildings and premises in Lithuanian territory over the post-war period.

A meeting that took place in Vilnius on Tuesday in protest at some decisions of the republican parliament served as an illustration that the Lithuanian working people follow with concern the activities of the new republican parliament and by no means uniformly regard laws being taken by it.

Despite the new Lithuanian government's statement, circulated by the media, that people who disagree with the Supreme Soviet resolution "are placing themselves outside the framework of civil society and are rendering themselves unprotected from negative legal, economic, and social consequences" and that participants in the meeting would be videotaped by foreign and Lithuanian correspondents and by representatives of all services, the meeting involved about 20,000 people.

Two demands dominated speeches at the meeting. First, the demand that members of parliament refrain from adopting anti-democratic laws such as the law "on criminal responsibility for anti-state calls" which was expected to be considered by the Supreme Soviet this week.

Second, participants in the meeting have supported the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination and voiced resolute demands that this right be exercised only through a referendum among all people of Lithuania.

Landsbergis Claims of 'Bloody Terror' Rejected

PM2803205590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

["Topical Reportage" by PRAVDA special correspondent Yu. Shabanov: "But What Is the Truth?"]

[Text] On Tuesday morning Lithuanian Supreme Council [Verkhovnyy Sovet] Chairman V. Landsbergis made a statement about the start of... "bloody terror in the republic." And he told the deputies and the journalists accredited at the session a story about assault troops abducting young patients from a republican psychiatric hospital. It was a truly horrific tale: A wrecked room, bloody sheets, patients beaten up, medical personnel hurt... I immediately went to the psychiatric hospital on the outskirts of Vilnius with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent V. Yermolin. We went up to the office of P. Navazinkas, the hospital's deputy chief phsyician.

"Is it true that some patients have been abducted?"

"No, they were perfectly healthy young guys who were dodging military service. We weren't even keeping charts on them and we had not prescribed any treatment."

"How did they come to be here, then?"

"Republican Health Minister A. Vinkus called and ordered us to find room for them in the hospital. We put the guys on the third floor, in a ward that had recently been prepared for refurbishment. There had been no patients there before."

So much for the rumor about "bloody terror" started at the session. I quote from a Lithuanian Council of Ministers order of 22 March 1990, signed by K. Prunskiene: "It is incumbent on Health Minister A. Vinkus and Internal Affairs Minister M. Misiukonis to provide these young men from the Lithuanian Republic (meaning those who have abandoned their places of service, as indicated in point one of the order—Yu. Shabanov) with the requisite living conditions and with protection."

On the same day, that is, Tuesday, we flew to Kaunas and met with some runaway soldiers. They refused to talk with representatives of the central press and turned away from the camera lenses. They were insistent: We have set up an independent state here and therefore we should not serve in a foreign army. When asked about violation of the oath, they remained silent. Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. Sorochko, Kaunas military prosecutor, said:

"If a soldier has been absent from his unit for more than three days, criminal proceedings are instituted at his place of service. Each will be examined individually."

In the evening there was a protest rally outside the Supreme Council building, organized by the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania. It was directed against the adoption of the law on criminal liability for antistate appeals, which, the rally participants believed, could result in neo-Stalinist repression. The deputies, incidentally, postponed the discussion of this law at the session and sent it back to the commission for further work. According to the figures of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, there were around 30,000 people at the rally. Lithuanian radio gave a different figure: 5,000.

When the rally had ended, there was a kind of rally-cum-concert against, as they said, the seizure of the Higher Party School building in Vilnius by the provisional Central Committee together with the military. Confrontation, it appears, is becoming increasingly serious. And the inhabitants of Lithuania, irrespective of the stance they take, condemn this.

Army General Refutes Vilnius Occupation Reports

LD2803170890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1625 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Mar—A representative of the Soviet Army has refuted reports that Soviet paratroops have allegedly "occupied" Vilnius, Kaunas, and other important towns of that Baltic republic, and are committing excesses against the local population.

Major General Vladimir Polevik, member of the military council of the paratroops, told a TASS correspondent that indeed a paratroop regiment had been brought into Vilnius. This action had been carried out "in accordance with the instruction of the president and the Government of the USSR to intensify the protection of important state facilities on the territory of the republic."

The general stressed that this unit's sole task is "to prevent possible disorders and to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the Lithuanian capital" in conditions of "the destabilization of local law enforcement and legislative structures."

General Polevik confirmed once again that "normal exercises in accordance with the plans for combat and political training of paratroops are being held in the republic, in accordance with which company and battalion tactical exercises are held in March and April."

These exercises are carried out with assaults, combat firing, forced marches, and mass movements of combat equipment and aircraft. For this purpose there are on the territory of Lithuania training grounds, shooting ranges, tank training areas, and sites and areas for making parachute jumps.

Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, commander of the parachute troops, informed Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic, at a meeting about the nature of the exercises which were being held.

'Mixed Reactions' to Military in Lithuania

LD2803184790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The work of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on forming a government, which in previous days had been taking place at an accelerated rate, has slowed down somewhat. Evidently criticism of the parliamentarians has had an effect: As was pointed out even by RESPUBLIKA, the Sajudis newspaper, they are interested primarily in the political views of those seeking ministerial posts rather than their businesslike qualities. When the deadly argument that he is a true Sajudis person is voiced in support of a candidate, the newspaper writes in a leading article, then the hall falls silent because even a child can understand that a true Sajudis supporter cannot be accused of trivialities like lack of professionalism or experience.

Amendments have also been made to the original structure of the government. It was decided today that a ministry for the protection of the country is not to be set up in the republic. Explaining this decision, Prime Minister Kasimiera Prunskiene told us that a nongovernmental committee under the Supreme Soviet would be formed instead of the ministry that had been planned. Furthermore, its functions will be determined by the concept of a demilitarized Lithuania now being worked out.

The protection of buildings belonging to the CPSU by soldiers is giving rise to mixed reactions here. Yesterday we brought you the position of a representative of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU. Today we talk to (Saulyus Razmo), a member of the Central Committee of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania and a deputy of the republic's Supreme Soviet. As rector of the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute he is claiming the premises of the Higher Party School in Vilnius:

[Begin recording] [Razmo] This Higher Party School was and is on the books of the Central Comittee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, and when I accepted the pedagogical institute I already approached the party leadership, the republican leadership, for helping in improving the conditions of the pedagogical institute. The pedagogical institute, I have to say, is in a very poor state, though the function and the tasks of the pedagogical institute during perestroyka and the democratization of society are particularly responsible ones. I appealed to the leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania and the leadership decided to hand over these premises of the Higher Party School to the education system in order to improve the conditions of the pedagogical institute. And by a decision of the government both the premises and all the property have been transferred to the pedgaogical institute. [end recording] [video shows soldiers guarding buildings; entrance of the Higher Party School in Vilnius, through the glass doors of which can be seen soldiers in uniform; (Razmo) being interviewed]

Army Daily on Seizure of Servicemen

PM2803182590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin under rubric "On Events in Lithuania": "Further Escalation of Tension"]

[Text] Vilnius, 28 Mar—Probably no one doubts any more the absolute determination of the republic's Supreme Council [Verkhovnyy Sovet] and cabinet of ministers to follow the chosen course. There is much to confirm this. I will begin in the usual way, with V. Landsbergis' daily review of the political situation in the republic at the session. The world has little idea, he said on this occasion, whom we are having to deal with, so it is dragging its feet and failing to give effective support. Landsbergis was particularly put out by the exchange of "secret telegrams" between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. He drew a historical parallel: the "Molotov-Ribbentrop" pact. Is little Lithuania's fate going to be decided, he said, by a deal between the two powers behind its back? To be frank, an unflattering assessment was offered of the Soviet leader and of the Soviet Union in general.

When you listen to the top man in the republic you get the impression that the Supreme Council chairman is keen to fuel passions and exacerbate political confrontation. One thing is clear: It is the people who will pay for what I would call the adventurist course of the new government.

On the morning of 27 March Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman V. Landsbergis announced that a "bloody terror has begun" in the republic. To corroborate this statement, he said that on Monday night a group of servicemen broke into a republican hospital block and, "dragging the patients off their beds," took them to an unknown destination. Landsbergis' account featured

doctors with bloodstained coats, medical personnel getting beaten up, and violence against patients.

I went to the hospital and talked with witnesses.

Duty doctor K. Dashkevich: Around 0300 hours a closed-top vehicle pulled up outside the gates. People in assault troops' camouflage uniforms leapt out of it. They went up to the third floor, where the servicemen who had abandoned their units were staying. They were first lined up in the corridors and then taken to the vehicle.

Nurse V. Sidluskite: There are no patients on that floor. It has been prepared for refurbishment. The young people were brought there Thursday and Friday. There were no formalities. They were simply living there. The military did not touch any of the medical personnel.

I would add a few of my own personal impressions. In the wards there were beer bottles scattered among the crumpled beds, there were graffiti all over the walls, and everything was dirty and neglected. I also saw doors that had been smashed in and broken glass. At the headquarters of the unit whose men had arrested the deserters I was told that some of the young men had been drunk and had tried to offer resistance. But none of the arrested men had been injured.

This was confirmed by USSR Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Yu. Nauman. He had the following to say about what happened:

"Recently the Supreme Council, in the person of V. Landsbergis, and the Lithuanian government have been patently urging young Lithuanians, those who have already left their units, not to return to their place of service. There have been irresponsible assurances from lofty rostrums that allegedly all those who have gone absent without leave will be protected from Soviet justice. The fugitives are being hidden in churches, in hospitals, and on the premises of state institutions. We have pointed out to the Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman that such actions are impermissible and talked of the need not to involve young people serving in the Armed Forces in conflict situations. But it turns out that all our efforts to solve the problems through dialogue with the Lithuanian government have been in vain. Meanwhile, the decisions of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the resolutions of the USSR Government, and the USSR president's decree remain in force. And no one should have any doubt that law and order will be restored on Lithuanian territory. As for the arrest of a group of servicemen in a hospital ward, I can say here and now that we repeatedly asked for the young people who were dodging military service to be handed over. They would not discuss the matter. That is why we were forced to take this step. Once again I want to stress that anyone who leaves his military unit and takes refuge in a church or anywhere else will be brought back to his place of service sooner or later. His fate will be decided in accordance with Soviet laws."

But the question is how does one regard the fact that, on the one hand, the Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman asks the Lithuanian servicemen to continue their service until the matter has been legally resolved, while, on the other hand, literally the next day, he urges the fugitives to take refuge in psychiatric hospitals and churches and promises them protection that, as it turns out, he is not able to guarantee. I will cite, incidentally, some documents that shed light on how the hospital situation arose. Order No. 77, dated 22 March 1990: "1. The proposal by the Lithuanian Red Cross Society that the Health Ministry be instructed to immediately lease to the society one of the blocks of the republican Naujoji Vilnia psychiatric hospital (at least 250 beds) to accommodate young people from the Lithuanian Republic who have left the Armed Forces is to be accepted." A second order, No. 79, of the same date: "The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is to be instructed to return the identity papers of young people of the Lithuanian Republic who have ceased to serve in the Armed Forces and ensure their registration." Both orders were signed by Prime Minister K. Prunskiene.

In Oktyabrskiy Party (CPSU platform) Raykom [rayon committee] there was a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists and Lithuanian communists. V. Shved, secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, answered questions, mainly about events relating to buildings which are CPSU property. In particular he said:

"Local news media speak and write about the seizure of the Vilnius gorkom [city party committee], the House of Enlightenment, and the building of the Higher Party School. Seizure is an inappropriate term in this case. We have indeed placed these buildings under protection since they are the property of the CPSU. Unquestionably, this was an enforced measure. Unfortunately, all our attempts to solve this question by means of a compromise were rejected by A. Brazauskas. It has to be borne in mind that during the years of Soviet power in Lithuania the republic Communist Party received a subsidy of more than R69 million from the coffers of the CPSU. With this money party gorkoms, raykoms, and other buildings were constructed. You will agree that if these premises are taken over by organizations which have no links with the party this looks unfair, to say the least. Yes, we turned for assistance to the troop command. However, this would not have happened if the republic prosecutor's office and the MVD had ensured the observance of legality in the republic. I would like to stress that we use such enforced measures only to resolve questions of restoring the party's property to it. As for the political struggle, we wage it with the resources of our party organizations and the force of the party's word."

On Tuesday afternoon a rally of supporters of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform) was held at the Supreme Council building. Some 20,000 people protested the adoption of the law "On Criminal Liability for Antistate Incitement," which is being drafted.

A scheduled exercise of airborne assault troop subunits was held in the Kaunas area Tuesday.

Defense Ministry Statement on Anti-Army Campaign

PM2803185790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[USSR Defense Ministry Press Center report: "Who Benefits From This?"]

[Text] There is a mounting propaganda campaign in Lithuania to discredit the Soviet Army. Its organizers' intention is that it should bolster the Lithuanian Government's illegal, anticonstitutional actions aimed at the republic's secession from the USSR.

Resorting to blackmail and intimidation, separatist forces are encouraging servicemen to desert from the Armed Forces. To this end their emissaries are attempting to infiltrate military units and are engaging in other provocative actions. The commission for affairs of young men's military service set up under the the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet is continuing its inflammatory activity. For example, contrary to the intentions of Private V. Zvinis, who was briefly home on leave, and those of his parents, members of this commission sent a telegram to the unit command stating that the serviceman did not wish to return to duty.

The Lithuanian authorities are creating a situation of impunity for persons arbitrarily leaving the Armed Forces. Organs of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs are refusing to take measures to apprehend them and return them to their military units. Prosecutor's office organs are also failing to take action. Moreover, the republic's government has asked the International Red Cross to protect Lithuanians refusing to continue their service in the Soviet Army.

There have also been cases where deserters have been given refuge in psychiatric hospitals. Deserters are issued with passports and registered at their place of residence without being registered with the military commissariat. However, this does not prevent them from being enrolled in the so-called "regional defense detachments" now being formed in Lithuania. For example, according to the figures available, the detachment in the city of Klaipeda has some 300 members. They are being supplied with field uniforms.

The organizers of the anti-Army campaign must be aware that, criminally exploiting young people's political immaturity and misleading them about their true intentions, they are encouraging them to break the law. This entails criminal liability. The command and military justice organs are taking measures to stop desertion and to return all those who have abandoned their units to their place of service.

An unseemly propaganda campaign is also continuing with the aim of distorting the historical truth about Lithuania's accession to the USSR, falsifying the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and belittling the importance of the Soviet people's victory. On 23 March a 76-mm gun removed from the pedestal of the monument to Soviet servicemen who liberated the republic from the fascists was delivered to the building of the Vilkaviskis Rayon Military Commissariat. Attached to the gun was a poster which read: "We return what you have lent us." At a rally a "Sajudis" representative tried to frighten those present with reports of alleged "atrocities" committed by the military during the confiscation of weapons. He also said that this "information" would be passed on to the U.S. Congress.

Malicious rumors are being spread about troop concentrations in various areas. Measures carried out by military subunits in accordance with USSR presidential decrees and Soviet Government orders to step up the protection of certain state installations on the Lithuanian territory are deliberately interpreted as violation of the republic's sovereignty.

There is only one answer to the natural question in this context—who stands to gain from the anti-Army campaign: Those who, against the interests of the Lithuanian people and to promote their own ambitions, work to create chaos and destructive situations and severing the republic's links with the USSR.

The whipping up of emotions by representatives of "Sajudis" and certain Western news media about beatings of arrested deserters, or about any other atrocities, are unfounded and serve only inflammatory purposes.

Detailed Report on 27 Mar Events Published

PM2803204190 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 3

[TASS report: "What Capital Is 'Sajudis' Making Out of It?"]

[Text] 27 Mar—Today's rally in Taribu Square, near the Supreme Council building, attended by many thousands of Vilnius working people and members of the intelligentsia, can be seen as a protest against the Lithuanian government's unconstitutional decisions. The leitmotiv was the idea that such important matters as the republic's self-determination can only be solved by means of a nationwide referendum.

It is interesting that the rally was preceded by "large-scale" work by the republic's current leaders. In the media they stated that the rally was not authorized and its participants would be identified [fiksirovatsya] by members of the special services...

The constant anxiety felt by the inhabitants of Lithuania as a result of the unstable social and political life in the republic and the endless "surprises" staged by ultra-radical members of "Sajudis," who now have an overwhelming majority in the supreme organ of power, appears to be in danger of becoming prolonged.

The recent talk about the achievement of independence as a lengthy process of restoring the political and economic structures of a sovereign state is long forgotten. The unconstitutional decision to secede from the USSR was hastily adopted, without consulting the people, and now all manner of laws, resolutions, appeals, and statements that have nothing to to with either the legal or the moral norms and principles of our society are being churned out. And it all seems to be happening in accordance with the principle: The worse it is for the country, the better it is for "Sajudis"...

It is already a week since the promulgation of the USSR president's decree on the situation in Lithuania. And what are the republic's leaders doing to implement it? Let us look at the republican papers...

Lithuanian Supreme Council statement: "The USSR is artificially fueling tension... Unknown officials are being dispatched from the USSR clearly on confidential assignments, while officials of the Lithuanian Republic are being given illegal instructions to submit to another state's decrees..." See how incredibly easily the Constitution of the USSR, of the Union which has jurisdiction over the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], becomes "another state's decree"! So, by flouting one set of norms and creating another, the leaders of "Sajudis" are tring to make political capital and are hypocritically playing the "military pressure from Moscow" card.

Here is the latest instance. The republic's health minister announced on the radio "an attack by armed servicemen on the Naujoji Vilnia hospital." Your TASS correspondent asked Army General V. Varennikov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, to comment:

"Special subunits to find deserters have been set up in the military contingent on Lithuanian territory. A group of Soviet troops did indeed arrest some Lithuanian deserters who had taken refuge at the Vilnius psychiatric hospital.

"The deserters, who were 'Sajudis' militants [boyeviki]," the general said, "were not undergoing treatment, but were engaged in special training in a hospital ward. So far 23 Lithuanian deserters have been arrested on Lithuanian territory."

Another Lithuanian Supreme Council resolution was promulgated 27 March, concerning the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. It orders the department henceforth only to carry out the laws and orders of the "Lithuanian Republic." As for the "disputes" with the USSR MVD "over material facilities or other property," the republic's Council of Ministers is instructed to resolve this question "by means of negotiations with the USSR Government." But the current Lithuanian internal affairs minister has made it clear that he will not implement Soviet laws.

There has been an independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. Its participants approved the republican Supreme Council's act "On Restoring the Independent Lithuanian State."

At the same time, sensible forces in the republic have reacted positively to the measures adopted by the military subunits to implement the USSR president's decree on protecting very important facilities.

"The attitude of Lithuanians living in the border areas to the soldiers in green caps has not changed," Colonel Zablovskiy, representative of the Border Troops Directorate, told your TASS correspondent. "The volunteer people's militia continues to operate, giving assistance to the border troops. During conversations with kolkhoz [collective farm] members and workers one often hears people say that nothing will divide the Lithuanian, Russian, and other people living in the republic; we are one country. Lithuanian-born border guards say the same."

The communists who remained on a CPSU platform after the Lithuanian Communist Party split are having a stabilizing effect on the situation in the republic. It was on their initiative, for example, that the first issue of SOVETSKAYA LITVA was published. The plan is to publish it in Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish.

"This newspaper is essential not only for communists who have remained loyal to internationalism, it is essential to the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people who do not want to follow the bourgeois nationalist government and do not want the republic to break away from the Soviet Union," S. Joniene, chief editor of SOVETSKAYA LITVA, said in conversation with journalists.

Kaliningrad, Leningrad Deputies Visit Lithuania

LD2903155790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] A group of USSR people's deputies for the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation, together with several newly elected deputies from Leningrad, are currently on a visit to Lithuania. Today they were received by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The deputies from Leningrad said that they fully supported the Lithuanian nation's right to independence and self-determination. Mr. Gennadiy Bogomolov, a minister of parliament for Russia, said that prior to his departure he had met with his electorate, who stressed their deep concern over Moscow's provocative actions directed against the Lithuanian Republic. The deputy said that a peaceful dialogue was necessary to solve the fundamental problem and that negotiations between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his Lithuanian counterpart should begin immediately. The parliamentarians from Leningrad said that they had wanted to speak at yesterday's rally organized by a group of pro-Moscow communists in Lithuania, known officially as the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Citizens' Rights. Being refused the right to speak at the rally, the group of deputies from Leningrad could not express

their fear that inter-ethnic relations were being manipulated by conservative forces in the Soviet Union.

Moscow Seen 'Flexing Muscles' in Lithuania

AU2803075590 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 23 Mar 90 p 2

[Michael Albrecht commentary: "Moscow Is Flexing Its Muscles"]

[Text] Now Moscow and Mikhail Gorbachev have after all drawn the cudgel a little out of the bag to make it clear to the rebellious Lithuanians who is the master in the house. During the session of the Congress of People's Deputies it still seemed as if the Soviet central government only resorted to scolding and urgent appeals, but now the situation suddenly is completely different.

The border troops and the departments of the notorious secret service, KGB, are being reinforced and the order has been given that from now on the border between Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] has to be carefully protected, which results in the question from whom or against whom does this border have to be protected. A large number of enterprises was placed under the tutelage of the Moscow ministries from one day to the next. For some days now, no foreign exchange transfers have been made from the Moscow Central Bank to the respective financial institutions, which, in view of the Lithuanian economic strategy, which is keen on exports, has the effect of being a chain around the neck of the delinquent.

No, Moscow has probably argued enough, and now the Kremlin and the ministries of the central metropolis are flexing their muscles. The fact that resistance by the Lithuanians cannot be completely ruled out is shown by a further regulation, according to which the sale of firearms (meaning sporting guns) has been temporarily prohibited and the Lithuanians have been requested to immediately hand in possibly existing guns in their private property.

In Vilnius and elsewhere in the small Baltic republic, which was the first of the union republics to dissociate itself from the Union and to constitute itself as an independent state, the people all the more continue their course defiantly and almost doggedly in view of the threatenig gestures of the Moscow central government. Moscow is, of course, irritated that Lithuanian Premier Mrs. Prunskiene confirmed in the past few days that preparations are currently being made to establish Lithuania's borders and it is hoped that 37 border checkpoints with a Lithuanian customs system will be established after approximately ten days. Here a situation is developing which Moscow will not easily tolerate.

However, political observers agree that Gorbachev will not embark on military adventures, even if he has just had unnanounced military exercises carried out on Lithuanian territory; his loss of prestige would be impossible to estimate. Thus, the Kremlin leader will probably only make threatening gestures, and if I am not completely mistaken, will look for solutions to this problems by means of legislation.

Only in this way can one understand the report that a draft law which describes the process by which a republic may withdraw from the Union has been put forward in the Supreme Soviet. This is possible five years after the start of the negotiations on the withdrawal and requires a two-thirds majority in the population of the republic that seeks to leave the Union. If the law were to be adopted, Gorbachev would be able to save face and, perhaps even more importantly, to gain time, an asset which has become very rare because of the USSR's increasing tendency to drift apart.

Lithuanian Party Official on Post-Election Hopes

90UN1209B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Yustas Paletskis, Lithuanian CP Central Committee chairman, by ELTA correspondent: "The Main Things Are Wisdom and Responsibility to Lithuania"]

[Text] **The following conversation was held in the secretary's office. A bright bouquet of flowers was lying nearby. Yustas Paletskis' coworkers had just congratulated him on his having been elected deputy to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. The conversation, obviously, was about the election. So, the first question that I asked the Lithuanian CP [Communist Party] Central Committee chairman was:**

[Correspondent] How do you evaluate the election results as a whole?

[Yu. Paletskis] Positively, since the election turned out for our party considerably better than the election of the USSR people's deputies. The radio workers who telephoned me this morning from Cologne (West Germany) preceded their interview by congratulating me on my victory as a representative of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee. The German journalists had in mind that the victory had been won by the absolute majority of the candidates and parties that are speaking out in favor of an independent democratic Lithuania.

We had forecast and expected that many candidates who were supported by Sajudis would emerge successfully at the election, since that corresponds to Lithuania's interests. The renewed independent Lithuanian Communist Party is not only a natural ally of the realistically-minded wise wing of Sajudis, but also, one might say, a part of it. Something else that is gratifying is the success of the Social Democrats, whose program principles are extremely close to ours. It is a good thing that the Christian Democrats and the Lithuanian "Greens" are also represented in the parliament. In a word, we are seeing the formation of a truly multiparty system, which

the Lithuanian Communist Party, having been transformed from a state party to a normal one, completely supports.

[Correspondent] In its election campaign, the Lithuanian Communist Party proceeded from the principle that what is important is not the party to which a person belongs, but the individual and his competency. Did this principle prove to be justified?

[Yu. Paletskis] I think that it did. In the present parliament, as one can already say, there are strong, brilliant individuals. I think that at the decisive moment these deputies will think not within the confines of their own party or organization, but on the scale and in the interests of Lithuania as a whole. They will be firm politicians who know how to evaluate the situation that is developing both within Lithuania and outside its confines. Casual decisions that have been dictated by one's moods or illusions would be ruinous during this decisive transitional period.

[Correspondent] The preliminary information concerning the voting attests to the fact that not a single one of the parties in the republic's Supreme Soviet will have an absolute majority. How do you imagine the formation of the future government?

[Yu. Paletskis] After the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, the leadership of our party's Central Committee represented the future government only as a coalition government. During the especially complicated period when it will soon be necessary to carry out difficult negotiations with Moscow and with other states, it is necessary to have a cabinet of ministers that will support the absolute majority of all the political forces and the population of Lithuania. At the present time, obviously, the simplest thing would be for the Lithuanian Communist Party—a party that for so many years did not have any independence and that had at its disposal an extremely narrow freedom of maneuvering, and a party to which people are currently ascribing all the errors of the past and the crimes committed by certain of its members—to become the opposition and criticize the government, especially by taking into consideration the present economic situation. But I do not think that this resolution would be beneficial for Lithuania. The intellect and experience of the members of our party who did not compromise themselves in the past are also extremely necessary in the government. I agree that there will be disputes and gentlemen's duels. They are not only inevitable, but are also necessary. The new atmosphere of constructive discussions is necessary as a motivating force on the path to a democratic state.

[Correspondent] Under the conditions of a multiparty system, the Communist Party will have to change its previous work models. The election campaign, obviously, also served as a definite lesson.

[Yu. Paletskis] One of the most brilliant lessons, it would seem, is the fact that the candidates from the Lithuanian Communist Party made a poor showing in the cities and rayons where an unpopular leadership that cut itself off from people used to operate. Society puts its trust in the leadership of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee (nine members of the Central Committee Buro have already been elected as deputies) as a result of their precise position, but in the low-level links these qualities have not yet manifested themselves sufficiently, and therefore the results were different. Obviously, despite the positive decisions by the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, the election results were also influenced by the fact that our party is undergoing a period of reorganization, a rather large number of communists have not yet determined their position, and a few of them are completely confused. A definite role was also played in a few places by vicious attacks that were made on all communists, by the degrading of people for the simple reason that they were members of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Methods like this have never been constructive, and especially at the present time they are scarcely needed by Lithuania. This is acknowledged by the absolute majority of the realistically-minded people who have grown up in Lithuania and the political figures in foreign countries. Unfortunately, many of our opponents did not so much explain their program and their aspirations, as attempt to defeat their rival. Our candidates did not do that and I think that objective observers will notice that the Lithuanian Communist Party in the election struggle preserved its political culture, dignity, and gentlemanly attitude. In many instances people realized who was who, and the most criticized candidate won the largest number of votes.

Consequently, it is necessary as quickly as possible to become renewed at all levels, to reject the survivals of the system of administration by fiat, and to work together to consolidate the different, but honest, competent people, those who share the same views, so that, together with all the democratic forces, we can march confidently toward the independent Lithuania that provides all its residents with social justice, human rights, and national consent.

KGB Efforts To Halt Weapons Influx Examined

90UN1209A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Lithuanian SSR KGB Press Bureau: "The KGB Reports"]

[Text] Fulfilling the 30 August 1989 Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers decree concerning the intensification of the fight against crime in the republic, the Lithuanian SSR KGB, within the limits of its competency and in interaction with the other law-enforcement agencies, as well as the republic's customs agencies, is carrying out work aimed at discharging the tension in the unfavorable criminal situation that has developed.

Among other problems, the ones that are especially disturbing to the law-enforcement agencies and the inhabitants of Lithuania are the increasingly frequent instances of the illegal importation into the republic of

gas-operated pistols and gas cannisters that are used by the criminal elements. Pistols with cartridges that have been filled with tear gas and paralyzing nerve gas, and gas cannisters of the foreign-produced SI-ES [expansion unknown] type are used by racketeers and holdup men.

In this regard, the Lithuanian SSR KGB, with the aid of the customs agencies and the border guards, has taken steps to locate the channels through which these objects are coming into the country and to establish the specific individuals who are engaged in the illegal importation of items that are used for criminal purposes.

In October 1989 V. Prokofyev, motor-mechanic at the Lithuanian Maritime Steamship Agency, had confiscated from him six gas pistols, 60 cartridges for them, and 36 cannisters filled with SI-ES gas, all of which he had smuggled into Klaypeda and was attempting to remove from the territory of the port. In December 1989 a seaman on the West German ship "Ditmar Festerling" was detained in the same place as he was attempting to bypass the customs inspection and remove from the port 260 cannisters with similar gas.

On 29 November 1989 at the KPP [control and check point] in Lazdiyay, Jadwiga Szypinis, a citizen of PNR [Polish People's Republic], who was proceeding on a private visa to Lithuania, had confiscated from her two gas pistols, 20 charges for them, and three gas cannisters. The woman—a mother who was called upon to bring good into the world—was importing weapons but was unable to give any reasonable explanation of why she was doing it.

On 29 January 1990, also in Lazdiyay, PNR citizen Boguslaw Mistkowski was detained as he attempted to smuggle 33 gas cannisters into Lithuanian SSR for the purpose of selling them later. And the foreigner was traveling as a member of a tourist group going to Armenia—a republic where the sociopolitical and criminal situation is so complicated at the present time.

It is necessary for the smugglers to take into consideration the fact that persons smuggling a large number of gas cannisters that have been recognized, by virtue of their chemical composition and the effect of their action, as being a variety of chemical weapons are criminally liable. These are not toys! This must be understood by everyone—not only those who buy them, but especially by those who sell them. In the appropriate situation these are weapons, and no one knows into whose hands they might go, or who might become a victim of criminals!

But it is not just cannisters that people are attempting to import. Ukmerge residents A. Komarov and A. Mikshta were detained by Georgian internal-affairs agencies in Tbilisi. As was already reported in the central press, a Nagant-system revolver and 60 gas cannisters were confiscated from them. A criminal case was initiated against them, and an investigation is in progress.

The Lithuanian SSR KGB is checking a number of materials concerning the criminal connection between certain Soviet citizens and foreigners who have made smuggling, including the smuggling of gas weapons, their permanent business.

The number of offenders is growing. Therefore we are making this appeal to the republic's citizens—inform the law-enforcement agencies about any criminal actions, either known or in the process of preparation, that are linked with the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, or poisonous substances.

Estonian, Latvian Reaction to Lithuania Viewed

LD2803211490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] The Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense, describing the situation in the Baltic Republics, notes that an anti-Army campaign has been launched in the region, in which misinformation and slanderous statements are being extensively used. Thus, the speech on republican television by Ivans, one of the leaders of the People's Front of Latvia, asserted without substantiation that servicemen of the Soviet Army are disarming the militia by force in Lithuania. In response to this, the People's Front of Latvia, according to Ivans' assertion, should recruit volunteers from the republic's militia and send them to Lithuania. It is not difficult to imagine what the consequences of such provocative statements might be.

The republic's Supreme Soviet appealed to deserters, absent without leave from Soviet Army units, who have gone into hiding in churches, closed medical institutions, and other places that are hard to monitor. Approximately 250 Lithuanian soldiers have been officially listed as absent without leave. Army commanders are taking measures to return them to their units. Unfortunately, the local law and order bodies, as has already been reported, are not only failing to help, but are at times hampering it. The decision of the People's Front of Estonia to send its emissaries to units of the Soviet Army to persuade Estonian servicemen to desert is instigatory. The subsequent aim of the provacateurs, who are playing with the fate of young men whom they are inciting to violate their military oath, is to use the servicemen to form the so-called self-defense detachments, the Kaitseliit, the union of defense.

In the Sajudis organization, the registration of volunteers for the kray defense units has not stopped. According to a statement by Vaisvila, the Lithuanian minister of defense, the size of the future Lithuanian army should be 38,500 men. A military group of officers in reserve is operating under Sajudis, the basis of which is comprised of officers of the former 16th Lithuanian Division. Among their goals is propaganda on the traditions of the old Lithuanian army, work with men called up for military service, and the establishing of national formations.

In a number of towns in Estonia and Latvia, rallies have been organized by separatist forces at which, in particular, appeals were heard for a collection of money as well as for a registration of volunteer-vigilantes to come to the aid of independent Lithuania.

Estonian Communist Party Split Discussed

LD2903081790 Moscow TASS in English 0722 GMT 29 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn March 29 TASS—Following Lithuania, Estonia now faces a split in its Communist Party after its recent party congress. How did it happen and what does it mean for the Estonian Communist Party and the republic?

Harrj Roots, secretary of the Estonian Communist (Independent) Party Central Committee, told TASS that "in contrast to Lithuania, they did not aim to separate from the Soviet Communist Party and break with it."

He noted that the majority of ethnic Estonian communists seek the creation of an independent party with its own programme and rules. They are supported by 30 percent of communists, belonging to other ethnic groups.

However, a considerable number of communists believe that an independent party is out of the question.

"The congress proclaimed a transitional period, during which the number of communists wishing to join our party will be estimated," Roots said.

"Since we remain in the Soviet Communist Party, delegates to its 28th congress were elected at the Estonian party forum. I think that the results of this congress and its decisions will, to a considerable extent, influence the choice of our communists.

"We are ready for a dialogue with people and are maintaining contacts with regional party committees in the northeast of Estonia, where the Russian-speaking population dominates. We do not mind factions within our party. But if a group of delegates elects its own Central Committee, they are forming another party that does not want to join us," Roots stressed.

Aleksandr Gusev, secretary of the pro-Union Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, told TASS that "they could have avoided the split at the congress".

During the preparations for the congress "we proposed a programme for renewal of the Estonian Communist Party, which took into account perestroyka and democratisation in the Soviet Communist Party," he said.

Some of its provisions were included in a document distributed among delegates. Gusev said they were ready to adopt that document as a programme for party renewal and, at the same time, as the Estonian Communist Party's theses for the 28th CPSU Congress.

However, despite their objections, the Auditing Commission submitted the draft for voting without including this principle issue.

This is one of many examples. For instance, an agreement had been reached on equal representation of the two party trends in the Central Commitee, but the congress was offered a list that ran counter to the agreement. In short, the other side spoke about a compromise and, actually, forced a split.

Gusev said they consider themselves the Estonian Communist Party as it used to be. As for party members, it is up to them to decide upon their stand.

There are supporters of both parties in all organisations and it will become clear in a month who will join this or that group. It is still early to speak about this, since the balance of forces at the congress does not always reflect the opinion of average party members.

Gusev said that the formation of two party organisations in one labour collective and two regional party committees in one region is quite possible.

Nevertheless, they will have to cooperate in solving common problems—all of them live in the same Estonia.

Estonian Communist Party Head on Transition

LD2703114990 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 26 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] The first secretary of the independent Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee held a news conference today. Juri Hansen has the details:

[Hansen] Is the Communist Party of Estonia now an independent party or not? That was one of the questions asked by journalists at today's news conference of Enn-Arno Sillari, the newly elected first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee and [name indistinct], who is a newly elected secretary.

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia adopted a party program. It says in writing that a radical change in the previous status of the Communist Party of Estonia as an oblast organization, and the Communist Party of Estonia (?ceasing to be) the power monopoly, constitute a transformation of the Communist Party of Estonia into an independent party in the political (?life) of Estonia. A certain period is envisioned for the transformation, and it could last up to six months. Thereafter a Constitution will be adopted. During the transformation period, however, members of the republican party organization, on the strength of their individual expression of will, determine their membership in the Communist Party of Estonia.

On the basis of the reorganization program an independent Communist Party of Estonia has juridically been created. But during the news conference, when Enn-Arno Sillari was answering questions put to him, the new party

did not have a single member. The time was precisely 1541 at that moment. That means that at that time the new party did not as yet actually exist, because what kind of party is it that has no members!

To clarify the matter further, the journalists were given the statement of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia so that they could acquaint themselves with it and disseminate it. It announces the creation of an independent Communist Party of Estonia. The Central Committee is obliged to elaborate and make public a statute for the transitional period within 10 days. This will point out how membership will be formed, how membership dues will be paid, and how party membership (?will be registered). So those who intend to become members of the independent Communist Party of Estonia will have to wait a while. The issue of new membership cards will also be resolved [words indistinct].

The Estonian shadow party had barely been created when one of its founders proposed to send a letter to Gorbachev in which the issue of dividing party property would definitely be raised, so that things would not be done—as they expressed over there [words indistinct] what fell due to the shadow party in Lithuania. The new first secretary did not find a reason for handing over the party property, but today, during the early hours of the morning, when the shadow party had finished its founding meeting—which they had, so to speak, (?christened) as a congress—we managed to talk to Andrey Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who is staying here.

[Begin Girenko recording in Russian fading into superimposed Estonian report] [passage indistinct] Andrey Girenko thought that for that reason there are grounds for raising the issue of dividing the property. But how and in what proportions—that must be discussed. [passage indistinct] What is more, the question arises whether Estonia really needs such a Communist Party of Estonia, where there are no Estonians. With the reorganization of the party it would indeed be possible to manage it so that part of the property would remain (?in the republic). [passage indistinct] There are no cases known in the world where one party would hand over its property to another, and the Communist Party of Estonia will not do it, either. It is ready, however, to hand over vacated property to education, culture, and health care.

Altogether, a large number of various [word indistinct] and purely practical questions are waiting to be resolved. It was pleasing to here that the new party leadership has already started to deal with them.

Estonian Officer Views Alternative Service Law

LD2803175290 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Tallinn March 28 TASS—Major-General Rein Pyder [name as received], enlistment officer of the Estonian Republic, lodged a protest with the Estonian Supreme Soviet against the adoption of the law "on labor service in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic." TASS asked Major-General Pyder to comment on this fact.

"The talk about a rule-of-law state remains just talk," Pyder said. "A law like the one 'about labor service in Estonia' would not have appeared in a rule-of-law state. USSR people's deputies from Estonia have not raised the issue of alternative service for discussion at the country's supreme legislative body, although the issue needs to be resolved. Meanwhile, a hasty decision was made in Estonia, and the law was passed in an unfinished form."

The law states that labor service is not within the jurisdiction of the USSR Armed Forces. It means obligatory work at enterprises, institutions, and organisations of the Estonian republic, in accordance with a procedure and schedule stipulated by the given law.

The duration of labor service is 30 months. For citizens who graduated from higher educational establishments but had no military training, it is 12 months.

The Estonian Supreme Soviet's desire to offer a choice to Estonian youths is understandable. The law states that labor service is an alternative to military conscription. Estonian citizens, aged 18 to 27, who permanently reside in Estonia and are registered for military conscription, can turn to labor service if they cannot serve in the Armed Forces.

Alternative service exists in a number of countries, for instance, in West Germany. The law on alternative service adopted in West Germany in 1960 stipulates legal grounds for refusing conscription and sets out the rights and duties of young people who do not wish to serve in the Bundeswehr for religious, philosophical, ethical, or other reasons.

But since the law on labor service in the Estonian Republic does not clearly formulate the criteria by which the reasons for not serving in the Army will be determined, there may be differing interpretations of the law. There may be young people fit for conscription who will try to take advantage of this law.

Therefore I believe that the law on labor service in Estonia requires further specification, Major-General Pyder said.

RSFSR

Further on RSFSR Supsov Presidium Elections

Returns Discussed

LD2803173890 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—The Presidium of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet today discussed

election returns in the Russian Federation, autonomous republics and local soviets of people's deputies.

As many as 1,026 people's deputies of Russia, or 96 per cent of the total number of deputies' mandates, were elected after two rounds of voting. 2,530 people's deputies of autonomous republics, or 88.4 per cent of the number of mandates, and 702,268 deputies of local soviets of various level, or 89.8 per cent of the total number of deputies' mandates, were elected.

It was noted at the meeting that during the election campaign government bodies and electoral commissions made several errors and blunders.

Work collectives, public organisations and voters made a considerable number of critical remarks about unjustifiable difficulties during the nomination and registration of candidates, violations of the rules for the canvassing campaign by candidates and their authorised representatives, the unsatisfactory organisation of voting at a number of polling stations, and so on. In some constituencies, because of violations of the legislation, the election has been found invalid, and new elections will be held.

The voter turnout was lower than in the previous years. 77 per cent of the electorate participated in the first round on March 4, less than 70 per cent of the electorate participated in the second round of voting on March 14, 17 and 18.

It should be noted that a large number of ballots, some ten million, were found invalid. Electoral commissions are at fault because they failed to explain the voting procedure to people.

It was pointed out at the meeting that the shortcomings are largely explained by flaws in some articles of the law on election. New People's Deputies of the Russian Federation are to sum up the experience of the election campaign and amend the existing laws.

The meeting discussed the date for convening the First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. Taking into account the experience of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it was decided that all the preliminary work for the holding of the Congress should be carried out by a preparatory commission, to be formed of deputies elected from each region of the republic.

Runoff Results Reported

PM2903092390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium "Announcement on Results of Runoff Elections of People's Deputies of Autonomous Republics and Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the RSFSR"]

[Text] (Data published on the basis of materials received from the autonomous republic Supreme Soviet presidiums and executive committees of the kray, oblast, and Moscow and Leningrad city soviets of people's deputies).

Runoff elections of local soviet people's deputies ended 18 March on the territory of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

Voting took place in 42,166 okrugs in all echelons of local soviets. That included 640 kray okrugs, 4,260 oblast okrugs, 118 autonomous oblasts' oblast soviet okrugs, 270 autonomous okrugs' okrug soviet okrugs, 6,693 rayon okrugs, 16,151 city okrugs, 6,181 rayon okrugs in cities, 3,010 settlement okrugs, and 4,903 rural soviet of people's deputies okrugs.

Some 32.9 million voters, or 65.8 percent of those on the lists, took part in the runoff. The elections were deemed valid in the absolute majority of okrugs.

On the basis of the results of the two rounds of the elections (the 4 March vote and the 18 March runoff) 702,268 deputies were elected in all echelons of the local soviets of the RSFSR, or 89.8 percent of the total number of deputy seats.

Among the people's deputies elected women comprised 35 percent, people under 30 comprised 15.1 percent, CPSU members and candidate members 49.1 percent, Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members 6.6 percent, 34.2 percent were deputies of local soviets of the previous convocation, 96.6 percent work on the territory of the relevant soviets, and 96.4 percent of deputies live there. Among the elected deputies workers comprise 24.9 percent and collective farm members 20 percent. In 1,697 electoral okrugs the runoff was deemed invalid or void.

In 1,101 electoral okrugs runoffs were held to elect autonomous republic people's deputies and in 14 of them the runoff was invalid. In all 2,530 autonomous republic people's deputies were elected on the basis of the results of the two rounds of elections. Among them women comprise 9.2 percent, workers 9.2 percent, collective farm members 5.9 percent, people under 30 comprise 3.5 percent, CPSU members and candidate members 88 percent, Komsomol members 1.2 percent, and 18.4 percent were deputies of autonomous republic supreme soviets of the previous convocation.
[signed] RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Further on Results

PM2903101590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

["Central Electoral Commission Report on Results of Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies at Runoffs 14, 17, and 18 March 1990"]

[Text] Having examined the protocols submitted by the okrug electoral commissions on the results of the elections of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist

Republic] people's deputies during the runoff, the Central Electoral Commission reports:

In accordance with Article 52 of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies" runoffs were held 14, 17, and 18 March in 766 territorial and 146 national-territorial electoral okrugs.

There were 87,008,694 people on the electoral lists for the runoff for the territorial electoral okrugs and 89,996,801 people on the lists for the national-territorial electoral okrugs. Some 69.3 percent and 69.4 percent of voters respectively took part in the vote. There were 2,230,439 ballot slips deemed invalid.

As a result of the runoff RSFSR people's deputies were elected in 760 territorial and 146 national-territorial okrugs. In territorial okrugs Nos. 43, 425, 737, and 853 the okrug electoral commissions deemed the runoffs void in connection with the fact that less than half the voters on the lists took part. During the runoff for territorial okrug No. 697 both candidate people's deputies collected the same number of votes for and against, which did not allow the elected deputy to be determined. For territorial okrug No. 125 the okrug electoral commissioned deemed the election invalid because of the violations of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies" perpetrated during the election. Repeat elections will be held in these okrugs in accordance with Article 53 of the law on elections.

The registration of deputies from territorial electoral okrugs Nos. 11, 37, 80, 90, 112, 239, 683, 810, 884, and 886 and from national-territorial okrugs Nos. 93, 95, 100, 121, 138, 155, and 156 has been deferred until the complaints of violations of the law on elections during the voting which have reached the Central Electoral Commission have been examined.

Reports on the result of the runoff for each territorial and national-territorial electoral okrug have been published by the okrug electoral commissions in the local press.

On the basis of Article 49 of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies," the Central Electoral Commission has registered 889 people's deputies elected during the runoff from the territorial and national-territorial electoral okrugs.

As a result of the 4 March elections and the 14, 17, and 18 March runoffs, 1,026 of 1,068 RSFSR people's deputies have been elected. There are still 42 deputies to be elected, including 37 from the territorial and five from the national-territorial electoral okrugs.

Among the elected deputies there are 55 women, or 5.4 percent; 234 industrial, construction, transport, and communications workers, or 22.8 percent; 123 agricultural workers, or 11.9 percent; 192 science, culture, health, and press workers, or 18.7 percent; 262 workers in party, soviet, and public organizations, or 25.5 percent; 60 workers, or 5.9 percent; and 47 collective farm members, or 4.6 percent.

In all there are 107 workers and collective farm members, or 10.4 percent. Among the people's deputies there are 886 CPSU members and candidate members, or 86.3 percent; 140 nonparty people, or 13.7 percent; and five Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members, or 0.5 percent. Citizens of 46 nationalities living in the republic have been elected to the RSFSR supreme organ of state power.

The list of RSFSR people's deputies elected during the runoffs on 14, 17, and 18 March 1990 and registered by the Central Electoral Commission is published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.
[signed] Central Electoral Commission for elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR.

Vorotnikov Meets North Small Peoples Delegates

LD2803230790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2130 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Excerpt] On 28 March there was a meeting between Vorotnikov, CPSU Central Committee politburo member, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium, Vlasov, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, and delegates of the congress of the numerically small peoples of the North.

Let us recall that the congress will take place in Moscow on 30 and 31 March. Over two days it is intended to discuss the political and social-economic position and the prospects for the development of northern ethnic groups. It is proposed to create an all-Russian association, to adopt its program and rules. [passage omitted]

Rostov Informals Capitalize on AES 'Alarm'

PM2903093990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[PRAVDA correspondent M. Kryukov report: "Are Their Intentions Good, or Who Is Straining to Grab the Microphone at the Rallies?"]

[Text] Rostov-na-Donu—You frequently hear the following in Rostov Oblast: "Those informals again! How many more times!" These are the words of malcontents. But people also say: "Fine fellows, those informals! They've gotten to the heart of the matter!" For instance, the public environmental movement is popular on the Don. And rightly so. Informals can credit themselves with useful acts of environmental protection.

One being the fight to halt the construction of an incineration plant in Rostov. Informals have displayed both character and reason here. They have proved that the enterprise design is imperfect and will bring the city nothing apart from additional environmental problems.

More than R12 million have been spent on construction of the plant to date. You will agree that the situation was delicate. The dispute also made the local newspapers. Incidentally, Professor Yu. Dombrovskiy from the state university here was the first to express an opinion in the press. He was later in charge of the oblast social and environmental center.

A. Dontsov, then first secretary of Rostov party gorkom [city party committee], told me:

"We supported the informals. Their arguments were convincing and we could not fail to take them into consideration. Our interests coincided here—we both regarded people's health as being of paramount importance. It is just a pity that we failed to consult people earlier. We only rectified our mistake after great losses. This is a good lesson for us...."

"At first the local authorities' attitude toward us was quite guarded," Yu. Dombrovskiy said. "Even now, if we are being frank, there are people in their ranks who totally spurn us. But there are fewer and fewer of them. After all, we are ultimately united by common aims...."

There are many informal associations on the Don. Many of them are contributing to perestroyka. They sharpen the eyes and ears of local leaders. They give officials and bureaucrats no rest. But how can we fail to mention something else at this juncture. Why, for instance, do people often describe some rallies and meetings organized by informals as a "farce" and a "shambles." I did not make up these definitions. Take these ecologists. Heated disputes have flared up of late over the problem of constructing the Rostov nuclear electric power station [AES]. The wave of indignation rose particularly high in Volgodonsk, where the station is to be constructed just 13km from the city. It is not that far from Rostov either—180 km as the crow flies.

The reason for the flareup of passions is understandable. A crisis of confidence arose regarding the safety of AES's after Chernobyl. People demanded guarantees.

It cannot be denied that ecology also constitutes politics. It concerns the state's policy with regard to the health of its citizens. But the following poster appeared among the demonstrators: "Use the Manych AES for dachas for Politburo members." That is indeed irrelevant. To be more precise, it is provocative. During the noisy "round-table" debate in Volgodonsk one member of the "green wave" said: "We do not trust Ryzhkov, because he is not shutting down the nuclear power stations." Everything can be blamed on an excess of emotion. On an inability to discuss things. But is that the only point? I am sure that it is not. Some people are endeavoring to play a political card under the smokescreen of these environmental movements. There are grounds for saying this.

I happened to attend a rally called by the social environmental center last fall. It took place at the city's "Trud" stadium. Approximately 1,000 people were present. It was opened by Yu. Dombrovskiy. He gave a warning right away: "Comrades, let's get to the point and talk about the AES." However, he was later given frequent loud reminders of this—the discussion frequently digressed. Those people who were only using the AES as a cover, an excuse to "declare themselves," rushed to take the microphone. Their true intention—to become masters of the situation at any price and win some political capital—were all too clear. They vented insults on people. They were seeking a scandalous popularity.

I played the recording of the rally in Dombrovskiy's presence once again, to remind him better who spoke. The speeches were heated but well considered and well argued, and they showed unconcealed distress over the state of the environment. But there were also speeches like the following: "I have just been informed that public health bodies will be trying to reduce the incidence of cancerous disease reported in the second half of the year. We will investigate the matter to ensure that there are no rigged figures." "The gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] intends to build a sports complex costing R9 million in conjunction with the Belgians. That is probably to ensure that gorispolkom personnel can pay more frequent visits to Belgium." "We all know the nitrate situation in our area. What have we heard from party leaders. They say that if control is established in the customary manner, you will all die of starvation!"

Do you think that the speakers bothered with evidence? Nothing of the kind. Their only concern was to hot up the rally and sow doubts in people's minds....

I am by no means comprehensively analyzing the activity of informal associations now. I will only judge things by who spoke at the rally and what was said. A man came up to the microphone and said loudly: "The Don People's Front welcomes you!" People sitting next to me began to ask one another: "Does this front really exist here?" I had not heard of its establishment either. I only knew that it had been attempted. Last summer I read a letter on this subject addressed to N. Pivovarov, then chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], and the minutes of the meeting of the "Memorial-People's Front" Board. "Memorial" is already in operation and has met with increasing support. One USSR people's deputy was elected chairman of the board—the "leader," as the minutes say—and a USSR people's deputy was also elected its first deputy. However, two weeks later the chairman left the board, writing a statement on this to the oblispolkom. His deputy also sent a similar letter there: "I did not know of this assembly's existence. Someone used my name as a cover. I am indignant that all this is taking place behind my back, without my knowledge."

Nevertheless, now at the rally one of the representatives of the nonexistent people's front kept his word. He said loudly, with pathos: "We want to give power to the local soviets," "the apparatus has shown its teeth," "we cannot be intimidated." It reminded me of the claqueurs—people who were hired to create a ballyhoo to

prevent a disagreeable actor from speaking in the theater. "These claqueurs are here too," the speaker raised his voice. "They must be silenced! They are not letting the informals speak!" But no one interrupted him or the other informals. Mainly they interrupted "representatives of the authorities," not "their own."

An "independent" journalist appeared at the microphone. He was aggrieved: "People in Moscow know us better, they don't let us speak." It is hard to tell whether he is known in Moscow or not, but he is certainly known on Radio Liberty. On two occasions, if not more, he has blurted out cock-and-bull stories on its frequency. During the elections of USSR people's deputies I heard one of them: "The Rostov militia was the most active of all during the elections. Not only did it tear down the bills posted by the defenders of perestroyka, but it also provided a ridiculous escort of special vehicles whenever the smallest group of activists just put in an appearance in the center of the city. And those people who were involved in agitation were thrown behind bars." There was nothing of the kind. I do not know why my colleague lied.

There at the rally I could not escape the thought that these speakers were concerned least of all with the AES and people's health. They see their main task as being to fuel tension.

Some informals are striving to twist the question of whether or not the AES should be built above all so as to show party officials in an unfavorable light. It is they who are supposedly in favor of the station, they are "poisoning the people." Some people fall for this line. However, I decided to question leaders of party committees—ranging from party obkom [oblast party committee] to gorkom and raykom [rayon party committee] first secretaries: Did they support or oppose the construction of the station? I was shown letters at the party obkom and the oblispolkom sent to central bodies over the last two years asking for an expert opinion on the Rostov AES. The answers, succinctly, are as follows: "It is not up to us to decide whether there should or should not be an AES here. There are scientists and specialists to do that. Although we are aware that there is a tremendous shortage of electricity in the area, which is tending to worsen. The prospect is 'not rosy'—that is, we face the disconnection of enterprises and apartment blocks. That's cause for alarm. People must not be worse off."

At a recent Rostov party obkom plenum G. Fomenko, first secretary of Volgodonsk Gorkom, said: Our job is hard now; in the case of the AES it looks as though the construction chief and the party committee secretary made a decision and resolved to construct it on the Don. Many of those who are sitting in this hall—and they are mainly party and soviet personnel—are even asking: "When are you going to shut the station down?"

A. Fisunov, another secretary from this party gorkom, wrote the following in the municipal VOLGODONSKAYA PRAVDA about the construction of the AES: "All the city's residents are interested in what the CPSU gorkom is doing and what it thinks about the question that has been raised. We are inhabitants of the city with families and children and, believe us, we are equally concerned for them and their future. We are not cutting ourselves off from other citizens. We want an independent, nondepartmental examination conducted by a USSR Government commission. The population of the city and the region should only make a decision on the basis of the commission's findings. We are firmly convinced that specialists and the region's inhabitants should ultimately decide whether or not to build the Rostov AES." That is the candid opinion of yet another party official. So why put them "in the dock"? Why make them scapegoats? Who benefits from their bad reputation?

Events then developed in the following way. A nondepartmental commission of experts was set up on the instructions of the union government following an official question put by the Rostov delegation of USSR people's deputies. However, it has done virtually no work. Yu. Dombrovskiy told me:

"The government's instructions have once again gotten bogged down in department offices. The administrative-edict syndrome is taking its toll. The public are still demanding clear answers."

Rostov party obkom and oblispolkom once again insistently asked the USSR Council of Ministers to speed up the examination and settle these questions. An answer addressed to B. Volodin, first secretary of Rostov CPSU Obkom, arrived from L. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, announcing that a program had been ratified this January and specific dates set for the examination. The results will be considered at the USSR Council of Ministers in the third quarter of 1990 with the public of Rostov Oblast. Nuclear fuel will not be shipped into Volgodonsk until the examination is completed and the relevant decision adopted; the AES startup date has been postponed. USSR Supreme Soviet people's deputies received answers to their questions from the State Committee for Environmental Protection.

So there is general alarm. One should say that there are many other hotspots on the Don. They clamor for attention. In this situation the informals' position will have greater weight, the better the intentions of those who take the floor at their rallies and meetings. At present people trying to use the "Green" movement for gain are worming their way into the movement. But it should not be forgotten that a ship loses speed when it has too many barnacles stuck to its hull.

Nine Killed in Yakutsk Freight Helicopter Crash

PM2903092790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by own correspondent O. Borodin: "Helicopter Crash"]

[Text] A giant Mi-26 helicopter from the Yakutsk Civil Aviation Administration's Mirnyy Aviation Enterprise has crashed in the northern part of Irkutsk Oblast, near Kirensk. Nine people were killed—crew members and people accompanying the freight. An investigation is taking place.

Western Republics

Belorussia Expresses Concern Over Lithuania

LD2803180190 Moscow TASS in English 1703 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Minsk, March 28 TASS—The Belorussian Communist Party's Central Committee has expressed profound concern and anxiety over developments in Lithuania.

In an address to communists and all people of Lithuania, the Central Committee said that "forces that came to power at the recent elections seek to change the state system in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and restore the bourgeois system."

"By kindling nationalism and hiding under slogans about independence and sovereignty, militant politicos endanger the cause of perestroyka in the republic and the country as a whole," the address said.

"We regret the moral terror unleashed against communists who remain committed to internationalist principles and favor preserving the unity of the USSR."

"We deplore attacks on the Soviet Army and the desecration of our memorials," the Central Committee stated.

"Separatist nationalist forces are trying to erase from people's hearts the feeling of belonging to a single family of Soviet peoples."

"Misinterpreting the slogan of sovereignty, they are moving towards isolationism and separatism and a rupture of economic and spiritual ties with other republics. They maliciously slander the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party."

The Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, respecting the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination and their striving towards economic, social, and cultural progress, believes that "these issues can only be resolved in strict compliance with Soviet legislation and consideration for the mutual interests of Lithuania and other union republics."

Reportage on Aftermath of Chernobyl Disaster

Honesty, Actions Urged

PM2803114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent N. Matukovskiy article: "Disaster. The Lessons of Chernobyl"]

[Text] We finally have to tell ourselves the whole truth about what happened: The world's greatest technological disaster occurred at Chernobyl. And we have only just started to analyze its consequences and how to minimze them. Today we can only talk about adjusting and adapting mankind and the entire biosphere to the new and irreversible conditions in the wake of Chernobyl.

Millions of people live in the disaster zone. The Chernobyl disaster presented us with exceptionally difficult tasks touching virtually all spheres of life and many spheres of science, production, and morality. Those were the conclusions recently reached by a panel of state experts headed by Academicians N. Moiseyev and S. Belyayev and Doctor of Biological Sciences A. Nazarov.

They proceeded on the basis of the only acceptable and possible approach in the situation. Since the disaster has occurred and we cannot move to another planet, we have to urgently find the most effective ways and means of minimizing the consequences of the disaster not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. Above all we have to save the lives and health of people living in the disaster areas and safeguard future generations against its consequences. Even such major scientific authorities as Yu. Izrael, L. Ilin, L. Buldakov, Ye. Chazov, V. Marin, D. Popov, and others tried to play down the scale of the Chernobyl disaster. (Why they should do so we will discuss later). In a letter to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, 92 scientists tried to claim that the Chernobyl accident was not as terrible as the scientists from the Belorussian Academy of Sciences tried to make out.

In an interview with the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 29 November, D. Popov stated: "Foreign scientists (namely a group of WHO experts) were shaken by the radiological ignorance of the scientists from the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. This clearly had more to do with political short-termism and a desire to win prestige with rallies of people than with real science."

Even previously this "rider" had been repeated virtually word for word by Ye. Chazov, USSR minister of health, in his letter to N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

In order to put a stop to the confusion that was arising, V. Soldatov, vice president of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences, turned for an explanation to Pierre Pellerin, director of the French Central Radiation Service, whose authoritative opinion was quote by D. Popov and Ye. Chazov. Mr.

Pellerin replied immediately: "I can confirm that during our recent June visit to Belorussia my WHO group colleagues Beninson and Waite, and I myself of course, never called into question the overall competence of the Belorussian scientists. On the contrary, we admired it and have the greatest respect for it. Particularly after our interesting and fruitful exchange of opinions at the Academy of Sciences in Minsk. Of course, the 29 November 1989 claims in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA are incorrect."

The supporters of the "Moscow" concept hold that nothing terrible will happen to the people living in the accident zone if they continue living where the radiation contamination does not exceed 40 curies per square kilometer. And if the external and internal dose of radiation does not exceed 35 rems in 70 years.

Belorussian scientists, on the contrary, claim that people should not live in areas where they cannot obtain food products uncontaminated by radiation. And contamination means 15 or even 10 curies per square kilometer, not 40. The concept of "35 rems in a lifetime" is unscientific and inhuman, because it fails to take any account of people's health at the time of the disaster, of the existence of "high-risk groups" among the population, or of the large impact dose of short-lived radionuclides received by people at the time of the disaster. It is not possible to measure this amount using physical dosimetry methods, nor is it possible at all to monitor the critical 35-rem "threshold" using existing equipment.

Doctor of Chemical Sciences Ye. Petryayev, chief of the Radiochemistry Faculty at the V.I. Lenin Belorussian State University:

It is impossible to determine this "threshold" during someone's lifetime for another reason, too. The norm for all doses is calculated by reference to cesium alone. Yet in the affected areas there was also a fallout of strontium, plutonium, and a large "package" of transuranic elements, which could be breathed in by a human organism as fine aerosols. The most horrifying things were the "hot particles" measuring a micron and above. In the southern part of the Gomel area there are between one and 10 such particles per square centimeter of soil. And all these constitute more than the 35 "official" rems!

To be blunt, the "scientific" argument is not about curies and rems, but about how many people need to be resettled and from which areas. Or, to be more accurate, it is about rubles and how many billions need to be allocated to resettlement—10, 15, or 20? Isn't this hypocritical? We say that human life is priceless and we argue about how many rubles to spend on an individual, an adult, a child....

The Belorussian program (which will become a program in the full sense of the world only after ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet) envisages spending around R18 billion on eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disasters in the five years of the current five-year plan.

Why are we talking only about Belorussia? After all, certain parts of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine also suffered. But out of all our country's radionuclide-contaminated territory more than 70 percent is in Belorussia. In order to bring that percentage "home," I would cite the following figures. On the republic's territory where radiation contamination is more than one curie per square kilometer there are 2,200,000 inhabitants—that is, one-fifth of the total Belorussian population. In the strictly monitored area, where the contamination is more than 15 curies per square kilometer, there are 498 population centers with a population of 102,000 people, of which more than 30,000 are children. Some 12,000 people in 85 villages live in a 624-square kilometer area with a radiation level of over 40 curies. You can't touch anything in your own garden or vegetable patch, you can't take a walk in the woods, you can't pick mushrooms or berries, you can't drink the milk from your own cow, you can't swim in the river, and you can't catch any fish. Even adults could not stand such restrictions. Not to mention children!

Belorussian scientists, upholding the "nonthreshold" concept (nobody in the world has yet studied the long-term impact of small radiation doses on the human organism), are concerned for the future of the entire nation.

In the past few years higher levels of disease in the upper respiratory tract, the gastrointestinal tract, and the endocrine system have been recorded in the affected regions. There have been immunity disorders, psychic disorders, diseases of the circulation system, various pregnancy disorders, and cases of major birth deformities. Of particular concern is the state of children's thyroid glands, in which hyperplasia has become widespread everywhere. "Genetic changes, which could contribute 50-100 percent to these diseases," are one of the causes of the deviations that have been observed. We are faced with the fact that there has been a real increase in the incidence of disease among the population living in territories contaminated as a result of the accident. Available information also points to an increase in genetic pathology. In subsequent decades we will hardly be able to wholly avoid the development of oncological and genetic deviations in a certain proportion of the population.

You might wonder what kind of struggle we can be talking about when we have the kind of official conclusions of state experts that we do. Who could object to such clear and irrefutable facts? Such people exist. Unfortunately, the adoption of a final "overall" decision at the very "top level" depends largely on them. They are, above all, Yu. Izrael, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, and L. Ilin, vice president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and director of the Biophysics Institute.

In a written reply to a question from Deputy N. Ignatovich (7 July 1989) V. Marin said: "Analysis of the data obtained as a result of the medical investigation and

out-patient monitoring of people living in these areas carried out by the USSR Ministry of Health shows that no diseases connected with the effects of radiation have been recorded among the population of the monitored areas of Belorussia."

D. Popov goes even further, claiming that in the radionuclide fallout areas favorable conditions have been created for people to freely obtain curative doses of cesium equivalent to radon baths. He admits that in these areas, "there has been a growth in many diseases. There is just one diagnosis—mass radiophobia."

In SELSKAYA ZHIZN (No. 29 for 4 February) L. Buldakov also fails to experience any alarm about radiation-contaminated areas. "If all our people," he wrote, "only ate food from the Chernobyl region they would receive just an additional 7 millirems a year. This is just 10 percent of the annual dose, which is not dangerous at all. Not at all!"

But if D. Popov and L. Buldakov are "merely" major authorities in the radiology sphere, V. Marin is a member of the government commission on the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

Why do many senior leaders so stubbornly uphold the idea that nothing terrible or irreparable happened at Chernobyl in 1986?

A. Stepanenko, vice president of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences:

In ancient times a runner who brought ill tidings had his head cut off. But, of course, it is not a question of "historical fear." When this terrible accident happened, all of us—from mere mortals to Politburo members—instinctively rejected the idea that it was not just an accident but a monstrous disaster whose consequences would never be eradicated. The physicists who had given us assurances for so many years about the peaceful nature of the atom could not be so tragically mistaken! Were they now to take a step back from their initial claims, all of us—from top to bottom—would have the natural question: "Does this mean you have lied to the people, the government, and the Politburo for almost four years?"

I think that the stubbornness in upholding obsolete and discredited ideas is also explained by the proverbial monopolism of our central departments, particularly on matters concerning notorious "secret" subjects. Just let somebody try to state the opposite opinion! All kinds of means will be brought into play in order to defend their "pure" positions, and the question of how accurate an opponent's objections were comes a long way down the list. This situation is familiar to us in many spheres, but in this instance we can see for ourselves that monopolism and departmental backscratching do not retreat in the face of even the most sacred of concepts.

It is natural we should have begun this conversation with the purely medical aspect of the Chernobyl problem—whether or not people will survive, whether or not they will be healthy. There are a large number of other aspects which are also connected in one way or another with the health of people living both in the actual disaster zone itself and a long way from it. The first concerns peasant labor in areas with a level of radiation contamination of over 15 curies per square kilometer. Belorussian scientists are unanimous that peasant labor has lost all point there. Why should people produce "contaminated" goods and for whom? So that the "shadow" of radiation can spread further and further?

In certain rayons of Mogilev and Gomel Oblasts 40-60 percent of the milk is contaminated. At best they reprocess it and feed the skimmed milk to calves. Meat contaminated beyond all permissible levels is partially reprocessed as meat and bone meal, which is fed to the piglets on virtually all the republic's farms. Monitoring the spread of radionuclides in produce sent from the private sector is utterly impossible.

A. Lyutsko, candidate of physical-mathematical sciences and senior lecturer at the V.I. Lenin Belorussian State University:

The Soviet side's report to the IAEA cites estimates of the anticipated collective dose in the European part of the USSR—300,000 man-sieverts from external irradiation, 2 million man-sieverts from internal irradiation. (For comparison: The total damage in dosage units from the accident at America's Three Mile Island was 35 man-sieverts). The point is that the dosage from food products is several times greater than the gamma radiation dose in the contaminated area. Doctors claim that in terms of cesium content in the body, people from Minsk and Vitebsk have already almost the same amount as inhabitants of Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts. It is necessary to immediately pass a law which would envisage the most rigorous criminal liability for the production and distribution of produce contaminated with radionuclides.

There is an extremely complex problem—moving people away initially from territories where radiation contamination exceeds 40 curies per square kilometer, then 15 curies, and finally 5 curies. It is not even a question of the vast resources needed for such a large scale action. It is possible to at least partially divert the republic's housing program "toward Chernobyl." It is possible to issue a special state loan. It is possible, too, to resolve a very acute psychological and moral problem—that of settling people from the affected regions exclusively in separate settlements (even retaining the names of the old villages) or building separate streets for them in cities and settlements. That will maintain the old ethnic and communal relationships and will more quickly cure the "Chernobyl complex" and their sense of feeling disadvantaged and belief that those around them are to blame.

All this can be done. But there is another problem here: What to do with the lands that have been abandoned?

After all, they will run to hundreds of thousands of hectares. Wind erosion cannot be allowed to create secondary radiation.

Problems, problems.... Some will take 5 years to resolve, others 10 years, still others will take 200 years. Then there are those which.... Clearly, no one has studied them as thoroughly as Candidate of Agricultural Sciences A. Volkov, chief of the Land Reclamation Institute's laboratory of problems of the Polessye lowlands. He has spent at least 3 years in the disaster zone, established several thousand metering points, produced hundreds of charts showing the radioactivity level, measured the radiation level in hundreds of population centers, and observed people who have "absorbed" an excessive dose of radiation externally and internally. In some rayons of Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts he was quite simply chased away: "Get out immediately and take your apparatus with you, don't frighten our people, don't cause panic among them!"

Such was the official position not only of the party obkoms [oblast committees] but also of the republic's soviet and party leadership. Briefly, it can be summed up like this: Yes, there was a disaster, but we'll cope with it. We don't need any help from foreigners, we aren't paupers. Back in 1987 the Japanese offered to build a large joint hematology center in Gomel. "Great! So now we're going to reveal our secrets to the Japanese!" (I was present in the office of M.V. Kovalev, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, when this conversation took place). There is no hematology center in Gomel to this day.

The republic leadership's position has resulted in tens of millions of rubles being wasted building levees which, their designers believed, would keep the contaminated silt in the rivers. It did not work—the silt "crossed" the levees and settled in the places where the current is sluggish. The levees had to be destroyed because they were causing flooding. Tens of millions of rubles have been wasted on useless decontamination, on a re-evacuation which was nothing more than an ostentatious show, and on the construction of new settlements in places where they shouldn't have been built. Some R17 million were wasted just on the "Bratstvo" state farm in Gomel Oblast's Narovlyanskiy Rayon after the Chernobyl catastrophe. Whether this "heroism" was the result of local initiative or whether it was prompted from above has yet to be investigated by an independent parliamentary commission of the new Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

So, A. Volkov has this to say:

Pripyat has been virtually ruined and along with it the entire Pripyat basin over 122,000 square kilometers—it can only be used as an ecological conservation area. Today the waters of the Pripyat and the Sozh and their tributaries, the Nesvich, Iput, Besyad, Braginka, Kolpita, and Pokot, carry radioactive silt into the Dnepr. The Kiev reservoir is gradually becoming a "time bomb." The water is uncontaminated but all the silt is "hot" and there is already 60 million tonnes of it. The whole series of electric power stations on the Dnepr right down to the Black Sea is in great jeopardy. Yet 40 million people live in this area!

Another two problems also give me no rest. An elderly woman once called me out to her house, complaining of daily headaches. Some 300 milliroentgens per hour were recorded in the stove, which she stoked with firewood from the neighboring forest. The firewood was the cause. All the wood in the affected areas is radioactive. It must not be used for furniture, for construction, or even for firewood. The peat is also "hot." Where can people get fuel from?

The so-called "burial sites" simply horrify me. I did not see a single one built according to all the regulations—with concrete walls and a concrete covering. They are generally large pits whose walls and bottom are covered with polyethylene sheeting. In two or three years the ground waters will freely wash away the radioactive dust and run into the rivers and lakes.

I have also made several visits to the "dead zone," which has been turned into a dumping ground where everything is piled up—equipment, clothing, and furniture. Deserted, untended houses "glow" like candles. The fires that break out there when the peat becomes too dry intensify the tragedy. Smoke carries the radiation over a great distance. How can we combat this disaster?

There are two opinions about the future of the cluttered "dead zone." The first is that it should be handed over to the Main Administration for Atomic Power Stations to be sold to foreign scientists, two or three hectares each. This land is indeed worth its weight in gold because it is the only place that truly unique radiobiological studies and experiments can be conducted in natural rather than under laboratory conditions. Nowhere else in the world are there such conditions for scientists.

The second opinion is that since this land is unique it should be left at the disposal of the governments of the Ukraine and Belorussia. Let them lease it out in return for the requisite medical equipment and medicines. I consider the second option to be fairer—why reward the main culprit?

Another very sensitive question that has not been settled is what should be done with the Chernobyl AES itself. After all, each of its surviving three reactors contain 192 tonnes of nuclear fuel. Last year there were more than 30 "registered malfunctions" in the main equipment at the station, including 13 through staff error.

Belorussian SSR Academician E. Konoplya, director of the Radiobiology Institute:

The Chernobyl AES must be shut down, there can be no other opinion. We do not have the right to tempt fate twice. After all, the land it is on represents a vast blot of contamination from whence radiation is gradually

creeping in all directions. Not to mention potential mishaps on a more major scale. Of course, it would be hard to do without its 3 million kilowatts, 1 million of which goes to Belorussia. But a way out must be found—and as soon as possible. Of course, we cannot do without nuclear power in the future. But atomic power stations must not be like the Chernobyl AES; they must be constructed quite differently, a long way from densely populated areas. Is it expensive to transport electricity over long distances? Is it cheaper to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster?

My last interview was with Academician V. Platonov from the USSR Academy of Sciences, president of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences:

Our scientists are in an extremely difficult position because they are having to wage a war on two fronts—against the authors of the antiscientific concepts of "35 rems for life" and a "comfortable 40 curies per square kilometer" and against the republic's government, which is displaying astounding "obedience." Ye. Chazov had hardly written his letter to N.I. Ryzhkov than we were told, not without spite: It turns out that you are incompetent! We proposed not building new settlements for the settlers so near the zone—but you built them there. Now they have to be abandoned. We proposed not producing any food products in the strictly monitored zone—yet they are still being produced there now. We proposed immediately evacuating everyone who lived in the zone with more than 40 curies per square kilometer—people are still living there even now. Many people are even living where there are levels of 60-100 curies. It is indeed a question of the nation's future.

Take the following question. Three years ago scientists, writers, and informals claimed that we would not cope with our disaster without international aid. It is only today, after wasting three years, that our government has asked governments, parliaments, and peoples of all countries for aid. We have been talking for a long time about setting up a Belorussian National Committee To Protect the Population Against Radiation and Declare the Republic a National Disaster Zone. We last adopted a resolution to this effect at a Presidium of the Academy of Sciences 7 March. If the government does this straightaway, we would get direct access to many foreign organizations. We would obtain great aid—scientific, medical, technical, and material.

I listened to Vladimir Petrovich and thought: Will we really stick to our unpopular principle of "We are not paupers, it is not becoming for us to ask capitalists for aid" once again. The scale and nature of the disaster are such that we have no choice. We must make maximum use of all our resources and means and not be ashamed to ask for help from those whom yesterday we considered to be our enemies.

Today we are all people, living on earth—a planet that is not that large. Ours is a common disaster. It is a crime to the people themselves not to ask for help. If we are offered help, as we were by the Japanese in 1987, it would be simply immoral and inhuman to ponder it and reject it. After all, the Chernobyl catastrophe represents a disaster for the whole world.

Money Raised for Aid Fund

PM2803145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 8

[PRAVDA correspondent V. Drozd report under the "From the Latest Mailbag" rubric: "Aid or Ambitions?"]

[Text] Lvov—On Sunday Lvov Oblast newspapers and one central newspaper once again recalled the Chernobyl tragedy. Expressing the wishes of hundreds of collectives and most of the region's public organizations and inhabitants, the Lvov Oblast Trade Union Council urged working people to go to their workplaces on a Saturday in the near future and give all their earnings to the inhabitants of Zhitomir Oblast who suffered from radioactive contamination. It is proposed to transfer more than 2 million rubles into the aid fund (from the experience of previous subbotniks). This money would be enough to build a hundred homes in the Lvov area and offer Zhitomir Oblast families housing. The initiative seems worth consideration in the republic.

Thus it was all the more surprising when the poet I. Drach, leader of the republic's Rukh, divulged to us on the same day his intention to organize a splendid human chain 26 April to run between the nuclear power stations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and the Baltic. The poet sees this as serving to increase the prestige of Rukh itself. But is it moral to gratify personal ambition through human calamity?

People have a much greater need of concrete aid rather than words (they have heard more than enough of them over the last four years) and "human chains." This is a case where hands offering help are truly holier than praying lips....

Foreign Experts Consider Plan

LD2803153190 Moscow TASS in English 1044 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Trotsenko]

[Text] Kiev March 28 TASS—A group of foreign experts, currently in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Government, will consider a plan for the safe habitation of areas contaminated as results of the Chernobyl accident.

On Tuesday the group completed a three-day survey in the Kiev and Zhitomir regions.

They were received by Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Konstantin Masik. He stressed that the Ukrainian Government seeks to expand international cooperation to eliminate the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster and is grateful for help.

Masik told the experts that over 90,000 people had been evacuated from the affected areas. Fourteen settlements are being constructed in "clean" zones, where about 15,000 people will live.

The official also spoke of measures that reduced the radiation level in the disaster area by two-four times and the re-orientation of agriculture there.

At the same time, 1,450,000 people still reside in affected areas. Five million hectares of land are contaminated in the Ukraine. That is why a new plan for the safe habitation of these regions is needed, Masik said. He expressed hope that the experts will contribute to the plan. According to the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) assistant deputy director-general, the group includes representatives of the Commission of the European Communities, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organisation and the IAEA Agency, as well as Austrian, British, American and Japanese experts.

They will work for three or four months in affected zones of the Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia in order to estimate the population's irradiation level and its impact on human health.

The information will be used to ensure the safety of people residing in the affected areas.

Caucasus

Violence Causes Azerbaijan Border Closure

AU2903160690 Paris AFP in English 1547 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 29 (AFP)—The Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan has closed its border with Armenia amid reports of renewed armed clashes between the two communities, a Radio-Moscow publication reported here Thursday.

A number of villages in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, part of Azerbaijan which borders Armenia, have come under fire, notably in the Shabkhur, Babek and Ilyichyovsk regions, INTERFAX said.

A number of local residents have also been abducted, while Army reinforcements have been sent to the area, the publication added.

The decision to temporarily close the border was taken at a special joint session of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and government on Wednesday.

Meanwhile, Moscow has rushed General Yuriy Shatalin, the head of the internal ministry troops, to the Caucasus to "end violence, mass disorders and civil disobedience" in the region where recently clashes left a dozen dead and scores of injured, TASS news agency reported Thursday.

A group of Azeri deputies have also sent a message to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev urging him to reinforce security along the border between their republic and Armenia.

The presidium of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet has also declared invalid a session of the local government in the Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno- Karabakh, over which both Armenia and Azerbaijan claim sovereignty.

The local government had decided at a recent meeting in Stepanakerk to restore the Armenian-controlled regional executive committee and end a campaign of civil disobedience there, INTERFAX said.

All industrial premises were reported to have resumed work in Stepanakerk Wednesday, it added.

Further on Azerbaijan Violence

NC2903160190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] The newspapers report that the joint meeting held by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers on 28 March examined the situation in the Nakhichevan Autonomous SSR and in Kazakhskiy, Gedebekskiy, and Kel'badzharskiy Rayons, along with other rayons which have common borders with the Armenian SSR. The meeting also examined the urgent measures required to stabilize the situation.

The chauvinist and nationalist forces in the Armenian SSR have, like bandits, organized a number of armed attacks on the residential areas in Azerbaijani border regions in order to disrupt the inclination to normalize the situation and in order to make the current situation much worse. Equipped with modern combat equipment and [word indistinct] arms, including arms manufactured abroad, the armed men have fired on the towns and transport vehicles, set houses on fire, and detonated explosives on the railway tracks and motorways.

Blood has again been shed in our land, and dozens of peaceful residents in the republic have been killed, as during previous extremist activities. This has occurred before the very eyes of the Armenian SSR's party, soviet, and law enforcement organs and as a result of the opportunities they have created for such activities.

Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and Gasan Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, indicated that USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev; Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the Committee for State Security; General V.I. Varennikov, commander in chief of the ground forces; and other leaders who are responsible for the security of the people in our country have been extensively briefed on the current complex situation. It was [word indistinct] that

all the means available to the USSR should be used to end the bloody and tragic situation which has continued for two years.

It was noted that the republic's party leaders and government are resolutely safeguarding Azerbaijan's sovereignty and the life and peaceful existence of the republic's people. Measures are being taken to temporarily close the air and land borders with the Armenian SSR. The leaders of the neighboring republic were seriously informed that if they are not capable of controlling and disarming the bandit groups, the Azerbaijan SSR will then take the measures necessary in light of its constitutional rights to safeguard the territorial integrity of the republic and to provide security for its citizens.

The meeting adopted a decision to provide the necessary material aid to the families of those who have perished.

Azerbaijani Deputies Address Letter to Gorbachev

NC2803210090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 28 Mar 90

[From the Republican Press Review]

[Text] The USSR people's deputies from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] have conveyed a letter of appeal to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. The letter, which was published on the front pages of the newspapers today, explained the attacks launched against the entire length of Azerbaijan's border with the Armenian SSR by armed Armenians on 24 and 25 March. The letter said:

The objective behind the savage attacks is totally obvious. The fact that the situation has begun to normalize in the region, including the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, does not please certain unofficial organizations in the Armenian SSR and some leading workers in that republic who support them. How long will a handful of terrorists trifle with the (?achievements) of a world power like the Soviet Union? It is not clear why the leaders of the Soviet Army and the internal troops, who showed themselves [word indistinct] during the incidents in Baku, fail to advise against the frantic activities of the terrorists and turn a blind eye to the activities of the well armed national army in the Armenian SSR which is waging an undeclared war against the Azerbaijan SSR.

All this has been debated during many rallies and meetings in Azerbaijan SSR. The workers are demanding that the USSR use all the means at its disposal to end the tragic situation which has been going on for two years.

The USSR people's deputies from the Azerbaijan SSR appeal to you to use all the presidential powers which have been vested in you to take urgent measures in connection with this situation.

In their letter, the USSR people's deputies put forward a number of proposals aimed at stabilizing the situation. According to the signatories of the letter, if these urgent measures, which are of primary importance, are not put into effect, the outburst of violence in the region will get worse and the people will justifiably describe such inactivity as the condoning of activities conflicting with the law and with humanity.

Official Sent To 'Normalize' Caucasus Region

LD2803190190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Mar (TASS)—As the press center of the USSR Interior Ministry reported today, Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, head of the Chief Administration of Internal Troops of the USSR Interior Ministry, has left for the Transcaucasus region. He has been instructed to ensure normalization of the situation, to prevent acts of violence and disobedience of the requirements of the law.

By resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 5 March concerning the situation in the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and Armenian SSR and measures for the normalization of the situation in the region, the bodies of state power and administration of both republics were instructed to ensure the disbanding of extremist organizations and associations responsible for terrorist actions, pogroms, and mass disturbances, and to secure normalization of the transportation situation. But in both republics there are certain circles which act against the implementation of these decisions and whip up interethnic conflict. In the last few days there have been several clashes in border districts. There are casualties.

The actions of the extremist forces and corrupt elements which have brought real tragedy upon the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia are doing great damage to the peoples of the whole country and to the development of democratic processes, the report from the press center of the USSR Interior Ministry points out. In view of this, the USSR Interior Ministry is taking measures to stabilize the situation and ensure investigation into all cases of crime and unlawful activities.

Train Bombing in Megrinskiy Rayon Examined

NC2803163790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] It was reported earlier that the locomotive of passenger train No. 669, which was travelling on the Norashen-Baku line, was destroyed close to the Karchevan railway station in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Megrinskiy Rayon three days ago. Why are the troops not protecting the main railway lines? Is the protection of the lines not included among the duties of the troops? An AZERINFORM correspondent called on Agayanov, who is the procurator of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic's transportation network, to reply to these questions which the people of the republic are asking. Agayanov said:

The Armenian extremists have committed 80 crimes on this section of the Azerbaijan railways network during the past two years. The causes of the crimes were established and the results of the preliminary investigations were conveyed to the investigations administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the central authority has concluded none of the cases and none of the criminals has been sent to prison. Consequently, the Armenian extremists have caused even greater damage. The damage that has been caused does not concern only the people of Azerbaijan. It is a challenge to the entire country. I am convinced that the troops of the internal units, who are [words indistinct]. However, the bandits have not missed an opportunity. The place was so skillfully and carefully selected for the blast that there would have been innumerable casualties. This is due to the fact that there are very deep (?ravines) on both sides of the line. Anyone looking down is filled with fear. Furthermore, there is a long tunnel as you go toward Nakhichevan.

The investigation has revealed that the explosion was very carefully planned beforehand. Everything was considered over and over again. In all, 20 kg of explosives were placed on the railway line and a 200-meter telephone cable was used to detonate the device from a distance. Two people were probably required to make the preparations for such an act of destruction and to carry it out. In fact, the traces of the destructive elements, which were found near the tracks, confirm this. The criminals arrived at the scene of the incident in railway freight cars. I believe that neither the troops nor the Megrinskiy Rayon's Party, Soviet, and legal organs took the necessary measures to prevent the incident.

Meanwhile, officials of the Nakhichevan section of the Azerbaijan railways netowk have told an AZERINFORM correspondent that more than 200 meters of the railway line which were damaged, have been repaired and restored.

Incidents in Kazakhskiy Rayon Examined

NC2803174190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] The incidents that occurred in Kazakhskiy Rayon are still causing unease among the republic's people. What is the present situation in Kazakhskiy Rayon? What measures have been taken by the local party, soviet, and law enforcement organs to protect the lives of the people and ensure the normal functioning of the establishments, organizations, and administrations in the rayon? An AZERINFORM correspondent has telephoned Bakir Ayubov, first secretary of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Party Committee, and asked him to reply to these questions.

The situation in the rayon was generally peaceful until 1800 on 27 March [date as heard]. However, (?Palagatarly) and (?Basidarly) towns were fired on from the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] last night. The situation became peaceful again after army units came to help and silenced the sources of fire. There were no casualties.

Except for Sabir and Tinchlik state farms, which are very close to the Armenian SSR's territory, all other establishments, organizations, and administrations in the rayon are working. Fearing the activities of the Armenian bandits, the local people are afraid to report to work. In view of this, the residents of Baganis Ayrum town are being moved to neighboring residential areas. It will be recalled that the bandits set fire to more than 10 houdes in this town. A number of residents of Baganis Ayrum have been temporarily settled in one of the hostels in Kazakh city. The elders and party aktivs of the rayon have been visiting them in their rooms to calm them.

Meanwhile, a special committee has been established to determine the extent of the damage caused in the town. Furthermore, the leaders of the rayon have asked the republic's benevolent association to help the victims. The leading officials of the association have agreed to extend help. In another development, the necessary measures are being taken to supply provisions to the people who live on the border with the Armenian SSR. The units of the Soviet Army and the USSR Interior Ministry troops have all the residential areas in the border region under control. Together with the military servicemen, the local people are [word indistinct] round the clock.

Colonel General Shatalin, first deputy minister of internal affairs and head of the USSR Interior Ministry troops, has arrived in Kazakhskiy Rayon because of the tense situation. Comrade Mamedov, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, is also in Kazakhskiy Rayon.

Further Details on Transcaucasus Clashes

LD2803193190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In Kazakhskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan, a number of inhabited localities have come under fire, and a militiaman of the Astarinskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Administration, Sergeant Akhmedov, was killed. Adygizalov, a driver at a state farm, was wounded. Thirteen houses have been plundered and burned in the countryside.

In Idzhevanskiy Rayon, Armenia, a shepherd was killed and an adolescent was physically injured in a field by the explosion of an unidentified object. During 27 March, there was no movement of trains toward the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic through the stations of Idzhevan and Norashen because locomotive crews are refusing to go to work, fearing acts of terrorism. [passage omitted]

Georgia Faces Acute Struggle for Power

LD2803133890 Moscow TASS in English 1253 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS—"Georgia is facing a new, open stage of acute struggle for power," an article in the TRUD newspaper says today.

"The opposition is now divided into 'irreconcilables' (who have united under the National Forum flag and who do not recognize the legality of Soviet structures), and those who are seeking Georgia's independence through parliamentary means."

The former intend to continue "to destabilize the political situation, to develop and deepen destructive processes inside the state." The latter favor a constitutional struggle for a democratic parliament.

Some people believe that the Communist Party has followed the lead of the informal movement, making one concession after another, and is unsure of the way forward, the article says. Others believe that the party is hesitant before making a start in the new socio- political conditions. Many people believe that the communists have not yet lost strength and will have their say.

In any case, much will depend on the forthcoming communist congress. It is planned to be open on May 15 this year, under a decision taken by the March 22 central committee plenary meeting.

The press center of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee has distributed a report on a meeting that the republican leaders had with senior officials of the State Security committee (KGB), the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry.

The situation is tense, the report says. There is a vacuum of power, with many provisions of laws and the Constitution not being complied with. State, labour and social and civic insecurity are not confident of the morrow. They do not believe in the authorities' ability to put things in order and to stop unlawful and unconstitutional actions of separate groups of citizens who deliberately seek to destabilize the situation.

The consolidation of law and order was discussed at the meeting.

President of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Presidium and First Secretary of the Party Central Committee Givi Gumbaridze during his television appearance on Friday noted that nobody had the right to encourage processes that imperil the future of the people, civil peace and consensus.

Central Asia

Further Reportage on Uzbek Supreme Soviet

Session Opens

LD2403192590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 24 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We now have the report we promised from Tashkent. The work of the first session of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation began there today. Our correspondent Mukhtar Ganiyev reports:

[Ganiyev] There are 463 people's deputies in the newly elected republican Supreme Soviet. They are cotton farmers, workers, scientists, writers, and party workers. It must be said that the backbone—90 percent of the deputies—are communists. The work of the new parliament is expected to last approximately seven days. There are over 20 important issues on the agenda. The deputies will elect a republic president, a chairman, and deputy chairmen of the supreme soviet, and standing commissions of Uzbeskistan's supreme legislative body will be formed. The people's deputies will affirm the composition of the government of the Uzbek SSR, and will make changes and addenda to the republic's Fundamental Law. One of the main issues of the first session is economic recovery. [video: correspondent in a foyer with deputies mingling and chatting in the background; votes being taken at the session]

[Begin recording] [Deputy R. Akbarov, identified from caption] In our republic there are almost 1 million unemployed people. Generally, the situation in agriculture is not good. Unless we are given power, we will not resolve this issue in a fundamental way. We need the social issue to be placed at least on a medium level.

[Deputy A.P. Khiebushkina] There must primarily be protection for motherhood and childhood, an improvement in the lifestyle and domestic scene of our women.

[Deputy SH.K. Gataulin] We must at last resolve the problems connected with the use of our raw material and labor resources, so that we can use them properly, and so that we turn our republic into a raw material base, into a major, mighty, industrial-agricultural power. [end recording]

[Ganiyev] The first session of Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet will continue its work tomorrow.

President Karimov Takes Oath

PM2803113390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[PRAVDA correspondent A. Kaipbergenov report: "At the First Session"]

[Text] Tashkent, 27 Mar—The first session of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, is continuing its work. It was already reported that an Uzbek SSR Law on Establishing the Post of President of the Republic was adopted. By way of an exception, the first president was elected by the Supreme Soviet; in the future the republic's supreme official will be elected in accordance with the law for a five-year term. I. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, who was elected the republic's first president, took the oath.

The provisional standing orders for Supreme Soviet sittings were also ratified. M. Ibragimov and V. Bugrov were elected chairman and deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet respectively.

Then Uzbek SSR President I. Karimov submitted for the session's consideration two candidacies for the post of chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers—M. Mirkasymov, who was hitherto head of the government, and Sh. Mirsaidov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic's Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. After a discussion, Sh. Mirsaidov was elected chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers by secret ballot.

Today deputies heard a report from the republic's government on its future activity and on the progress made in fulfilling the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies' resolution "On Measures to Improve the Economy, Stages of Economic Reform, and Fundamental Approaches to the Elaboration of the 13th Five-Year Plan." After discussing the report the Supreme Soviet will embark on ratifying the composition of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

Mirsaidov Elected Chairman

LD2803141690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2130 GMT 27 Mar 90 txt

[Text] We begin this bulletin with a report on the work of the Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet session. Those taking part in it are electing the republic's leaders on an alternative basis. Thus Comrade Mirsaidov was appointed to the post of chairman of the Uzbekistan Council of Ministers by a majority of votes. He set out the government's program for the 13th five-year plan period, and reported that by the year 1993 it is planned to increase the living standard of people with a limited income. The head of the government submitted a proposal for the composition of the new cabinet of ministers. After each candidate has been discussed in the standing commissions, this composition will be endorsed at the republic's Supreme Soviet session.

Economic Recovery Discussed

LD2803181190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 28 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by M. Ganiyev, identified by screen caption]

[Text] One of the main events of the day is the work of the first session of Uzbekistan's newly-elected Supreme Soviet:

[Ganiyev] The republic's ways of overcoming the economic crisis, transfer to regional financial autonomy and the work of the new government in this difficult situation were presented in his program by Shukurulla (Akhmatovich) Mirsaidov, chairman of Uzbekistan's Council of Ministers, elected in a contested election. The discussion of the programs was overanimated but that's understandable—these are Eastern, excitable people and the problems are very urgent. [video shows Soviet in session]

[Begin video interview] [Kh.Sh. Sharafutdinov, Uzbekistan's people's deputy, identified by screen caption] We all now that in the main our republic is a raw-material supplying republic. We have to develop industry, that is other sectors, so that we have end products, so that turnover taxes stay here and we could live better.

[D.D. Sharipov, Uzbekistan's people's deputy, identified by screen caption] I support my comrade's words. Without the direction of economic independence within a renovated Federation we shall not solve these problems, this program. [video shows deputies interviewed by reporter] [end interview]

[Ganiyev] The people's deputies elected the chairman of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Constitutional Supervision Committee and approved the composition of the standing commissions of the republic's Supreme Soviet. This morning the deputies started work in the standing commissions. The preparation of bills and their discussion began. The new composition of the republic's government is being examined. Future ministers are attending hearings and presenting their programs for improving Uzbekistan's economy to the deputies. The work of the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet continues. [video shows commissions at work]

Commissions Confirmed

LD2803154190 Tashkent Domestic Service in Russian 0115 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Yesterday, 27 March, the first session of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation continued its work. The session was opened by Ibragimov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. Mirsaidov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, submitted proposals on the new composition of the republic's government. The Supreme Soviet decided to pass those proposals for preliminary examination to standing commissions. Then Mirsaidov delivered a report on the program of forthcoming activity of the government, and on the basic directions of the economic independence of the Uzbek SSR. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Soviet created an editorial commission to work out a resolution on the report of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR.

On the recommendation of President Karimov of the Uzbek SSR, the Supreme Soviet appointed (Khachiturov) as Chief State Abritrator of the Uzbek SSR. The Supreme Soviet elected (Urazhayev) as chairman of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the Uzbek SSR. The session confirmed the composition of the standing commissions of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

Today, 28 March, the session will continue its work.

Uzbek Party Plenum Sets 7 June Congress Date

LD2403191590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1017 GMT 24 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondents report:

The results of the February and March plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the tasks of the republic's party organizations in preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan have been discussed at a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, held in Tashkent.

A report was delivered by Islam Karimov, first secretary of the republic's Communist Party.

It was noted in the course of the discussion that the renewal of the political system is developing in favorable conditions for the republican Communist Party. Its representatives account for over 90 percent of the corps of people's deputies of Uzbekistan, formed as a result of democratic elections. This creates good preconditions for the programs of renewal of the economy and social and spiritual life outlined by the communists to be embodied in appropriate statutes and government decisions.

There was a principled evaluation at the plenum of the situation which has developed in the republic. It is marked by growing social and interethnic tension, a polarization of social forces and confusion, and declining authority in many party committees and organizations. Moreover, all this is being manifested with the utmost actueness in a number of regions. In this connection, it has become necessary to bring forward the date for holding the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. It was decided to convene it on 7 June this year.

The establishment of the post of president of the republic acquires great importance in the situation which has developed, participants in the plenum noted. The issue of the presidency and the restructuring of certain state administrative structures in connection with it is not simply an imitation of USSR decisions. As at the union level, the introduction of the post of an individual head of the republic will help to strengthen the mechanism for fulfillment of laws and other state decisions and, in other words, to accelerate the processes of perestroyka in the political, socioeconomic, interethnic, and other spheres.

It was decided to put forward a legislative initiative on establishing the post of president of Uzbekistan at the first session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

9 April Declared Day of Mourning in Georgia

LD2903083790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers adopted a decision in accordance with which, in memory of those who died tragically on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi and taking into account the wishes and requests of a wide section of the public, 9 April is declared a day of mourning in Georgia. On this day state flags should be lowered to half-mast on the territory of the republic, entertainment should be cancelled, and corresponding radio and television programs should be organized.